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URBAN AGE SOUTH AMERICA
In bringing the Urban Age to São Paulo, the London School of Economics  
and Deutsche Bank’s Alfred Herrhausen Society are confronting the changing 
realities of one of the most urbanised regions of the world. Like its seven 
predecessors, the eighth Urban Age conference addresses the social, 
economic and spatial conditions of urban South America through an 
interdisciplinary lens, focusing on the interconnected issues of security, 
mobility, climate change, governance, urban design and development.
Following in-depth analysis of New York, Shanghai, London, Mexico City, 
Johannesburg and Berlin – brought together in The Endless City book 
published earlier this year – the Urban Age in 2007 turned its attention to 
cities in India and now to São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Bogotá  
and Lima. In 2009, the focus will be on Istanbul and urban development  
in South-Eastern Europe, with a concluding Urban Summit and major  
exhibition in Berlin in 2010.
The South America Urban Age conference in São Paulo will be the largest  
and most complex of the series, bringing together 80 experts and civic 
leaders from over 25 cities from 14 countries. It follows a year of research 
and a series of workshops in London and São Paulo, as well as input drawn 
from submissions to the second annual Deutsche Bank Urban Age Award,  
created in 2007 to recognise and celebrate creative solutions to the 
challenges facing cities. Working closely with academic and institutional 
partners and by inviting speakers from around the world to share their  
urban experiences, the Urban Age conference offers a mirror to reflect  
on São Paulo’s problems and opportunities at a time of intense social, 
political and economic change.
Ricky Burdett
Director, Urban Age 
London School of Economics  
and Political Science
Wolfgang Nowak
Managing Director 
Alfred Herrhausen Society  
Deutsche Bank
SOURCES*
The data illustrated in this section has been derived from various official statistical sources, including the United Nations Statistics 
Division, Instituto Basileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (Brazil), Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (Colombia), 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (Argentina), Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica (Peru), Observatorio Urbano 
(Lima) and Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano (Buenos Aires) as well as the individual ministries, departments and secretariats for  
each city, state and country. 
A complete list of data sources is available at www.urban-age.net
CONTENT
SOUTH AMERICAN CITIES
FINE TUNING SOUTH AMERICAN CITIES 3
Deyan Sudjic
THE SPECIALISED DIFFERENCES OF GLOBAL CITIES 4
Saskia Sassen
BUILDING URBAN ASSETS IN SOUTH AMERICA 7
Jeroen Klink
POLITICS, POWER, CITIES 9
Enrique Peñalosa
THE MOBILITY DNA OF CITIES 11
Fabio Casiroli
CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 12
David Sattherwaite
THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 14 
Patricia Romero Lankao
FROM WASTE TO PUBLIC SPACE 15
Stela Goldenstein
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES 16 
Gareth Jones
URBAN AGE CITY DATA
URBAN AGE OVERVIEW 19
SOUTH AMERICAN CITIES 20
   SÃO PAULO 21
   RIO DE JANEIRO 22
   BUENOS AIRES 23
   BOGOTÁ 24
   LIMA 25
GOVERNING CITIES 26
CITIES AND REGIONS 29
URBAN FOOTPRINT 30
DENSITY 32
URBAN FORM 34
MOVING IN THE CITY 35
THE URBAN WORKFORCE 40
METROPOLITAN SCALE IN SÃO PAULO 42 
Regina Meyer
FOCUS ON SÃO PAULO
URBAN AGE CITY SURVEY 44 
Luci Oliveira and Ben Page
NEW URBAN OPPORTUNITIES 48  
Raul Juste Lores
THE MULTICULTURAL CITY 50 
José de Souza Martins
SÃO PAULO’S URBAN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE  52 
Ciro Biderman
MOBILITY AND THE URBAN POOR 53 
Alexandre Gomide
WORLDS SET APART 54 
Teresa Caldeira
SAFE SPACES IN SÃO PAULO 56 
Paula Miraglia
IMPLEMENTING URBAN CHANGE 59 
Nadia Somekh and Carlos Leite
INSERTS
DEUT CHE BANK URBAN AGE AWARD
URBAN AGE SOUTH AM RICA CONFERENCE PROGRAMME
The URBAN AGE CITY DATA section has been derived from various official statistical sources, including the United Nations Statistics Division, Instituto 
Basileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (Brazil), Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (Colombia), Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 
y Censos (Argentina), Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica (Peru), Observatorio Urbano (Lima) and Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano 
(Buenos Aires) as well as individual Ministries, Departments and Secretariats for each city, state and country. Complete data sources available  
at www.urban-age.net
SECURING AN URBAN FUTURE  3
URBAN AGE SOUTH AMERICA CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 2008
Urban Latin America is one thing. Urban South America  
is quite another. The former is dominated by Mexico City, 
by far the largest city of the two entities with Miami as its 
other putative, though offshore, capital. Perhaps that’s why 
South America is a construct that appeals to Brazil’s boosters. 
Geographical fine-tuning allows São Paulo's Metropolitan 
Region with 19 million people to make an unblushing claim 
to be the unchallenged leader, if not of Latin America, then 
at least of South America, of which it is indisputably the 
largest city. 
Even if São Paulo, for all its economic dynamism, 
sometimes suspects that it lags behind Mexico City –  
not just in size, but in its cultural and political clout – it  
is certainly way ahead of Rio de Janeiro. When Juscelino 
Kubitchek, Oscar Niemeyer’s greatest patron, transferred 
his government to establish a new kind of country with 
Brasília at its geographical heart, it was a huge political 
gesture. One unintended consequence was that it tilted  
the balance between the country’s two largest cities even 
further towards São Paulo. Rio is now a place in which  
once languid embassies are hemmed in by angry favelas. 
But that sense of confidence and self assertion,  
marked by the building of Brasília, is a reflection of the 
rather different status that South American cities have 
when compared with some of the other regions visited by 
Urban Age. By comparison with Shanghai, with its strongly 
centralist government, cities in South America display a 
much more sophisticated level of ‘social entrepreneurship’ 
and civic engagement. There, active pressure groups, religious, 
ethnic and political groups – in the wealthy districts as well as 
the highly organised favelas – are not beholden to central 
government. South America also has the benefit of civic 
initiatives that can pay off. Brazil has the example of Curitiba 
and beyond that, the work done by reforming mayors in 
Bogotá, a Metropolitan Area that with eight million  
people is far more relevant in terms of scale. 
In the last ten years, Bogotá has built more than 50 new 
schools, a tangible investment in the quality of life of some 
of the city’s poorest inhabitants. It has done a lot, not just to 
reduce truancy rates, but also to create a sense of inclusion. 
The city has initiated a vigorous programme to build new 
libraries, and an impressive public transport system based 
on special rapid transit bus lanes, which has succeeded in 
persuading commuters to leave their cars at home. Bogotá 
has tackled crime through its visible commitment to social 
justice, bringing its murder rate down from frightening 
levels, and raising literacy in its overwhelmingly young 
population. Bogotá shows its neighbours what can be done, 
given will, organisation, and rational priorities.
In the network of South American cities, São Paulo 
certainly eclipses Buenos Aires, which, despite its nineteenth- 
century classical architecture and its European airs has  
still to regain the equilibrium of its time in the sun in the 
1940s. Argentina’s farmers are still angry enough with  
their government’s economic policies to ignite the protest 
fires that left Buenos Aires trapped in a cloud of choking  
smoke last winter. 
Yet Brazil’s huge size, and population in excess of  
180 million, gives it a different urban pattern to that  
of its South American neighbours Argentina, Peru, and 
Colombia, who each have one overwhelmingly dominant 
city. One in every three Argentineans and Peruvians live  
in their capital cities compared to only one in every nine 
Brazilians who live in São Paulo. Lima's dominance in Peru 
has virtually destroyed the national system of cities, a trend 
that was not even halted by the dismantling of Lima’s public 
transport system in the early 1990s following the government’s 
espousal of the most aggressive neo-liberal reforms in 
South America. Given the city’s unique physical setting, 
constrained by mountains and the sea, and the absence of 
growth controls, Lima could develop into a 300 km long 
linear megacity that encroaches on adjacent low-value 
desert land; an unsustainable scenario in an environment 
where water supply and transport accessibility are already 
at their limits. 
São Paulo and Mexico City are very different models  
of what a city can be. Mexico City’s roots go back far into 
the Pre-Colombian past. São Paulo was a tiny colonial 
outpost until the beginning of the last century. São Paulo  
is now the largest city in one of the world’s most important 
new economies, representing the B in that uncomfortably 
named entity, BRIC, of which the other members are 
 India, China and Russia.
Brazil has the tenth largest market in the world, and  
an art biennale that has global clout. São Paulo’s GDP is  
in excess of US$ 10,000 per head, and it has 30,000 millionaires. 
It has an economy that has powered past that of Mexico,  
to become bracketed by booming India and Russia. A very 
large part of Brazil’s economic strength can be ascribed  
to the extraordinary growth of São Paulo. It has exploded 
in size from just 240,000 people in the early years of the last 
century. Despite a recent slowdown in its economic 
prowess, it has been a job-creating machine, absorbing 
successive waves of migrants: from Europe and Japan, as 
well as from Brazil’s poor North-East. By many measures,  
it is an unqualified success. 
And yet, it is a country and a city that cannot control 
crime. A year ago Brazil found itself unable to trust the 
safety of its skies and found itself paralysed by air traffic 
restrictions. The clichés about São Paulo come thick and 
fast. It has more private helicopters registered to its citizens 
than any other city in the world. Its prison system is in a 
permanent state of insurgency. Its tribes of street children 
are brutalised both by crime and the police. It is also the 
city whose reforming Mayor reclaimed the public realm by 
banning outdoor advertising, leaving the ghostly traces of 
billboards stripped of their posters and the charred surfaces 
revealed by neon signs that have been dismantled. And it is 
a centre for media that has created the telenovella, spreading 
a very particular kind of Brazilian culture to audiences 
around the world.
São Paulo is the classic second city, built on an industrial 
explosion from almost nothing. And it is that industrial 
base that makes the Brazilian economy different. It has 
moved far beyond the natural-resource based boom-and-
bust cycles of its neighbours. São Paulo could have been a 
Manchester, a Shanghai, or a Chicago. But where Rio lost 
the will to work after it ceded its capital-city status to 
Brasília, São Paulo is a second city that became a first city. 
Its infrastructure may be in a ramshackle state. Its crime 
really is an issue. But like Johannesburg, São Paulo has the 
vitality and drive that keeps it moving. São Paulo is an 
authentic metropolis with the racial diversity to prove it with  
a Japanese and an Arab quarter as well as a Balkan district. 
In urban and architectural terms, Brazil is still 
overshadowed by the remarkable generation that began  
by creating Rio’s great Corbusian monument: the Ministry 
of Education. It may have lost the remarkable landmark 
building skills of Oscar Niemeyer. The remarkable architectural 
talent of Lino Bo Bardi, who arrived from Italy in São Paulo 
after World War II has not yet been overtaken by her successors. 
But in the shape of the Campana brothers São Paulo has 
developed its visibility as a centre for creative design.
In urban terms the question that faces it is how to 
address the inequalities, and the fractured nature of its 
public services. If it does that it could yet find itself becoming  
a Tokyo, where prosperity and organisation overcame an 
equally random pattern of dizzyingly rapid growth.
FINE TUNING SOUTH  
AMERICAN CITIES
Built in 1953, Oscar Neimeyer’s Copan building in the centre of São Paulo is the largest structure in Brazil and has the largest floor area of any residential building  
in the world.
Shifting the Urban Age focus to development trends in South America, Deyan Sudjic 
outlines the contours of urban form that are shaping the economic and political narratives 
of life in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Bogotá and Lima. 
Deyan Sudjic is the Director of the Design Museum in 
London. Sudjic was formerly the design and architecture 
critic at The Observer and has published several books  
on the subjects of design, architecture, and cities.
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There is no such entity as ‘the global economy’ in the sense 
of a seamless economy with clear hierarchies. The reality 
consists of a vast number of highly particular global circuits: 
some are specialised and some are worldwide while others 
are regional. Different circuits contain different groups of 
countries and cities. For instance, Mumbai is today part  
of a global circuit for real estate development that includes 
firms from cities as diverse as London and Bogotá. Global 
commodity trading in coffee includes New York and São 
Paulo as major hubs. Buenos Aires is on a global commodity 
trading circuit that includes Chicago and Mumbai. Globally 
traded commodities – gold, butter, coffee, oil, sunflower seeds 
– are redistributed to a vast number of destinations, no matter 
how few the points of origin are in some cases. And the current 
collapse of major financial institutions involves particular sets 
of global circuits and hence does not affect all global cities in 
the same way. 
Not only global economic forces feed this proliferation 
of circuits. Migration, cultural work, and civil society’s 
struggle to preserve human rights, the environment, and 
social justice, also feed the formation and development of 
global circuits. Thus NGOs fighting for the protection of 
the rainforest function in circuits that include Brazil and 
Indonesia, the global media centres of New York and London, 
and the places where the major forestry companies and the 
main buyers of wood are headquartered, cities as diverse  
as Oslo, London and Tokyo. The other side of all these 
trends is an increasing urbanising of global networks.
Adopting the perspective of one of these cities reveals 
the diversity and specificity of its location on some, or 
many, of these circuits. These emergent inter-city geographies 
begin to function as an infrastructure for multiple forms of 
globalisation. The first step is to identify the specific global 
circuits on which a city is located. These will vary from city 
to city, depending on a city’s particular strengths, just as 
the groupings of cities vary on each circuit. All of this  
also shows us that the specialised differences of cities matter, 
and that there is less competition among cities and more  
of a global or regional division of functions than is 
commonly recognised. 
For example, the knowledge economies of São Paulo, 
Chicago and Shanghai all share a long history of servicing 
major heavy manufacturing sectors. Theirs are economic 
histories that global cities such as New York and London 
never developed. Out of these specialised differences comes 
a global division of functions. Thus a steel factory, a mining 
firm, or a machine manufacturer that wants to go global 
will go to São Paulo, Shanghai or Chicago for its legal, 
accounting, financial, insurance, economic forecasting,  
and other such specialised services. It will not go to  
New York or London for this highly particular servicing. 
Recognising the value of the specialised differences of 
cities and urban regions in today’s global economy shows 
how the deep economic history of a place matters for the 
type of knowledge economy that a city or a city-region  
ends up developing. This goes against the common view 
that globalisation homogenises economies. How much this  
deep economic history matters varies, and partly depends 
on the particulars of a city’s or a region’s economy. It matters 
more than is commonly assumed, and it matters in ways 
that are not generally recognised. Globalisation homogenises 
standards – for managing, for accounting, for building 
state-of-the-art office districts, and so on. But it needs 
diverse specialised economic capabilities. 
The capabilities needed to trade, finance, service, and 
invest globally need to be generated. They are not simply  
a by-product of the power of multinational firms and 
telecommunications advances. The global city is a platform 
for producing these types of global capabilities, even when 
this requires large numbers of foreign firms, as is the case 
in cities as diverse as Beijing and Buenos Aires. Each of  
the 70 plus major and minor global cities in the world 
contributes to the production of these capabilities in its 
home country, and thereby functions as a bridge between 
its national economy and the global economy. In this 
networked multi-city geography, most of the 250,000 plus 
multinational corporations in the world have kept their 
headquarters in their home countries, no matter the vast 
numbers of affiliates, subsidiaries or offshore sourcing sites 
they may have around the globe. So have Latin American 
multinationals with expanding global regional and global 
operations. Brazil’s over 1,200 multinational firms, the 
single highest concentration in the region, have basically 
kept their headquarters at home, with a strong 
concentration in São Paulo. 
Within a vast and diverse region such as Latin America 
it has now become clear that several cities function as key 
hubs, each representing a distinctive mix of strengths. In  
a top tier we find São Paulo, Mexico City and Santiago, and 
in a second tier Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Caracas, Montevideo, 
Monterrey, Quito and Lima. Finally, there is a global Latin 
American space economy that includes cities outside the 
geographic region: Miami and Madrid are prominent in 
this space. For instance, the 20 major banks headquartered 
in Central America have about 200 correspondent links with 
Miami, compared to 35 with New York. In a comprehensive 
survey asking businesses in Latin America what is the best 
city to do business in Latin America, America Economia 
found that Miami appeared regularly in the answers. 
THE SPECIALISED DIFFERENCES  
OF GLOBAL CITIES
Saskia Sassen describes how the specialised capacities of cities feeding the  
global economy have been misunderstood and overlooked by the attention given  
to homogenised standards for new state-of-the-art built environments.
19    Fortaleza
21    San Juan
22    Medellín
23    Puebla
24    Recife
25    San José
26    Salvador
27    León
28    Guayaquil
29    Rosario
30    Mendoza
31    Córdoba
32    Tijuana
33    Juárez
34    Caracas
35    Santo Domingo
36    Cali
37    Quito
38    Asunción
41    Santa Cruz
42    La Paz
40   Guatemala City
39    San Salvador
4    Mexico City
3    Santiago
2    Miami
1    São Paulo
5    Buenos Aires
6    Monterrey
7    Rio de Janeiro
8    Bogotá
9    Lima
10    Curitiba
12    Querétaro
11    Panama City
13    Porto Alegre
14    Belo Horizonte
15    Guadalajara
16    Florianópolis
17    Brasilia
18    Chihuahua
20    Montevideo
0 10050
TOP PLACES FOR BUSINESS  
IN LATIN AMERICA
This list ranks ‘urban competitiveness’ as measured by a 
composite of indicators that compare each Latin American city’s 
capacity to attract and keep companies doing business in 
their city. It was prepared by America Economia and analyses 
each city’s economic structures, geo-strategic advantages, 
service industries available for businesses, intellectual and 
human capital and services for executives.
Substantial local and foreign investment to revitalise the Puerto Madero waterfront in Buenos Aires – in the form of hotels, restaurants, shops and commercial and 
residential complexes – continued despite the onset of a deep depression in 2001 which cut Argentina’s GDP in half. 
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The other side of this dynamic is that for a firm to  
go global it has to put down its feet in multiple cities that 
function as entry points into national economies. This 
bridging capacity is critical: the multiple circuits connecting 
major and minor global cities are the live infrastructure  
of the global economy. It indicates that cities do not simply 
compete with each other. A global firm does not want one 
global city, even if it is the best in the world. Different 
groups of cities will be desirable, even if they have some 
serious negatives. This helps explain why there is no one 
‘perfect’ global city. Today’s global phase does not function 
through one imperial global capital that has it all.
A large study by MasterCard of 75 cities rates the top 
cities for worldwide commerce. Not one of them ranks at 
the top in all of the 100 factors, and not one gets the perfect 
score. London and New York, the two leading global cities, 
rank low in several aspects – neither is in the top ten when 
it comes to starting a business, or closing a business. If we 
consider a critical variable in the ‘ease of doing business’ 
indicator, part of which is ‘ease of entry and exit’, London 
ranks 43rd and New York ranks 56th. Perhaps most 
surprising, London ranks 37th on ‘contract enforcement’ 
and 21st on ‘investor protection’. It is Singapore that ranks 
number one in relation to all three variables. Less surprising is 
that New York ranks 34th on one of the data points for 
‘livability’: health and safety. In the global South, cities like 
Mumbai and São Paulo are in the top group for financial and 
economic services, but are brought down in their overall 
score by their low rankings in factors related to the ease  
of doing business and livability, given their especially low levels 
of well-being for vast sectors of the population. 
Overall, São Paulo is in a middle-ranked group of about 
20 cities framed at the top by Dubai and at the bottom by 
Shenzhen. The group includes some of the most powerful  
in the world. Furthermore, it is a power based on multiple 
and various conditions: cities as diverse as Beijing, Mumbai, 
Tel Aviv, Moscow, Johannesburg and Kuala Lumpur. This 
group ranks between Dubai’s 44th place with an overall 
score of 47, and Shenzhen’s 60th place with an overall score 
of 40. The scores for the top two cities are 79 for London 
and 72 for New York; further down, Amsterdam’s score  
is 60 followed by Madrid at 59, respectively the 10th and  
11th ranked global cities in the world for commerce. 
Some of São Paulo’s lowest rankings are in macro-
economic variables, such as ‘political and legal framework’ 
and ‘economic stability’. Cities at similar levels on these two 
indicators within South America are Bogotá, Caracas, and 
Buenos Aires, and, outside of South America, Johannesburg, 
Mumbai, Moscow, Budapest and Istanbul. Sub-indicators 
such as ‘dealing with licenses’ and ‘registering property’, 
where the city’s implementation of national regulations  
and laws can make a difference, point to a considerable 
variability in performance. São Paulo does not do better  
than in the basic macro-economic variables such as inflation.  
But Bogotá, Buenos Aires and Caracas all do much better 
on these two sub-indicators than they do on purely  
macro- economic variables, pointing to more successful 
implementation. 
This negative urban performance also comes through 
on the indicator measuring the ‘ease of doing business’.  
São Paulo ranks considerably below its overall ranking in 
the global set of 75 cities. With Dubai it is just the inverse: 
on ‘ease of doing business’ it does much better than its 
overall ranking. When disaggregated into sub-indicators, 
São Paulo is below its overall rank on ‘starting a business’, 
‘employing workers’, ‘closing a business’, ‘banking services’ 
and ‘contract enforcement’. São Paulo ranks well above its 
overall score on ‘investor protection’, ‘getting credit’, and 
‘ease of entry and exit’ – though on this last one Caracas 
does even better. 
São Paulo’s ranking of 16 on the ‘financial centre’ 
indicator sits sharply above its overall ranking, putting it  
in the top echelon of the global economy; Santiago, Mexico 
City, Buenos Aires and Bogotá also rank much higher on 
the ‘financial centre’ indicator than they do overall. The 
sharpest differentials are for São Paulo and Buenos Aires. 
On some of the sub-indicators São Paulo’s rank jumps to 
the top ten: ‘total number of derivatives contracts’ at 7, and 
‘total number of commodities contracts’ at 9. It ranks 12th 
globally in its ‘banking and financial services companies’, 
20th in ‘investment and securities firms’, 23rd in ‘equities 
trading’. Its lowest score on the financial dimension is 39th 
on ‘insurance companies’, which is still well above its overall 
rank. Similarly, Buenos Aires is in the top 20 for particular 
financial circuits – 14th in the number of ‘commodities 
contracts’ and 15th in the ‘value of bond trading’.
Clearly São Paulo is one of the major global financial 
centres in the world. Its overall score of 34.92 may not make 
that immediately evident. But the top-ranked financial 
centres are also well below the perfect score of 100: London 
TOP CITIES FOR WORLDWIDE COMMERCE
ECONOMIC STABILITY EASE OF DOING BUSINESS
LIVABILITYFINANCIAL CENTRE
0 10050
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has a score of 67.44, New York 54.60, Frankfurt 46.73,  
Seoul sits at 52.76, and Chicago 40.52 while Dubai is valued 
at 24.74, Atlanta at 8, and Edinburgh at 2. These ‘financial 
centre’ indicator scores are partly a function of a) the 
enormous weight of the major centres and b) the fact  
of multiple specialised types of financial circuits (equities, 
commodities, derivatives, bonds). This leaves even significant 
centres such as Dubai and Edinburgh with a very low 
relative score which can nonetheless override the fact that 
Dubai, for instance, ranks number one in ‘banking services’ 
along with most of the top 20 centres, except for Chicago at 
41, as it has lost all its major banks, Seoul at 57 and Tokyo at 23.
São Paulo gets its second highest indicator ranking, at 
26 as a business centre. Its highest score is for ‘volume of 
commercial real estate development’, placing it 4th, right, 
below Shenzhen, which has seen a vast building boom. Even 
so, São Paulo’s contrasts among its sub-indicator rankings 
are sharp, placing it 49th for international airport traffic.
In this growing number of global cities and in their 
differences we see the larger story of a shift to a multi-polar 
world. The loss of position of US cities compared with the 2006 
survey is part of this shift: Los Angeles dropped from the 10th 
to the 17th rank, and Boston from 12th to 23rd, while European 
and Asian cities moved up in the top ranks, notably Madrid 
going from 17th to 11th. These shifts give added content to the 
loss of position of the United States as the dominant economic 
and military power. It is not that the United States is suddenly 
poorer, it is that other regions of the world are rising and that 
there are multiple forces feeding these multi-sited economic, 
political, and cultural strengths.
The recent growth of informal economies in major 
global cities in North America, Western Europe, and to  
a lesser extent, Japan, raises a number of questions about 
what is and what is not part of today’s advanced urban 
economies. Three trends suggest that much of today’s 
informalisation is actually linked to key features of advanced 
urban capitalism. One is the sharp emergence and growth  
of informal economies in the major global cities of the North. 
Secondly, the mostly overlooked proliferation of an informal 
economy of creative professionals – artists, architects, 
designers, software developers, event choreographers, etc. 
working in these cities. Finally, the new types of informalisation 
of work actually function as the informal equivalent of the 
formal deregulation in finance, telecommunications and 
most other advanced economic sectors pursued in the name 
of ‘flexibility and innovation’. The difference is that while 
formal deregulation was costly, and was paid through tax 
revenue as well as private capital, informalisation is low- 
cost and sits largely on the backs of workers and informal 
firms themselves. 
This new creative professional informal economy greatly 
expands opportunities and networking potentials for these 
artists and professionals to operate at least partly informally.  
It allows them to function in the interstices of urban and 
organisational spaces often dominated by large corporate 
actors and to escape the corporatising of creative work.  
In this process they contribute a very specific feature of the 
new urban economy: its innovativeness and a certain type 
of frontier spirit. We can see it as a reinvention of Jane 
Jacobs’ urban economic creativity. 
Conditions akin to those in global cities of the North 
may also be producing a new type of informal economy in 
global cities of the south, including a professional creative 
informal economy. Their emergence may be far less visible 
than in the North because they are partly submerged under 
the old informal economies that continue to operate in  
the global South, and are still more a result of poverty and 
survival than of the needs of advanced economic sectors.1 
In brief, the same politico-economic restructuring that 
led to the new urban economy emerging in the late 1980s 
also contributed to the formation of new informal economies. 
The decline of the manufacturing dominated industrial 
complex that characterised most of the twentieth century, 
and the rise of a new, service-dominated economic complex 
provide the general context within which we need to place 
informalisation if we are to go beyond a mere description  
of instances of informal work.
Thus while much has been said about the global economy 
homogenising national economies, these urban facts actually 
point in the opposite direction: different cities have different 
strengths. Global firms and markets, but also cultural 
enterprises, want many global cities because each of these 
cities expands the global platform for operations, and 
because each is a bridge between the global and the 
particularities of national economies and societies. This also 
underlines that global cities are built, developed and made. 
The rebuilding of central areas that is occurring in all  
of these cities, whether downtown, at the edges, or in both 
areas, is part of this new economic role. Rebuilding key 
parts of these cities as platforms for a rapidly growing range 
of global activities and flows, from economic to cultural 
and political also explains why architecture, urban design 
and urban planning have all become more important and 
visible in the last two decades. And it explains the growing 
competition for space in these cities and the emergence of  
a new type of politics, one centred in the right to the city.
Whether all of this is good or bad for the larger social 
fabric of these cities and their countries is a complex matter, 
and the subject of many debates. But the fact that global 
firms need cities, and indeed groups of cities, should enable 
the political, corporate and civic leadership in those cities 
to negotiate for more benefits for their cities from global 
firms. This could lead to overall positive outcomes if the 
governing classes can see that these global economic 
functions will grow better in a context of a strong and 
prosperous middle class rather than the sharp inequality 
and polarity that exists among a growing share of households. 
European global cities have done better than global cities  
in the United States precisely for this reason.
As was evident at the Urban Age India conference, the 
trends in the new rising global cities of the South have seen 
the now familiar trends of the North: the growing numbers 
of the very rich and of the very poor, along with the expansion 
of the impoverished old middle classes. What there will be 
less of in these cities is the modest middle classes and the 
modest-profit making economic sectors that once were the 
major presence in these cities: they are critical to the urban 
economy because they have incomes which are most likely 
to be fully spent in the city’s economy. Their presence is a 
built-in resistance to the spatial and social reshaping of 
cities along extreme class lines. Finally, my most pessimistic 
scenario is that conflict is now wired into urban space itself, 
partly due to gentrification and displacement and the resulting 
politics for space. In some cities, for instance New York and 
Los Angeles, it takes the form of a diffuse petty criminality 
and mostly violence of the disadvantaged on the disadvantaged. 
In other cities, the European ones but also the rising Shanghais, 
it takes the form of new racisms that can lead to physical 
violence. And yet in others, perhaps São Paulo or Rio de 
Janeiro, at its most extreme it takes the form of partial sporadic 
urban warfare, including warfare in the space of prisons. 
In my view we urgently need to innovate on the front  
of urban governance. The old bureaucratic ways will not  
do. This is a whole new urban era –with its share of positive 
potentials and its share of miseries. In cities our governance 
challenges become concrete and urgent. National states can 
keep talking; urban leadership needs to act.
Saskia Sassen is the Lynd Professor of Sociology and a 
member of The Committee on Global Thought at Columbia 
University. She has written extensively on topics such as 
globalisation and urbanisation.
BUSINESS CENTRE SUB-INDICATOR RANKINGS
BUSINESS  
CENTRE RANK
CITY PORT CARGO 
TRAFFIC
AIR PASSENGER 
AND AIRCRAFT 
TRAFFIC 
AIR CARGO  
TRAFFIC 
INTERNATIONAL  
AIR PASSENGER 
TRAFFIC
5 STAR  
HOTELS
COMMERCIAL 
REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT
17 Madrid 46 12 40 11 4 17
18 Milan 48 17 23 12 19 9
19 Beijing 63 15 17 32 13 38
20 Atlanta 49 3 21 45 21 44
21 Toronto 38 18 31 24 33 5
22 Osaka 16 36 18 37 59 15
23 Dallas 39 6 20 61 61 60
24 Sydney 17 31 24 40 26 33
25 Shenzhen 4 53 25 75 69 21
26 São Paulo 65 24 30 49 14 4
27 Istanbul 29 33 41 29 24 29
28 Moscow 57 16 47 16 63 20
29 Barcelona 12 27 63 22 37 42
30 Houston 18 8 34 53 71 68
31 Mumbai 36 39 29 54 12 36
The 2008 Worldwide Centres of Commerce Index by MasterCard compiles 100 factors which cover a wide range of conditions – from macro-level factors such as 
‘political and legal frameworks’ to the particulars of how easy it is to execute an import or export operation, how many days it takes to open and to close a firm, as 
well as livability and a city’s global recognition. For example, the macro level ‘Business Centre’ ranking is compiled from the six sub-indicator rankings listed above. 
It is impossible to show the whole data set and one of the key values of the study, which is the variability among cities on diverse indicators and sub-indicators, 
including among cities that share a similar overall value.
BUSINESS CENTRE
1 For one of the most detailed accounts on four favelas in São Paulo and how they are connected 
to the new economic trends see Simone Buechler’s chapter in Deciphering the Global: Its Scales, 
Spaces and Subjects (Routledge 2007).
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The development trajectory of the South American continent 
in the 1980s has commonly been interpreted by macro-
economists in terms of ‘the lost decade’, specifically in light 
of the debt crisis and the subsequent cumbersome structural 
adjustment programmes. Nevertheless, it can be claimed 
that the region suffered a second, perhaps less visible setback 
in the 1990s, from which it has been trying to recover only 
recently. More specifically, while many South American 
countries witnessed an intense socio-economic, technological 
and regulatory adjustment process, with often dramatic 
impacts on cities and metropolitan areas, there was a 
surprising lack of a solid and transparent institutional  
and legal framework that could guide transformations  
in South American city-regions and metropolitan areas  
in a sustainable manner. The institutional vacuum in 
metropolitan areas was all the more dramatic considering 
the continent’s relatively urbanised profile, in which large 
city regions had often been the spatial nodes of earlier 
national import substitutions strategies, and where, to some 
extent, challenges at the national and the metropolitan or 
regional scale – social exclusion, environmental degradation 
and overall loss in competitiveness – had become increasingly 
interdependent. Moreover, as has been analysed extensively 
by South American scholars of urban development, the 
continent’s cities and city regions were entering this new 
stage of the internationalisation process when historical 
deficits, both in terms of access to basic services, land and 
sustainable and predictable sources of finance, had, to say 
the least, not been settled satisfactorily; as a matter of  
fact, there was suspicion that in many South American 
metropolitan areas disparities had actually been growing 
during a large part of the 1990s. 
A few examples to illustrate the point. Greater Santiago 
generates about half of Chile’s GDP, while approximately 
two thirds of the country’s population is concentrated in 
the city regions of Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepcíon. 
Although the Chilean development model has generally 
been recognised for its achievements in terms of growth 
with poverty reduction, Santiago has increasingly been 
facing rapid sprawl, reduction of environmental quality, 
socio-spatial segregation and escalating intra-metropolitan 
disparities. Recent theoretical work on the spatial evolution 
of Greater Santiago has confirmed a (postmodern) pattern 
of fragmented land uses, privatisation of public spaces and 
social-spatial segregation, as reflected in the proliferation of 
gated (vertical and horizontal) communities, often directly 
connected to specific workplaces by (frequently privately 
financed) motorways, the rise of completely new towns and 
isolated industrial, commercial and technological parks  
and districts. At the same time, this patchwork of cities is 
situated in an institutional limbo, particularly considering 
the fact that Chile doesn’t have specific arrangements for 
metropolitan areas and agglomerations. This is all the more 
worrying particularly for Santiago, where governance is 
fragmented over three provinces (one being Santiago itself, 
which is in turn subdivided into 32 municipalities). 
Along the same lines, the agglomeration of Greater 
Buenos Aires, although not existing as a formal political 
and administrative body as such, but nevertheless loosely 
defined as the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the 
surrounding 32 cities, concentrates approximately half of 
the production and a third of the population of the  
country. In the 1990s, the city region was the central stage 
of a traumatic process of productive restructuring and 
de-industrialisation. The absence of clear metropolitan 
governance structures, reflected in a complex and overlapping 
set of responsibilities allocated between a strong province, 
the federated Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, peripheral 
local governments and the institutions of the national 
government, made it all the more difficult to develop effective 
strategies to deal with the rapidly growing intra-metropolitan 
disparities and a pattern of environmental degradation.  
It was not that surprising, therefore, that during the 1990s 
Greater Buenos Aires witnessed a proliferation of suburban 
gated communities and metropolitan sprawl. 
According to 2003 data, Greater Bogotá, roughly composed 
of the central city (7 million inhabitants) and 24 surrounding 
municipalities (giving a total population of about 8.2 million), 
concentrated approximately 30 per cent of the national 
GDP (and 40 per cent of national industrial GDP), and 
about one fifth of the national population. The opening up 
of the Colombian trading regime reinforced the region’s 
attractiveness and its role as the main national economic 
powerhouse. By the year 2010, the city-region is expected  
to grow to 9.6 million inhabitants. In the last few years, the 
traditional polarised relationship between the central city 
of Bogotá and its surrounding municipalities has given way 
to a gradual process of regionalisation of production and 
land uses. Thus, several surrounding municipalities have 
been growing much faster than Bogotá itself; the lack of 
physical space, and the relatively higher land prices have 
also induced industries to increasingly locate themselves 
directly outside the central city, attracting subsequent 
additional investments in the tertiary sector and in 
complementary infrastructure to such areas as Sabana.  
This process has only increased the stakes to develop 
adequate arrangements to deal with the many challenges 
the region faces: socio-spatial exclusion (some 40 per cent  
of metropolitan income of Greater Bogotá is concentrated  
in the hands of the upper 7 per cent), the rapid increase  
in Bogotá river’s pollution levels, the inter-municipal 
transportation of freight and people as well as land use 
planning in environmentally sensitive areas. The Regional 
Roundtable of the Bogotá-Cundinamarca region, launched 
in 2001 and involving the national government, the state 
government of Cundinamarca, the city of Bogotá itself as  
well as 116 surrounding municipal administrations and three 
environmental special purpose districts, was an innovative 
approach, aimed at creating an informal multi-stakeholder 
policy so as to bring together a fragmented metropolitan 
system. However, recent evaluations by the United Nations 
Center for Regional Development, which has been supporting 
this process since the beginning, have stressed the need to 
strengthen these mechanisms with more formal arrangements.
The Brazilian scenario of the 1990s was no exception  
to this overall pattern of intense national socio-economic 
restructuring coupled with the lack of an institutional, 
financial and managerial framework to collectively work  
on a strategic agenda for metropolitan areas. An agenda 
like that would have established key priorities in order to 
both capture the potential economies of agglomeration on 
the one hand, and to reduce the historical social deficits in 
metropolitan areas on the other hand. Like in other countries 
in the region, this agenda didn’t emerge in Brazil. The 
metropolitan scale may have been associated with the 
military regime, which indeed allocated resources on the 
basis of an authoritarian metropolitan logic, and this may 
explain why the issue of city regional governance was 
practically neglected by the national constitutional assembly of 
1988, heavily influenced as it was by new stakeholders such as 
the mayors and the social movements. These actors pushed 
for an agenda in terms of decentralisation and democratisation, 
which, by and large, neglected the issue of inter-municipal 
and inter-sector territorial coordination. 
Thus, during the 1990s, Brazil’s industrial heartland  
of São Paulo, and specifically the so-called ABC region 
(sometimes labelled the Brazilian Detroit), which concentrated 
the bulk of the country’s car industry and a substantial  
part of its petrochemical complex, had to face the negative 
consequences of the changing Brazilian macro-economic 
regime without any consolidated framework for metropolitan 
governance. While the national government emphasised  
BUILDING URBAN ASSETS  
IN SOUTH AMERICA
A new waste management plan is expected to help keep the streets of downtown Buenos Aires clean. Uncoordinated and fragmented policies for services - with the 
excption of solid waste management - across the metropolitan area are largely to blame for Greater Buenos Aires’ environmental degradation.
In an in-depth overview of the various forms of regional governance across South 
America, Jeroen Klink analyses the institutional capacity of metropolitan areas  
to influence and restructure the urban economy
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a strategy of deregulation and retreat from active  
industrial and technological policies, the restructuring of 
big industry in the region caused high unemployment and 
underemployment, increasing poverty rates and social-
spatial exclusion. Real estate speculation and lack of local 
government control over land markets also triggered a 
proliferation of slums and irregular settlements in the 
outskirts of the São Paulo Metropolitan Region, frequently  
in environmentally sensitive and watershed protected areas. 
Being a highly politicised region that had participated 
actively in the process of Brazilian re-democratisation,  
and counting with proactive segments such as the labour 
unions and the social movements, an innovative response 
was organised by local stakeholders, which collectively 
created and negotiated the elaboration of an inter-municipal 
consortium, a Regional Chamber for Participatory Strategic 
Planning and an Economic Development Agency. In spite 
of the innovative character and the entrepreneurial drive 
behind some of these initiatives, it should not distract 
attention from the fact that, at least until recently, the low 
financial capacity, the weak institutional recognition within 
Brazilian fiscal federalism and the high dependence on 
individual leadership (particularly late Mayor Celso Daniel 
from the city of Santo André, and leaders from the labour 
unions and industry), proved to be bottlenecks in increasing 
the scale and continuity of this informal system of regional 
governance, and replicating it in other metropolitan areas. 
The institutional and political vacuum that surrounds 
metropolitan regions has even affected cities that were 
considered to be model cases of good urban governance  
and urban planning in the South American context. For 
example, the city of Curitiba has been widely benchmarked 
as a sustainable and well-planned city, specifically so in its 
capacity to guide city growth through financially accessible 
and good quality public transportation linked to land use 
planning. Recent developments have shown that this picture 
does not quite match the reality of Greater Curitiba. Along 
the same lines as other South American experiences, the 
process of metropolisation, which is reflected in an increasingly 
dense pattern of functional interdependencies between the 
central city and its outskirts, has revealed the deficiencies  
of the Curitiba model in a painfully clear manner. For instance, 
while development in the eastern zone was proscribed in the 
1978 metropolitan master plan and its recent update, since 
that area concentrates the environmentally sensitive areas 
and the watersheds, and provides approximately 70 per cent 
of the urban water supply, this was exactly where urban 
growth occurred. Part of this distorted land use pattern 
could be explained by the aggressive subsidies and tax 
incentives that had been given to attract industries away 
from the more expensive locations in Brazil (particularly 
the State of São Paulo). At the same time, Curitiba’s highly 
acclaimed integrated public transportation system has not 
been able to cope with the rapid growth in inter-municipal 
journeys between the central city and the metropolitan 
outskirts. Since the late 1990s, congestion and private car 
ownership have grown exponentially. 
It should be acknowledged that governments in  
South America have increasingly become aware of this 
interdependence between what happens in their metropolitan 
areas and national welfare. The Brazilian government, for 
example, created a new framework law on inter-municipal 
consortia to strengthen the institutional and organisational 
capacity of these bodies and allow their transformation  
from rather loose planning institutions into bodies that  
are also capable of effectively implementing city, regional  
and metropolitan functions, such as transport, watershed 
planning and management, solid waste disposal and 
economic development, among others. Nevertheless, laws 
by themselves are no substitute for political leadership; a 
remarkably small number of inter-municipal consortia has 
been created since the promulgation of the law, probably 
also in light of a ‘zero sum mentality’ of some of the local 
leadership. This lack of a strategic view could well represent 
a concrete bottleneck in terms of moving towards a scenario  
in which local governments voluntarily plan, finance and 
implement services of common interest, either with state 
and national support or not. Ironically, the ABC region’s 
inter-municipal consortium mentioned above, which 
proved both to be one of the more innovating initiatives in 
the 1990s in terms of city regional governance and which 
had also lobbied successfully for the new federal legislation 
on public consortia, has to date not adapted its legal and 
organisational structure in order to make use of the 
potential offered by the law. 
As mentioned earlier, social movements and non-
governmental organisations, although not always holding  
a metropolitan perspective, did succeed in pressing for 
improvements in the transparency and effectiveness of 
governance systems in South American city-regions. In this 
respect, the Brazilian innovative and progressive legislation 
on the so-called ‘Statute of the City’ is a paradigmatic example; 
its elaboration and approval in 2001 can be considered a direct 
result of more than a decade of political mobilisation by 
housing movements, planners, intellectuals and professional 
associations, focused on improving urban land markets. 
The legislation has allowed for the implementation of 
municipal masterplans that incorporate a series of 
instruments – special low-income zoning, development 
exactions, progressive land taxes on vacant land, etc. – 
which, at least in theory, increase the leverage of local 
governments over the functioning of urban land markets. 
Nevertheless, the instrument has yet to provide a concrete 
solution to the dilemma of uncoordinated and fragmented 
land uses at the metropolitan level. As a matter of fact,  
the law has no built-in mechanism for the coordination of 
individual municipal masterplans; thus, in practice, the 
bulk of Brazilian metropolitan land markets is guided by  
a patchwork of masterplans that have been elaborated on 
the basis of different criteria and methodologies, without 
incorporating a more strategic view on the sustainable 
development of the metropolitan areas as such. 
Perhaps this is one of the key lessons that emerges from 
the intense process of urban and economic restructuring  
in the last two decades or so in these city-regions: although 
occasional successes have improved the governance of these 
areas, involving both public sector innovation, decentralisation 
and mobilisation of non-governmental stakeholders, the 
challenges to systematically reduce socio-spatial exclusion, 
organise fragmented and speculative land use markets, 
confront environmental degradation, intra-metropolitan 
disparities and loss of economic competitiveness remain 
impressive. In effect, it seems that the decentralisations and 
democratisations of the 1990s were only the first steps in 
what can be considered to be a collective learning process 
that has only just started. In that sense, both the fragmented 
pattern of functional regionalism in Greater Buenos Aires, 
the intense conflicts between the central city of Curitiba  
and its peripheral towns regarding the management,  
finance and organisation of particular services, the Regional 
Roundtable of Bogotá-Cundinamarca and, last but not least, 
the challenge faced in the ABC region in Metropolitan  
São Paulo in terms of developing a regional public consortium 
that takes advantage of the new federal framework legislation, are 
in effect different sides of this complex and multifaceted 
collective learning process. 
National and state government should stimulate the 
negotiation and mobilisation of these territorial pacts aimed 
at the collective creation of public goods in metropolitan areas. 
After all, it is the socio-economic and political complexity 
as well as the richness of city-regions and metropolitan 
areas that allow us to go beyond the abstract macro-economic 
dichotomy of inflation control versus growth, which in fact 
has narrowed down so much of the debate on the future 
development of South American countries. 
Development of new concrete and brick houses in Rocinha, the largest favela in Brazil located on the hillside of Rio de Janeiro, is largely driven by auto-construction. 
Even so, basic sanitation and infrastructure is better here than most favelas across the country due to systematic community intervention.
Jeroen Klink is the Director of Institute of Science, Technology 
and Society of the Federal University of the ABC Region in 
São Paulo. Klink was formerly the Secretary for Local 
Economic Development in Santo André.
The bulk of Brazilian metropolitan land 
markets is guided by a patchwork of 
masterplans... without incorporating a 
more strategic view on the sustainable 
development of the metropolitan areas.
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There is not a scientifically or technically correct or incorrect 
way of making a city. Defining what makes a good city is 
more a matter of heart and soul than of engineering. It is 
more akin to an art than to a science. Yet, despite the subjective 
nature of urbanism, a government must adopt a vision and 
promote it, make decisions, build, define rules and enforce 
them – it must not only envision but also enact the city.  
If a good city is society’s collective work of art, then its 
government acts as the piece’s conductor and often its 
composer as well. 
Urbanism has to do with community and society 
decisions, enforced through some form of government.  
It is not possible to leave it up to private entrepreneurs 
whether there should be pavements or how wide they 
should be, how tall buildings should be, whether there 
should be parks and, if yes, where or how big they should 
be, and whether there should be a mixture of residential 
and commercial buildings. The fact that government 
intervention is essential, together with the reality that  
there are multiple possible designs for a city, makes 
urbanism one of the few remaining realms of ideology. 
In actual urban environments, Adam Smith’s notion 
that individuals seeking their own benefit brings about  
the best for society as a whole is not always valid. An 
entrepreneur may want to build a high-rise building in  
the midst of a three-storey townhouse neighbourhood;  
but it is also a logical individual decision to drive to work  
in the comfort of one’s private car, yet if all the residents  
of a large city were to do that, it would end in a traffic jam. 
Should the owner of rural land near a city be allowed to do 
whatever he wants with it, including, for example, use it to 
build a low-density gated community, far from the reach of 
public transport? How should scarce road space be distributed 
between pedestrians, bicycles, buses and cars? It would 
seem that public transport should be given priority over 
private cars in the allocation of road space, if democracy 
and the public good are to prevail.
There are at least two types of equality we can 
realistically strive for in our time: the first is equality in 
quality of life, particularly for children. All children should 
have the same opportunities to develop their potential and 
be happy, have access to green spaces and play areas, to 
libraries and waterfronts. The second kind of equality – 
which is still within our reach – is to make truly effective 
the principle that the public good must prevail over private 
interest. The first article in every constitution stipulates that 
all citizens are equal before the law. Consequently, some 
state explicitly that the public good must prevail over 
private interest. In cities the interests of a few individuals 
often conflict with those of the community as a whole. It is 
the role of politics and governmental institutions to manage 
those conflicts and find ways of promoting inclusion and 
social justice. 
According to the United Nations, there will be nearly 
2.8 billion new inhabitants in cities in developing countries 
over the next 40 years. Yet the growth of those cities will be 
more than proportional to their population growth for the 
following reasons: households will have fewer members and 
thus more dwellings will be needed for the same amount of 
people; more economic development means that institutional 
buildings take up a larger share of city space; and, people 
demand larger homes as their income grows. It is in cities 
in developing countries that many of the core urban and 
environmental challenges are concentrated in this century. 
And issues of equality and inclusion are particularly 
relevant there, as their societies are highly unequal. 
Inequality and exclusion can be even more painful than 
poverty, but the way we create and organise cities may  
be a powerful instrument in constructing equality and  
social justice. 
Public space dedicated to pedestrians can be a means  
to a more inclusive society. During work time the highest 
executive and the lowest-ranking employee may be equally 
satisfied or dissatisfied; in public space they both meet 
colleagues and do their jobs. It is only during leisure time 
that an abyss separates their quality of life. The upper-
income executive goes home to a large house, probably  
with a garden, has access to sports clubs, country houses, 
restaurants, expensive cultural activities and trips abroad. 
The low-income person and his or her children live in a 
very small dwelling and the only alternative to television  
for spending their leisure time is public space accessible  
for pedestrians. Pavements, bicycle lanes, plazas, parks, 
promenades, waterfronts and sports facilities show respect 
for human dignity and begin at least to compensate for 
inequality in other realms. 
Access to green spaces may be the most formidable 
barrier to inclusion, not only now but also in the future. 
Until recently, few people believed the poor would own 
refrigerators, ordinary telephones, much less mobile ones, 
colour televisions, washing machines or sophisticated  
hi-fi systems, all of which are becoming common, even  
in lower-income homes in developing countries. Lower-
income citizens will soon all have access to computers and  
a wide array of electronic equipment. What they will not 
have is access to green spaces and sports facilities – unless 
governments act today. Neglecting to acquire and secure 
open spaces today is not something that can be remedied 
easily in the future. It would be extremely difficult to 
purchase and demolish hundreds of buildings in order to 
create green spaces. And lacking such spaces severely affects 
quality of life, inclusion and as a result the legitimacy of 
social organisation. Beyond the basic public pedestrian 
space, which should be found throughout the city, a good 
city should have at least one, and ideally several, ‘grand’ public 
spaces. That is to say, spaces of such quality that even the 
wealthiest members of society cannot avoid frequenting them. 
A protected bicycle lane in a city in a developing 
country is a powerful symbol, showing that a citizen on a 
US$ 30 bicycle is as important as one in a US$ 30,000 car.  
A protected bicycle lane along every street is not a cute 
architectural fixture, but a basic democratic right – unless 
one believes that only those with access to a car have a right 
to safe mobility. Quality pavements and bicycle lanes show 
respect for human dignity, regardless of the level of economic 
development of a society. Many citizens in economically 
advanced societies cannot drive, because they are too young 
or too old, or because they have some kind of disability.  
A democratic city must be designed for the most vulnerable 
of its members. 
It is with regards to transport that governments have 
most dramatically failed to comply with democratic principles 
in cities in developing countries. There is a fight for the 
scarce road space between cars and public transport, 
pedestrians and cyclists; and there is a battle for public 
funds between car owners demanding more road infrastructure 
and lower-income citizens demanding schools, sewage 
systems, housing, parks and other basic infrastructures.  
The minority of car owners usually command the most 
political clout and thus direct public investment to road 
infrastructure aimed at reducing peak-hour traffic jams, 
leaving the needs of the poor unattended. Both urban and 
rural roads ignore or take poor care of pedestrians’ and 
cyclists’ infrastructure needs. 
There is no ‘natural’ level of car use in a city. Mature  
city governments such as those of Paris, New York, Tokyo, 
Berlin or London, explicitly or implicitly defined long ago 
that regardless of traffic conditions no more road infrastructure 
would be built in their core areas. Resources would be 
concentrated on public transport. If governments in 
Manhattan or Paris had built more and bigger roads, there 
would be increased car use in those cities. On the other 
hand, if these governments had built fewer or smaller roads, 
car use would have decreased there. In summary, it is the 
amount of infrastructure available for cars that determines 
the level of car use. 
The governments of less-advanced cities are reluctant to 
make the inevitable decision: no more road infrastructure 
POLITICS, POWER, CITIES
Initiatives to improve rapidly growing informal neighbourhoods of Bogotá have created new public space while enhancing services and the area’s transport infrastructure.
In an excerpt from ‘The Endless City’, Enrique Peñalosa describes the urgent need 
for governments to create socially inclusive and well-designed public spaces and cities.
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in the built city. Resources will be concentrated not on more 
or bigger roads but on creating, expanding and improving 
public transport. From then on, car use must be restricted 
explicitly through means such as number plate-based use 
restrictions, tolls, parking limitations; or implicitly, through 
traffic. Many advanced cities have seen famous citizen 
battles against urban motorway projects. One of the most 
high-profile is Jane Jacobs’ fight against the Lower Manhattan 
cross-town expressway. In most advanced cities today 
‘transport policy’ really means finding ways of achieving 
lower levels of car use and a higher share for public transport, 
cycling and walking. In cities in developing countries 
‘transport policy’ still largely means the opposite: how to 
facilitate more car use. In societies in developing countries, 
where less than 50 per cent of households do not have a car, 
having one is held as a visible certificate of belonging to 
society’s higher echelons. Upper-income people in less-
developed and highly unequal societies tend to see using 
public transport alongside lower-income citizens as an 
affront to their position in society. Although they gladly  
use public transport when they travel to more advanced 
countries, they rarely go near it in their own.
This partly because a city that makes too much room for 
fast- moving cars becomes less humane and loses quality  
of life, but also because road-infrastructure investments 
primarily benefiting higher-income citizens, redirect public 
funds away from schools, parks, housing and many other 
needs. The most vulnerable members of society, such as the 
poor, the elderly, children and disabled citizens, are not 
normally conscious of their interests and rights and do not 
have much political influence. A democratic government 
must act as their proxy and confront powerful minorities 
on their behalf. It must convince even upper-income groups 
that car-use restriction benefits them as well in the longer 
term. But in the end it must wield its decision-making 
power in order to implement its vision regardless of 
political costs. 
A frequent source of inequality is the division of cities 
or metropolitan areas into several, sometimes dozens of 
municipalities. Unfettered market forces create a situation 
in which expensive neighbourhoods for wealthier citizens 
attract similar high-income developments around them. 
Land around high-income developments tends to be 
expensive and normally low-income neighbourhoods  
will not be established there. The reverse is true too: a 
high-income housing development will not usually be 
developed next to a low-income one. 
A healthy, large city will have both low- and high-
income groups. Higher-income groups provide tax funds  
to tend to the needs of lower-income groups. They pay high 
taxes and often do not even use many services provided  
by the city: they use private healthcare services and their 
children go to private nurseries and private schools. 
Municipalities with lower-income citizens have a greater 
need of social services provided by government, yet no 
possibility to muster the necessary funds to provide them. 
Inequality ensues. Blunt extraction of funds from wealthier 
municipalities in order to transfer them to lower-income 
ones does not solve the problem: it has been found that 
those who spend funds not generated by themselves tend to 
do so inefficiently. To make matters worse, poorer citizens 
with lower levels of education tend to be easy prey to 
demagogues and corrupt politicians.
While there may be historical reasons for the existence 
of several municipalities within one city, once they are  
part of a large, modern metropolitan area there is little 
justification for them. Most citizens cross municipal 
borders unaware of their boundaries, except of course when 
the absurdity of such political subdivision is so extreme 
that public transport has to turn back at the border of the 
municipality, as happens in São Paulo. Long-term planning 
also becomes complicated when such subdivisions exist. 
Even the construction of a critical road artery or rail line 
becomes problematic. When different political parties 
control different municipalities, more problems arise, as  
has been the case in Mexico City. Bureaucratic expenses  
of many small municipalities are higher than those of one 
large one, and often the level of professional competence  
is lower within the smaller municipalities.
For these reasons Canada has merged nearly 1,000 
municipalities over the last decade, achieving more social 
justice, lower bureaucratic expenses and better long-term 
planning. In Johannesburg several municipalities were also 
merged after the end of the apartheid regime, in order to 
achieve greater equity. Higher-income citizens tend to oppose 
these mergers, as some of their funds will subsequently have  
to be redistributed to lower-income areas. Many small-town 
politicians also oppose them as they may end up in an 
unelectable position, or simply because they prefer to be, as the 
saying goes, the head of a mouse rather than the tail of a lion. 
Innovations are always difficult to implement. The 
status quo is maintained through a majority support, while 
ideas for change start with only a minority behind them. 
Government must act on behalf of the majority and also  
of the most vulnerable members of society, but it must also 
act on behalf of future generations. It is not possible for 
governments to provide all citizens with individual goods, 
yet it is possible to provide quality public goods and services: 
schools, libraries, transport and green space. Moreover, once 
citizens achieve a certain income level, it is easier to increase 
well-being through public goods than through private goods: 
through a concert hall, a green area, a waterfront. 
Inequality permeates everything around us so pervasively 
that it is difficult to differentiate between what is inevitable 
– or tolerable inequality – and that which could or should 
be altered. From today’s perspective it seems that the social 
changes achieved by the French Revolution were obvious, 
almost natural, since the injustices redressed were so 
flagrant. However such injustices were not considered 
flagrant and not even evident before that moment in time. 
In the same way, we are often not aware of many cases 
around us in which the public good does not prevail over 
private interest. Investments in flyovers to minimise traffic 
jams for upper-income groups seem normal. The poor in 
the same city might lack schools or basic sanitation and 
sometimes even clean water, while private waterfronts, 
pavement-less streets and urban roads abound. If we were 
truly rigorous in applying the prevalence of the public 
good, cities in developing countries would ban private car 
use during peak hours. Only a minority would be affected. 
Most people’s travel would take less time and there would 
be less air pollution; less road building and maintenance 
would free up public funds for better provisions for the 
needs of lower-income majorities
Most public policy discussions and decisions, such as 
those relating to macro-economics, are very short-lived. 
Even the most transcendental political events often do not 
affect people’s lives as much as they are thought to. At the 
risk of appearing sacrilegious, it is for example irrelevant 
for the way people live today whether most countries’ 
revolutions or wars of independence occurred 100 years 
earlier or later than they actually did. Instead, the way  
cities are built determines to a large degree citizens’  
quality of life for hundreds of years into the future.
Key transformations include the widely recognised success of the TransMilenio bus rapid transit system with dedicated lanes (left) to bring residents from outer areas to the city centre (middle) as well as the creation of new 
schools and libraries (right). Hundreds of new parks and pedestrian pathways have been created, making Bogotá’s cycle networks – ciclorias – among the most extensive in the world. 
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Enrique Peñalosa, Mayor of Bogotá 1998-2001, is an urban 
strategist who advises cities. He is a Senior International Advisor 
to the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. 
A government that cares about quality 
of urban life and democracy has to 
progressively veer away from trying  
to reduce traffic jams through investments 
in new or bigger roads, and instead 
concentrate on creating or improving mass-
transit and pedestrian and bicycle facilities. 
SECURING AN URBAN FUTURE  11
URBAN AGE SOUTH AMERICA CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 2008
The connection between transport and social exclusion  
is at the heart of the policy debate on the future of cities.  
Yet, while reducing energy and carbon emissions through 
more sustainable transport are understood and are being 
implemented in different urban regions of the world, the 
connections between urban form, transport infrastructure  
and social well-being require further analysis. Understanding 
mobility in cities relies heavily on deterministic, engineering-
based models. They tend to rely on a rather rigid, 
synchronous and static view of cities in which movement 
patterns are assumed to be the same for all consumers. 
Instead urban mobility can be approached as a ‘pliable’ 
science, one that allows the multiple scales and time zones  
to be understood through a set of simple modelling tools – 
which are in effect time-based accessibility maps – that do 
not require expensive and time-consuming techniques. 
The experience of the modern city changes according  
to the hour of the day and depending on the mode of transport 
to access the city’s primary urban provisions – jobs, shops, 
leisure and other essential social and community uses. 
Time, as opposed to distance, is perhaps a more appropriate 
variable to assess urban functionality. We need to first 
agree on an average quantum of time that is acceptable to 
most urban commuters. Research suggests that 45 minutes in 
each direction, or a total of 1.5 hours per day, is a reasonable 
time frame for most people to gain access to a range of 
primary urban functions from their point of departure.  
While the selection of any such figure may be challenged as 
controversial, it sets a benchmark against which to evaluate 
the amount of time spent on commuting by urban dwellers. 
To better understand the relationship between urban 
form and mobility patterns travel times for different modes 
of transport (public transport and private cars) were 
tracked in twelve global megacities – including São Paulo, 
Los Angeles, London and Tokyo – to identify how long it 
takes to get to work, to go out in the evening, to go 
shopping, to attend a sports event and to go to university. 
The results show strikingly different results for different 
modes of travel in relation to the time of day and the 
activity they pursue. 
The diagrams below indicate accessibility maps for the 
‘leisure city’, illustrating journeys from a selected point of 
departure in the evening to the main area in each city where 
theatres, cinemas and other facilities are located. The maps on 
the top show how far one can get within 45 minutes (in green) 
or 90 minutes (in yellow) by car, while the ones at the bottom 
indicates how far one can get using public transport. 
What stands out is the real strength of cities like London 
and Tokyo, which have extensive and integrated transport 
networks that are fully operational even outside traditional 
working hours. In these cities the accessibility maps roughly 
cover the same area for both cars and public transport users.  
A large percentage of the population can reach the city’s leisure 
districts within 45 minutes regardless of whether they use the 
car or a combination of bus, rail and metro. Bogotá shows a 
similarly integrated pattern following the implementation of 
the TransMilenio bus rapid transit system, which carries 25 per 
cent of all commuters daily, and has seen travel times cut by  
30 per cent, carbon emissions by 40 per cent and road accidents 
by 90 per cent. At the opposite extreme are Los Angeles and  
São Paulo where a much smaller area is accessible by public 
transport compared to the car. In Los Angeles the amount  
of people living less than 45 minutes by car from Rodeo Drive 
is 27 times larger than the amount of people that could get 
there in 45 minutes by public transport (2.7 million  
versus 100,000). 
The conclusions that can be drawn from these studies 
confirm that a road- and rail-based public transport system 
that extends across the surface of large urban areas is 
critical to providing access to jobs, leisure, shopping and 
any other primary functions of the city for the majority  
of its citizens. In Los Angeles, for example, less than 20 per 
cent of the population of the metropolitan area use public 
transport to get to work – a clear case of social exclusion 
– while in Tokyo – still the biggest metropolitan region in  
the world with 35 million inhabitants – 78 per cent of the 
population use public transport as part of their daily 
commute. Many of the most deprived areas of Johannesburg 
have hardly any public transport system to speak of, and 
thus access to jobs becomes extremely difficult for those 
who need it most – a pattern that is evident in many South 
American cities where commuting times can exceed three 
hours a day.
Ultimately, the results suggest that existing public 
transport networks should be used more intensively, taking 
into account the requirements of different user groups at 
different times of the day. For example, while London has 
an extensive and established bus, rail and metro system,  
its efficiency suffers from the fact that the entire rail-based 
system closes down at midnight, forcing many people to  
use cars to gain access to evening entertainment. But while 
these studies point to the need for policymakers to take 
time-based transport planning into account, growing 
metropolitan regions like São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Lima 
and Rio de Janeiro need to invest in an integrated cocktail 
of measures that include improvements in regional 
connectivity, the implementation of bus rapid transport 
technology, reserved lanes for public transport and cycle 
networks, and the introduction of traffic management 
policies such as an alternating number plate system and 
congestion charging. Only by approaching transport in a 
holistic way can urban policymakers begin to offer their 
citizens sustainable solutions.
Fabio Casiroli is a visiting professor at DPA Milan Polytechnic. 
He is the founder and chairman of Systematica, an urban and 
transport planning consultancy, and the author of ‘Khrónopolis, 
Accessible City, Feasible City’.
THE MOBILITY DNA OF CITIES
In a new methodology of urban modelling, Fabio Casiroli identifies how to develop 
sustainable transport options for complex urban systems.
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Cities are often blamed for contributing disproportionately 
to global climate change. For instance, many sources including 
United Nations agencies and the Clinton Climate Initiative, 
state that cities account for 75 to 80 per cent of all greenhouse 
gases from human activities. But the actual figure seems  
to be around 40 per cent. Of the 60 per cent of emissions 
generated outside of cities, a large part comes from agriculture 
and deforestation, with much of the rest coming from heavy 
industry, fossil-fuelled power stations and wealthy high-
consumption people who live in rural areas or urban 
centres too small to be classified as cities. 
In fact, many cities combine a good quality of life with 
relatively low levels of greenhouse gas emissions per person. 
There is no inherent conflict between an increasingly urbanised 
world and reduced global greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing 
on cities as ‘the problem’ often means that too much attention 
is paid to climate change mitigation (the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions), especially in low-income nations, 
and not enough on adaptation (minimising climate change’s 
damaging impacts). Certainly, the planning, management 
and governance of cities should have a central role in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. But this should also 
have a central role in protecting populations from floods, 
storms, heat waves and other impacts that climate change 
will bring to many cities and this is an area that receives  
far too little attention.
The main source of greenhouse gas emissions in cities  
is energy use – in industrial production, transport and 
residential, commercial and government buildings (heating 
or cooling, lighting and appliances). Greenhouse gas 
emission inventories for cities show more than a tenfold 
difference in average per capita emissions between cities, 
with São Paulo having 1.5 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per 
person compared to 19.7 for Washington DC. The figure  
for Mexico City is 2.6 tonnes per person. If figures were 
available for more cities in low-income nations, the differences 
in per capita emissions between cities could well be more 
than hundred-fold. In most cities in low-income nations, 
greenhouse gas emissions per person cannot be high, simply 
because there is too little use of oil, coal and natural gas  
and little else to generate the other important greenhouse 
gases. There is little industry, very low levels of private car 
use, and limited ownership and use of electrical equipment 
in homes and businesses. 
Transport is an important contributor to greenhouse gas 
emissions in almost all cities, although its relative contribution 
varies a lot – for instance from around 11 per cent in Shanghai 
and Beijing in 1998 (in these cities industry is the largest 
generator of greenhouse gas emissions) to around 20 per cent 
for London, New York and Washington DC to 30-35 per cent 
for Rio de Janeiro, Barcelona and Toronto. 
Perhaps it is not cities in general that are the main 
source of greenhouse gas emissions, but only cities in 
high-income nations. However, an increasing number of 
studies of particular cities in Europe and North America 
show that they have much lower levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions compared to their national average – for instance 
New York and London have much lower emissions per 
person than the average for the USA or the UK. São Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro also have much lower emissions per 
person than the average for Brazil. 
Of course, it is not cities (or small urban centres or rural 
areas) that are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, 
but particular activities. An inventory of these activities can 
allocate these between cities, other urban centres and rural 
areas but this is not a simple exercise. For instance, the 
places with large coal-fired power stations would be very 
high greenhouse gas emitters, although most of the electricity 
they generate may be used elsewhere. This is why greenhouse 
gas emission inventories generally assign cities the emissions 
generated in providing the electricity consumed within 
their boundaries. This explains why some cities have 
surprisingly low per capita emissions, because the electricity 
they import does not come from fossil-fuelled power 
stations. For South American cities supplied with electricity 
mostly through hydropower, this would reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions per person. 
There are other difficulties. For instance, do the emissions 
from the petrol used by car-driving commuters get attributed 
to the city where they work, or to the suburb or rural area 
where they live? Which locations get assigned the carbon 
emissions from air travel? Total carbon emissions from any 
city with an international airport are much influenced by 
whether or not the city is assigned the fuel loaded onto the 
aircraft – even if most of the fuel is used in the air, outside 
the city. Total carbon emissions for cities such as São Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro or New York are much influenced by whether 
or not these cities are assigned the fuel loaded onto aircraft 
at their airports. 
A more fundamental question is whether greenhouse 
gas emissions used in producing goods or services are 
allocated to production or consumption. If emissions are 
assigned to the final consumer’s home, most emissions from 
agriculture, deforestation and industry could be assigned to 
cities where the industrial goods, wood products and food 
are consumed. 
Although where to assign greenhouse gas emissions 
might seem pedantic, it actually has enormous significance 
for how responsibilities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
are assigned between nations and within nations between 
cities and other settlements. If China’s manufacturing cities  
are assigned all the greenhouse gas emissions that go into  
the goods exported (including the electricity that helped 
produce these goods), this would imply a much larger 
responsibility for these Chinese cities in moderating and 
eventually reversing such emissions than if these emissions 
were allocated to the nations or cities where Chinese exports 
are consumed. As Walker and King note: 'Many of the 
countries in the western world have dodged their own carbon 
dioxide emissions by exporting their manufacturing to 
China. Next time you buy something with “Made in China” 
stamped on it, ask yourself who was responsible for the 
emissions that created it.’
Seeing cities as ‘the problem’ draws attention away from 
the fact that the driver of most greenhouse gas emissions  
is the consumption patterns of middle- and upper-income 
groups in wealthier nations. Using average figures for 
greenhouse gas emissions per person for cities hide the  
very large differences in emissions per person between 
high-income groups and low-income groups. High-income 
groups in the wealthiest Latin American cities are likely to 
have greenhouse gas emissions per person far higher than 
low-income groups. Focusing on cities only as large greenhouse 
gas emitters ascribes too much importance to energy efficiency 
within climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies 
for low-income nations, most of whose cities have very  
low fossil-fuel use (and thus far less scope for reducing it). 
Seeing cities as ‘the problem’ also misses the extent  
to which well-planned and governed cities are central to 
de-linking high living standards from high greenhouse  
CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Protection of the Guarapiranga-Billings reservoir in the South of São Paulo is a persistent challenge despite initiatives aimed at containing the development  
of informal settlements encroaching on its edges.
Seeing cities as ‘the problem’ draws 
attention away from the fact that the 
driver of most greenhouse gas emissions  
is the consumption patterns of middle- and  
upper-income groups in wealthier nations. 
A provocative reassessment of cities’ contribution to global greenhouse gases by 
David Sattherwaite underscores the importance for local governments to foster 
environmental and social innovation.
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gas emissions. This can be seen in part in the very large 
differentials between wealthy cities in petrol use per person; 
most US cities have three to five times the petrol use per 
person of most European cities, yet, they do not have a 
better quality of life. 
Cities with good public transport systems that have 
avoided low-density sprawl will generally have much lower 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions per person than cities 
that have not. Singapore has one-fifth of the car ownership 
per person compared to most cities in other high-income 
nations, yet also a higher income per person. Many of the 
most desirable (and expensive) residential areas in the 
world’s wealthiest cities have high densities and building 
forms that can minimise the need for space heating and 
cooling – much more so than housing in suburban or rural 
areas. Most European cities have high-density centres 
where walking and cycling are preferred by much of the 
population – especially where good provisions are made  
for pedestrians and cyclists. High quality public transport 
can keep down private car ownership and use. 
Cities also concentrate so much of what contributes  
to a very high quality of life but which do not imply high 
material consumption levels (and thus high greenhouse gas 
emissions) – theatre, music, the visual arts, dance and  
the enjoyment of historic buildings and districts. 
Cities have also long been places of social, economic  
and political innovation. This is already evident in relation 
to global warming; in many high-income nations, city 
politicians have demonstrated a greater commitment  
to greenhouse gas emissions reduction than national 
politicians. This is evident in Latin America too, where 
much of the environmental and social innovation over the 
last 20 to 25 years has been driven by mayors. Many cities 
in Latin America, Africa and Asia have low greenhouse gas 
emissions per person. Yet they house hundreds of millions 
of people who are at risk from the increased frequency and/
or intensity of floods, storms and heat waves and water 
supply constraints that climate change is likely to bring.  
It is generally low-income groups that are most at risk –  
as they live in informal settlements, often on sites prone to 
flooding or landslides, lacking the drains and other needed 
protective infrastructure. Discussions of climate change 
priorities so often forget this. And these are risks that are 
not easily addressed, especially by international aid 
agencies that show little interest in urban areas and have 
little capacity to support the kinds of locally-driven 
pro-poor approaches that are needed.
This text is drawn from David Satterthwaite, ‘Cities’ contribution to global warming: notes  
on the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions’, in Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 20,  
No. 2, pp 539-549. The main sources for the statistics are: David Dodman, ‘Blaming cities for 
climate change? An analysis of urban greenhouse gas emissions inventories’, in Environment and 
Urbanization, Vol. 21, No. 1, forthcoming 2009; Patricia Romero Lankao, ’Are we missing the 
point? Particularities of urbanization, sustainability and carbon emissions in Latin American 
cities’, in Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, pp. 157-175; Shobhakar Dhakal, 
Urban Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Asian Cities: Policies for a Sustainable 
Future, Kitakyushu: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), 2004; Peter Newman, 
‘The environmental impact of cities’, Environment and Urbanization. Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 275–296. 
The quote from Walker and King comes from G. Walker G and D King (2008) G. Walker G 
and D. King, The Hot Topic: how to tackle global warming and still keep the lights on, London: 
Bloomsbury Publishers, pp. 199-200. For a full list of sources, refer to the longer paper from 
which this is drawn.
How a city is planned, managed and 
governed also has important implications 
for how it will cope with the impacts of 
climate change. 
Agriculture
13.5%
Transport
13.1%
Residential and 
commerical buildings
7.9%
Waste and 
wastewater
2.8%
Forestry
17.4%
Energy supply
25.9%
Industry
19.4%
IPCC 2007, Working  Group III
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Over six million cars in the São Paulo Metropolitan Region contribute to choking levels of traffic congestion and air pollution. Of the Urban Age cities, car density – measured by the number of cars per km2 – is the highest in São Paulo (2,486)  
and Buenos Aires (6,281) compared to relatively low levels in Bogotá (281).
David Satterthwaite is a Senior Fellow at the International 
Institute for Environment and Development and editor of 
the international journal, ‘Environment and Urbanization’. 
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Just as Latin American urban centres have registered levels 
and paths of development different from those prevailing  
in high-income nations, so too do their trajectories of 
emissions differ. Carbon emissions per capita in urban 
areas such as Austin and the District of Columbia are 6 to 
20 times higher than those in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and 
Mexico City. This might lead many to the conclusion that 
Latin American cities should not care about climate change, 
especially when they are faced with under-employment, 
housing backlogs and other more pressing development 
concerns; when considering the wealthiest nations emit 
most greenhouse gases it is the high-consumption lifestyles 
of the wealthy that drive climate change and must, hence, 
take urgent actions to curb their emissions and avoid 
catastrophic and irreversible damages. However, there are two 
sets of reasons here why urban centres in the region must pay 
attention to this burgeoning global phenomenon: first, our 
cities are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, and are faced with the health impacts of atmospheric 
pollution; second, cities can also play a pivotal role in our 
efforts both to cope with or adapt to heat waves, floods and 
other climate hazards, and to reduce or mitigate the emissions 
of greenhouse gasses and other atmospheric pollutants. 
The incidence of weather-related disasters in cities has 
increased more than twofold between 1970 and 2005. These 
included not only increasingly destructive hurricanes such 
as Mitch (1998) and Wilma (2005), and two intense episodes of 
El Niño, which, together with land use changes, resulted in 
floods, droughts, landslides and other disasters killing 
people and impacting the population, infrastructure and 
economic activities of many urban areas. 
The disruption of our climate system will add to the 
risks and stresses that Latin American cities, where 77 per 
cent of the population is located, are already facing. For 
example, urban dwellers in Low Elevation Coastal Zones 
will be exposed to storm flooding and damage, coastal 
erosion, and increased salinity of aquifers. Urban centres  
in Northern Chile, the Brazilian North-East and Northern 
Mexico and other arid and semi-arid regions will face 
particular problems of water shortages. Many water basins 
will get less precipitation, which will reduce the availability 
of fresh water. This will be especially hard for growing cities 
and large cities that already face serious problems in their 
fresh water supplies – e.g. urban centres along the US/Mexican 
border. As illustrated by the December 1999 flash floods 
and landslides in Caracas, which killed nearly 30,000, or 
the floods resulting from hurricane Stan in 2005 (more 
than 1,500 deaths), higher than average and more extreme 
rainfall events associated with climate change will be related 
to flood hazards, increased landslides and mudflows. A range 
of health-related risks is expected to arise from climate 
change. Extreme temperatures will coalesce with air pollution 
and the heat island effect to create heat and respiratory distress. 
Water-and vector-borne diseases will result from changes 
in temperature, precipitation, and/or humidity. Less direct 
risks are also expected, such as negatively affected livelihoods, 
food supplies or access to water and other natural resources.
Adaptive capacity, i.e. the ability of cities, their population 
and economic activities to reduce climate stresses or cope  
with their consequences, is as key a determinant of climate 
impacts as is exposure. Latin American cities have been 
struggling with – or even lacking – many of the determinants 
of adaptive capacity. During the 1990s, 48 per cent of urban 
workers were employed in the informal sector, thus lacking 
access to adequate and stable income sources. In the context 
of the state reform of the last 25 years, public provision of 
transport, healthcare, and water and sanitation services was 
practically abandoned by the state, or ‘decentralised’ to the 
private sector and local authorities. All this has negatively 
affected the key determinants of adaptive capacity such as 
stable and sufficient incomes, access to water, electricity, food, 
healthcare, education and other services and infrastructures. 
Many cities have no all-weather roads. The proportion 
of urban dwellers without piped water supplies ranges 
between 1.2 per cent in Chile and 42 per cent in El Salvador, 
while the percentage without drains ranges between 13 per 
cent in Chile and 77 per cent in Paraguay. About 37 per cent  
of the housing stock in the region is inappropriate to offer 
protection against disaster and diseases. Many homes are 
situated on illegally occupied or subdivided land, which 
inhibits any investment in more resilient buildings. Large 
sections of the low-income population live on risk-prone 
areas and dangerous sites – e.g. floodplains – because these 
are the only sites for them to occupy that are within reach 
of income-earning opportunities. Thus, it is difficult to talk 
about adapting infrastructure and buildings that are not 
there. It is more adequate to refer to adaptation deficits  
and even to the lack of adaptive capacity. 
Latin America has a long history of adapting to the 
impacts of stresses related to climate variability, including 
extreme weather events. Some are autonomous adaptations 
that occur without any specific planning. In Costa Rica and 
Ecuador for instance, communities have improved their 
housing design with elevated or reinforced concrete strips 
as foundations, and bamboo walls that are not touching  
the ground to better cope with floods and droughts.  
Low-income households in for instance El Salvador invest 
an average nine per cent of their incomes in risk-reduction 
actions – e.g. diversifying their livelihoods, getting  
assets that could easily be sold if a disaster occurred.  
The individualistic nature of households’ investments, the 
lack of representative community organisations through 
which to design and implement settlement-wide measures, 
and the lack of support from government agencies limits 
their effect. 
There are good examples of city governments, such as  
in Manizales in Colombia and Ilo in Peru, that are taking 
steps together with NGOs, communities and other local 
actors to promote development, and, in doing so they 
reduce vulnerability. Governments and involved stakeholders 
implemented actions to avoid rapidly-growing low-income 
populations settling on dangerous sites, but also to improve 
the living standards of the poor and to protect and regenerate 
fragile ecological areas. They illustrate how pro-development 
and pro-poor policies can enhance adaptive capacity. 
The problem is that most of the policy-driven adaptation 
practices are disaster responses rather than policies that 
actively reduce risks and address the factors that make 
poorer groups vulnerable. The poor quality of infrastructure 
and the lack of maintenance are key determinants of dams 
failing, public hospitals and schools and bridges and 
motorways collapsing as a result of weather-related disasters. 
Only 150,000 houses out of 16 million (i.e. less than 1 per 
cent) had disaster insurance coverage in Mexico in 1998. 
The rate of insurance coverage for the Venezuela floods of 
1999 only accounted for 1.4 per cent of total losses. As 
highlighted by events such as Hurricane Stan that hit 
Mexico and Guatemala in 2005, individuals bear most of 
the cost and manage it through the solidarity of family and 
other networks, if at all. The lack of transparency in public 
works procurement frequently leads to corruption and  
THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA
In an overview of various mitigation and adaptation policies, Patricia Romero 
Lankao summarises why Latin American cities should care about climate change.
Air pollution levels in São Paulo are twice as high as those of New York City and London even though Paulistanos have relatively low carbon emissions per capita compared globally. 
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poor quality infrastructure and buildings. Many urban 
governments also have antagonistic relationships with 
low-income groups. Decentralisation should have helped 
address these issues. However, in many cases decentralisation 
of responsibilities to urban authorities has not been 
accompanied by increased revenues or revenue-raising 
capacity. In most cases, the reform of the state during the 
1990s weakened many of the mechanisms that support 
adaptive capacity as the state withdrew itself from public 
transport, health care and public works. 
Although Latin American cities are not big emitters, 
they need to pay attention to actions aimed at reducing 
their emissions. First, wealthy cities such as Tokyo and 
Barcelona have pretty low levels of emissions per capita. 
Latin American cities need to address some of the factors 
that are jeopardising cities’ capacity to promote sustainable 
patterns of urbanisation, namely: urban sprawl, associated 
increased commuting distance and increasing use of 
low-capacity modes of transport.
Buenos Aires, Santiago and Mexico City for instance, 
experienced during the last two decades a region-based  
or polycentric urban expansion of first and second-order 
urban localities sprawling along major motorways and 
functionally linked to the main city. This pathway of 
urbanisation is associated to relevant consequences for both 
GHG and other atmospheric emissions. As illustrated by 
Mexico City, passengers’ commuting distance and travel 
times increased from 3.5 km/h and 16.8 km/h by bus in 
1987 to 5.6 km and 16.7 km/h in 2000. The same may  
be the case with freight transport. More sprawled patterns 
of urban growth are related to variations in car use, petrol 
consumption, and by this, to more emissions. 
Second, there are very large differentials within urban 
centres. Equity and affluence in other words are other key 
dimensions of the carbon footprints by Latin American 
cities. The transport sector of Mexico City, which accounts 
for the highest share (34.7 per cent) of CO2 equivalent 
emissions, can also illustrate the weight of equity. Private 
cars only contribute 16 per cent of the city’s daily journeys 
segments. Still, they account for 40.8 per cent of CO2 
equivalent emissions, while public transport accounts for 
82 per cent of those journey segments, yet emits 25.9 per 
cent of CO2 equivalent emissions. Therefore, a key determinant 
of greenhouse gas and other atmospheric emissions is the 
consumption patterns of middle- and high-income sectors 
together with the production systems that benefit from  
that consumption. 
Third, policy making in Mexico City and other Latin 
American cities involved in the International Council for 
Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) campaign and 
other climate initiatives illustrates the role that urban 
authorities can play in reducing emissions. They show that 
policies addressing other problems, such as air pollution 
and energy, can often be adapted at low or no cost to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and simultaneously improve  
the health of the population. The burning of fossil fuels is 
linked to climate change, energy security and air pollution. 
Thus reductions in the amount of fuel combusted will result 
in lower greenhouse gas emissions, lower energy costs and 
lower health and environmental impacts from reduced 
emissions of air pollutants and their precursors. However, 
attention needs to be given not only to the synergies, but 
also to the conflicts between these three policy domains. 
For instance, standards to improve the fuel efficiency of 
vehicles can reduce both local pollution and CO2 emissions 
per vehicle-km. Yet, they can result in increased emissions 
if vehicles’ travel distances increase, or drivers switch to 
vehicles with larger engines. 
To summarise, there are many reasons why Latin 
American cities need to address their many linkages with 
climate change: they concentrate industries, transport, 
households and many of the emitters of greenhouse gases 
and other atmospheric pollutants. They are affected by 
hurricanes, storms, water shortages and other hazards  
that climate change is expected to aggravate. Furthermore, 
without climate change they already face adaptation deficits. 
Therefore, actions need to be taken to address those and, 
by doing so, to enhance the adaptive capacity of urban 
populations, economic activities and infrastructures.  
Latin American cities are sources of initiatives, policies  
and actions aimed at reducing or mitigating emissions  
and coping with or adapting to climate change. However, 
those measures are still tiny, ineffective and not targeting  
climate change.
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Patricia Romero Lankao is the Deputy Director of the Institute 
for the Study of Science and the Environment at the National 
Centre for Atmospheric Research in the United States. 
City governments are institutions with great potential  
for reducing carbon emissions, and recent innovations in 
treating solid waste in São Paulo provides an instructive 
example. The city has reduced methane emissions through 
intervention in the disposal of urban solid waste, mainly 
domestic rubbish. Unlike the irregular and extremely large 
outdoor lixões, domestic waste in São Paulo is collected in 
landfills in environmentally protected areas which avoid 
human contamination or damage to the soil and ground 
water tables. The city operates two such solid waste landfills: 
Bandeirantes in the north-western part of the city, and São 
João in the South-East. Each receives around 7,000 tons of 
domestic solid waste daily, in addition to the sludge 
generated through sewage from the state water company.
Slow decomposition of organic matter present in the 
solid waste produces a biogas, rich in methane, which 
permeates the layers of material covering the landfills and 
is released into the atmosphere, thus contributing to the 
greenhouse effect. Here, a system for collecting, filtering, 
pressuring, and burning the gas in thermal electric plants 
prevents it from being released into the atmosphere. In 
addition, 80 per cent of the collected biogas is used to 
generate electrical power at electric plants located on site.  
By the end of 2008, seven per cent of households in  
São Paulo will be supplied by energy thus generated.  
The result is a twofold environmental gain: in addition  
to reducing the amount of methane released into the 
atmosphere, the need for new sources of energy is reduced.
The Kyoto Protocol, which requires industrialised 
countries to meet targets for reduced emissions of 
greenhouse gases either within their own territory or 
through investment in developing countries, made this 
project possible. The United Nations Clean Development 
Mechanism, which granted São Paolo the carbon credits to 
sell to companies and institutions in countries seeking 
emission control targets, has in effect helped to fund 
environmental controls already in place in São Paolo.
Today, the project’s biogas control certification is 
equivalent to controls of 3,106,211 tons of carbon, a sum 
close to the total carbon credits generated by all the other 
certified projects in Brazil combined. With the highest 
landfill control certification in the world (1,150,144 tons), 
the Bandeirantes landfill generates the highest benefit 
percentage for the State of São Paulo: half the credits are 
sold at public international auctions to ensure transparency 
and the highest price for the city. Recently, purchase of  
São Paolo’s Certificates of Emission Reduction (CER) 
generated almost € 28 million for the city. 
These proceeds are then invested in urban and 
environmental improvements to the areas surrounding the 
landfills – areas where their impact is directly experienced. 
The neighbourhoods of Perus and Pirituba in the North-
West, and São Mateus and Sapopemba in the South-East, 
are receiving parks, public squares and other measures  
to control erosion and to improve access to quality space  
for the low-rent population living there. Public hearings 
organised by the municipal government allow for the direct 
participation of residents in the vetting of how and where to 
invest financial resources obtained from the sale of the CER.
Additional credits and future auctions are expected to 
produce further social and physical improvements to the 
urban landscape, proving that the landfills are assets to be 
maintained, valued and utilised throughout their life span. 
This project is thus proving to be a safer and more 
economical solution than incineration plants. Even so, 
São Paulo will need to work with other prefeituras in the 
metropolitan area to implement and share new landfills 
at even more distant sites.
Stela Goldenstein is the Deputy Chief of Staff for the  
São Paulo Municipality, and was formerly the Environment 
Secretary for the State and City of São Paulo.
FROM WASTE TO PUBLIC SPACE10.0 – nation
6.2
11.2
8.2
23.7
7.1
23.9
19.7
23.9
8.2
1.5
8.2
3.8
3.4
6.9
6.8
8.1
Tokyo
Shanghai
Seoul
Beijing
São Paulo
Rio de Janeiro 
District of 
Columbia
New York City
Toronto
London
Barcelona
2.3
3.4
10.6
4.8
David Dodman, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 21, No 1, forthcoming.
3.4 – city
CARBON EMISSIONS PER CAPITA
Stela Goldenstein describes how solid waste management in São Paulo is 
reducing the city’s carbon emissions and allowing for investments in public space. 
16  SOUTH AMERICAN CITIES
Georg Simmel would be both fascinated and alarmed.  
The streets of Tepito are full of worshippers, upwards of 
2,000 people moving excitedly in anticipation of seeing  
and possibly touching La Grande, a lifesize statue of the 
Santa Muerte or saint of death. Looking to all intents like 
the Grim Reaper, La Santa represents a ‘crisis religion’,  
with devotees identified as the victims of the neo-liberal 
economy: she is popular among drug addicts and dealers, 
former prisoners and gang members. Mingling in the 
crowds of Tepito are heavily tattooed men, in every 
appearance hardcore gang members, except that they  
are bringing their babies to La Grande, delicately placing  
a cigarette at the baby’s lips to cast smoke over the shrine. 
But La Santa’s supporters go beyond these stereotypes. 
A friend’s uncle, a millionaire businessman, has replaced 
the conventional Virgin of Guadalupe altar in his house 
with one to La Santa. At the Sonora market in La Merced,  
the stallholders selling the statues – red for love, gold  
for wealth, black for protection, and the powders for the 
devotions – claim a broad clientele. In these times of 
economic uncertainty, of a state no longer willing to be 
associated with terms such as ‘welfare’, with families split 
by the 20 million Mexicans living in the US, everyone 
needs some form of social attachment.
Elsewhere, the scenes are a little different but essentially 
the same. In a Brazilian favela located on a rubbish dump  
a mae-de-santo (Mother of Saints) receives visitors to divine 
their life-paths through the interpretation of cowrie shells. 
The old woman has a steady stream of clients, keen to 
understand their futures but also grateful that believing  
in something provides the necessary motivations to be  
‘healthy’. In a favela racked with drug addiction, alcoholism, 
tuberculosis, dengue or ‘nerves’, this concern with health 
extends beyond the spiritual. 
In São Paulo, religion is also central to a reanimation  
of social life. Neo-Pentecostalism is the fastest growing 
religion in Brazil, with 24 million faithful (four times as 
many as in the US). The March for Jesus organised by the 
Renascer em Cristo church recently brought together over 
one million people for a daylong festival of faith. Many  
of those in attendance are drawn by the messages of hard 
work, family, moral integrity – disseminated by the Record 
Network of television and radio channels run by the Universal 
Church of the Kingdom of God. These messages speak well  
to people whose ‘faith’ in other religions has been shaken 
by links to political corruption, abuse and indifference. 
Religion offers salvation in many forms. Among Latin 
America’s numerous gangs, the 80,000 members of the 
Mara in San Salvador, Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa, or 
the parche in Bogotá and malandros in Caracas, conversion 
to Protestantism is the only way to leave your jombois, and 
avoid the ‘exit beatings’ dished out to people requesting to 
become a calmado (quiet one). Even then the decision is  
not taken lightly. In many cities gangs are the principal 
form of social engagement among young people. In Villa  
El Salvador, Lima, 70 per cent of inhabitants are under  
25 years old but fewer than 15 per cent have access to some 
form of higher or technical education. The gang is the focal 
point of social relations. Gang members congregate on 
vacant plots or corners, swapping stories, drinking, dealing 
drugs, discussing the latest styles of music or dress that 
might identify them as skatos, crew or punk. Their relations 
with community leaders, the police and rival gangs define 
the feeling of the barrio. Their use of tagging and graffiti 
may define the barrio’s territorial boundaries, and more 
likely by drawing from scripts through US and Japanese 
spray styles of cartoons and popular imagery the barrio 
gains an aesthetic. 
Deemed ‘anti social’ by those who fear leaving home or 
departing from fixed routes that make conviviality difficult, 
to its members the gang is hyper social. But rumour and 
gossip do travel. In dense squatter settlements with houses 
constructed from rudimentary materials there are few 
secrets. Local bosses or gangs know of the domestic violence, 
the adultery, drug taking or alcoholism, they learn of the 
debtors and neighbours with disputes over noise, thefts  
or property lines. Although complicit in these problems, 
the boss or gang is also the route to conflict resolution.  
In Rocinha, the archetypical favela holding onto a Rio de 
Janeiro hillside, the local drug gangs mediate disputes, 
sometimes working with NGOs. A programme known as 
‘Balcao do Direitos’ that organises favelados to apply for 
their registration papers involved the Rio Law School and 
the agreement of the major gangs. A drug gang’s decision  
is final and non-compliance is not recommended. Though 
not always fair, people have less reason to believe that a 
gang’s verdict will be any less just than a judge’s, and their 
decision will be arrived at more quickly and cheaply. In Rio 
it costs less to have someone killed than to arrange an illegal 
hook up to the electricity supply. Summary justice can be 
ruthless, but gangs also impose norms to prevent favelados 
resorting to individual violence. 
Public confidence in bosses and gangs is often higher 
than in the police or politicians, while the corruption of 
bosses is condoned. As the saying goes, ‘ele rouba mas faz’ 
(he steals but he gets things done). Bosses and gang leaders 
offer reciprocity, the organisation of work programmes  
for drainage and water supply, or the construction of a 
kindergarten requires collective action, known variously  
as faena, minga or rondas. In Buenos Aires the manzaneras 
and punteros create dense local networks that often rely on 
fictive kinships between compadrazgo (godparents) to bond 
people to their community and the party. Patron-clientelism 
is a dirty word among political scientists and international 
agency ‘experts’, but on the streets it looks a lot like 
personalised mediation and problem-solving. 
Social and economic deprivation begets certain forms  
of social engagement. In Lima, the crisis of the 1980s motivated 
community groups to organise soup kitchens. By 1986 there 
were over 800, and by the late 1990s almost 10,000 providing 
half a million meals each day, as well as serving as meeting 
points to share childcare, medication and exchange clothes. 
With the support of the Catholic Church the committees 
drew the attention of the municipality which used the 
kitchens to distribute free milk to children. One million 
children now receive milk through a committee structure 
involving almost 100,000 people. Recent threats to cut the 
Vaso de Leche budget have brought widespread protests, 
especially from women.
The 2001 crisis in Argentina prompted the formation  
of clubes de trueque (barter clubs) and empresas recuperadas 
(worker-occupied enterprises), and of new union groups. 
The Union of Seamstress Workers was formed to protest  
at labour abuses in Buenos Aires’ nearly 400 clandestine 
textile shops, and to remove the 100,000 undocumented 
immigrants from Bolivia and Paraguay. Perhaps the best 
known mutual solidarity and direct action has been the 
Piqueteros: organised groups of unemployed people, some 
with support from trade unions that blocked roads (piquets) 
demanding a fee for passage and the state to buy their 
acquiescence through granting access to the social safety 
fund or approve their local development projects. In 2003 
there were over 5,000 piquets with maybe 360,000 members 
in Greater Buenos Aires.
Elsewhere, in São Paulo for example, the Movimento 
Sem Techo has used land occupations to extend poor 
peoples’ access to land and housing. In 2003 the MTST 
mobilised 4,000 families to occupy land owned by 
Volkswagen. In Lima, around the fringes of Villa El 
Salvador, itself formed by a series of land invasions dating 
from the late-1960s and 1970s, and now a settlement with 
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT  
IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES
Although Villa El Salvador, located in the South of the Metropolitan Region of Lima, is heralded internationally for establishing itself as a sophisticated self-managed 
urban community since the early 1970s, almost 20 per cent of the residents still do not have sewage services.
Gareth Jones sketches the defining features of contemporary social life for  
Latin America’s urban poor.
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over 400,000 inhabitants, ‘cooperative groups’ are using 
agrarian law to gain plots on the desert and sand dunes.  
At present there’s just a series of reed matt houses, but the 
community knows that the agrarian law affords them  
some protection from eviction.
Over time, the new area of Villa El Salvador will become 
a consolidated vibrant settlement. Established areas are  
full of billboards and vans with loudspeakers announcing 
consumer items and credit terms. There are small yards 
selling wood and concrete block, and stores selling 
kerosene, sewing workshops and plenty of mechanics.  
The settlement is host to 12,000 small- and medium-sized 
enterprises. Impromptu cinemas show the latest films with 
rigged up screens and shaky DVD quality. Despite all this 
enterprise, amidst unemployment – 30 per cent of the 
population is permanently unemployed and 54 per cent 
have incomes insufficient to cover basic needs – and the 
police absent or bribed, crime is high. The residents of 
sub-districts of Villa El Salvador such as Pachacámac  
have organised rondas vecinales (vigilante groups) using 
paid security guards or neighbour rota. In Lima over  
700 reported cases of ‘vigilante justice’ in 2004 were in 
squatter settlements.
Families may also save in small groups, known as 
cadenas de ahorro, for funerals, costs of educating children 
or house construction. Until the 1990s most savings clubs 
relied on circulating funds within the community. But with 
growing numbers of international migrants the clubs now 
receive and circulate remittances. In Bogotá around 5 per cent 
of households receive income from abroad. In Quito and 
Guayaquil the figures are probably higher as estimates put one 
million Ecuadorians living in Spain, the United Kingdom 
and the US sending US$ 1.4 billion back home. Settlements 
show signs of Western Union and Moneygram, and notices 
for Delgado Travel prominently displayed.
A few savings clubs have joined with micro-finance 
organisations, some affiliated with larger banks or with 
NGOs. In Lima the largest is MiBanco, which specialises  
in small loans to micro-entrepreneurs; it acquired about 
125,000 clients per annum in recent years. In Buenos Aires, 
Progresar gives small loans to members with limited formal 
savings histories, undercutting the major banks’ and 
moneylenders’ interest rates. The loans are usually devoted 
to the establishment of small shops or kiosks where inventory  
is limited, profits low but risks are minimal. 
Contemporary social life is often associated with Samba, 
Tango or Huey Huey. But on the urban landscape the football 
stadium looms large. Driving through Baranquilla’s industrial 
and squatter areas, en route to the airport, the view is 
punctuated by an enormous concrete stadium. Walking 
through Leblon in Rio de Janeiro in the aftermath of 
Flamengo beating Corinthians or near La Bombonera 
following a Boca Juniors victory over River Plate gives some 
sense of the buzz. The better off spill into bars wearing their 
authentic shirts, while others wearing replicas waive flags  
in the street. Car park attendants and vendors paint their 
faces to display team loyalty, or to drum up a little extra 
business from the crowd. The rituals and chanting of songs 
give football a religious feel, just as well, as the Estádio São 
Januário in Rio has a church inside.
Emotion can get out of hand. The tribus and barra  
brava (supporter clubs) draw the attention of riot police and 
mounted patrols. Fights erupt inside and outside stadiums, 
often leaving the injured nursing knife wounds and sometimes 
a few dead. But organisation is here too. The barra are 
linked to the clubs, some clubs are owned by their supporters. 
Clubs anchor urban identities and connect neighbourhoods 
with social histories. Identifying with one team or another 
can mark people as local or an outsider, might indicate 
their political affiliation or class position – the Racing Club 
stadium in the working class area of Avalleneda in Buenos 
Aires is called the Estadio Presidente Peron – and even 
their gender.
Social engagements are fomented through public policies 
and urban design. Schemes for participatory budgets and 
governance may now involve upwards of 2,500 city  
and district authorities in Latin America. In Bogotá the 
municipality instituted the Concejos de Planeacion Local, 
and the feedback circuit of ‘Bogotá, Como Vamos’. In Lima 
the city’s urban development plan for Villa El Salvador  
was put out for citizen consultation followed by an exercise 
to discuss anti-poverty measures. Despite an announced 
budget of only US$ 2 per capita, nearly one quarter of 
inhabitants turned out. These programmes have gained 
many supporters for the effects on transparency, efficiency 
and welfare. Even in cities such as Buenos Aires which only 
briefly instituted a Presupuesto Participativo between 2002 
and 2005, these programmes generate spheres in which 
people voice opinions in public and attempt to persuade 
doubters. Discussions resonate long after the meetings,  
in conversations with neighbours, in the queues for the  
Via Expresa in Lima or the TransMilenio in Bogotá.
Participation can also scale up to link city hall with  
the political networks and social agents that run daily life 
in the barrios. In Medellín, the non-partisan Compromiso 
Ciudadano movement built on the mobilisation that elected 
Mayor Sergio Fajardo to open dialogue with armed groups 
and push forward a process of disarmament. In Rio de 
Janeiro, Residents’ Associations – independent of every 
political party in the 1960s – had by 2005 become dominated 
by drug dealers or death squads. Some favelas are no-go 
areas to the state in formal guise – when Minister of Cities 
Marcio Fortes visited Complexo de Alemao his train was 
shot at. But NGOs such as Sou de Paz and Viva Rio, with 
Catholic and evangelical churches, have worked with young 
people and gangs to reduce violence, and trade in guns. 
Their example and pressure promoted Brazil’s National 
Disarmament Statute in 2003.
Finally, back to Mexico City. Here, as in other cities, 
social movements performed vital roles in the transition  
to democracy, combining ideologies with a social awareness 
that was seemingly ignored by politicians. Rallies and 
demonstrations brought hundreds of thousands onto the 
streets but also fomented smaller engagements in the 
colonias, tenements and public housing estates. Social 
engagement informed political engagement. Today the 
‘politics of protest’ has given way to the ‘politics of proposal’, to 
links with government and reinvention as NGOs. However, 
save in the aftermath of elections, demonstrations now 
rarely muster more than a few thousand participants, the 
largest most recent march drew perhaps 80,000 people 
angry at a spate of kidnapping’s. We must not romanticise 
social engagement as natural to Latin America or a cure-all 
for its ills. As Superbarrio, an icon of popular resistance in 
the 1980s and now a restaurant owner put it: ‘In the 1970s  
I served the Revolution, in the 1980s I served the people, 
but now I serve tables.’ 
Gareth Jones is a Senior Lecturer at the London School of 
Economics, an Associate Fellow at the Institute for the Study 
of the Americas at University College London, and co-editor 
of the Journal of Latin American Studies. 
In Rocinha, a favela in Rio de Janeiro with a population estimated between 100,000 and 1,000,000, there is an active tradition of providing for one’s own urbanity 
according to informal and organic interventions.
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TOWARDS AN URBAN FUTURE 
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POPULATION GROWTH IN THE URBAN AGE CITIES
URBAN GROWTH PER HOUR
Since 2007 more than half of humanity has been 
living in the globe’s urbanised areas. Every hour 
since, as people migrate at increasingly high speeds 
to cities, we are fast moving beyond that mark. But 
the distribution of this growth across the surface  
of the earth is unequal. 
Today, metropolitan regions accommodate over  
one billion people, reflecting their roles as centres in the 
global flows of capital, people and culture. The number 
of cities with over one million inhabitants has grown 
dramatically over the last 50 years, reaching close to 450 
in 2008. While many of these larger urban clusters were 
historically based in the developed countries, today 15 
out of the 20 largest city regions of the world – with 
populations of between 10 and 20 million – can be 
found in the less economically advanced countries, 
many of them in the global South. The number of cities 
with over one million people in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America combined grew from 39 to 308 between 1950 
and 2005. In the same period the numbers grew from  
37 to only 96 in Europe and North America.
The cities of South America have a long history 
within the social and physical context of high 
urbanisation. South America is one of the most 
urbanised places on earth, with 83 per cent of its 
national populations living in cities. By 2050 this will be 
closer to 90 per cent, close to the twentieth-century 
urban heartland of North America, and ushering in a 
new generation of megacities with significant social, 
economic and environmental consequences.
The movement to cities sparks push-and-pull 
dynamics of new and emerging economies, and 
embodies the intersection of the physical and material 
nature of the city with changing social behaviours and 
beliefs. Answering the question of our ‘Urban Age’ 
requires us to take stock of where cities are, who lives 
in them, how they are run and what obstacles they 
face. Tackling the problems of our urban future 
demands us to move beyond the present to manage 
increasingly scarce resources, develop sustainable 
ways of living, and take the intersection of growing 
inequality and the city seriously. 
The information contained in this ‘data section’ 
summarises the findings of research undertaken by 
Urban Age since 2005. It includes an overview of 
new research carried out on five South American 
cities – São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, 
Lima and Bogotá – and places them in a comparative 
context with other world cities including New York, 
Shanghai, London, Johannesburg, Mexico City, 
Berlin and Mumbai. By investigating the differing 
patterns of urban density, transport and governance, 
together with a wide range of social and economic 
indicators, the information provides a unique insight 
into the DNA of cities today.
This world map shows the population growth per hour projected through  
2015 in some of the fastest growing cities with more than one million people. 
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A hundred years ago, Buenos Aires was the 
only South American city with a population 
larger than one million. Today, there are 36. 
São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Buenos 
Aires and Bogotá represent the five largest 
metropolitan regions. These cities are typical 
of urbanisation in South America, having 
exhibited their fastest and largest population 
growth in the mid- to late-twentieth century. 
From 1950 to 1980, São Paulo saw its population 
quadruple: from two million to more than 
eight million people. Lima saw similar growth 
rates, Bogotá grew by a factor of seven, Rio de 
Janeiro grew more slowly, while the population 
of Buenos Aires remained broadly static. Today 
the combined metropolitan population of these 
five cities is just over 60 million, a fifth of 
South America’s total urban population. 
Since the 1980s, growth has slowed in 
São Paulo, though with close to 11 million in 
the city and over 19 million in the Metropolitan 
Region, it remains the largest in South America. 
Rio de Janeiro’s growth rate has also slowed, 
and Bogotá’s and Lima’s stabilised earlier. 
While each of the cities has a history 
stretching back to colonial times or earlier, 
their growth came after the withdrawal of 
Spain and Portugal’s colonial powers from 
the continent. Driven first by agriculture 
and trade, and then by rapid industrialisation, 
these cities now face a third revolution 
within a century as they adapt to become 
centres of the new service economy. In many 
cases, with slowing growth, their crucial 
task is to consolidate and build on their 
growth as the global economy enters a 
period of unprecedented change.
Given that 37 per cent of the population 
in Brazil live in favelas at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, compared to 33 per 
cent in Argentina, 22 per cent in Colombia 
and an astounding 68 per cent in Peru, 
against an average of almost 36 per cent 
across South America, the challenge for 
decent housing, provision of urban services 
and economic opportunities requires  
urgent action. 
Inequality, its implications and potential 
policy responses are major themes for the 
Urban Age. Against this backdrop, a 
comparative spatial analysis of inequality 
using educational attainment as a proxy for 
social status and wealth is presented on the 
following pages. Education levels are good 
indicators of social potential since they 
indicate varying levels of qualification and 
job opportunities. Maps indicating where 
pockets of highly or poorly educated people 
live in each city correspond to data which 
varies from city to city. In the case of Brazil, 
the education levels correspond to the head 
of household, whereas in Buenos Aires, 
Bogotá and Lima, the mappings correspond 
to the education levels of the total population. 
Nonetheless, in each of the cities, a pattern 
of segregation between the centre and the 
periphery results from a range of factors 
including unequal distribution of public 
infrastructure and the expansion of informal 
settlements. This spatial distribution creates 
both exclusive areas with a high quality of life 
as well as stigmatised areas intensified by 
inadequate services, accessibility and 
economic opportunities.
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Comparing material inequality (using the Gini Index) 
in cities around the world, South America stands out 
as one of the most unequal regions. A low Gini Index 
indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, 
while a high Gini Index indicates greater income 
inequality. Darker shaded areas represent less equal 
income or wealth distribution. The unbalanced 
distribution of resources is a common characteristic 
of all the countries in the continent, one of the world’s 
most urbanised regions. Even so, inequality is often  
lower in the city than in each nation. 
WORLD MAP OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY
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Praça da Sé 
SÃO PAULO
São Paulo is the capital of the State of São 
Paulo, the most populous Brazilian state. It 
is also South America’s richest and largest 
city, with a population of over 19 million 
in its Metropolitan Region. It is located on 
a plateau, at an average elevation of 800 
metres, 70 kilometres from the sea and 
Santos, South America’s largest port. Rolling 
terrain prevails within the urbanised areas 
of São Paulo, except in the North of the city 
where it rises. Natural reservoirs define the 
extreme southern area of the metropolitan 
region, which provide nearly 30 per cent of 
the city’s drinking water.
Since its foundation in the sixteenth 
century, São Paulo has experienced three 
major transformations. Established as a 
Jesuit mission, its first period of growth was 
fuelled by its role as a major coffee exporter 
in the nineteenth century. This opportunity 
arose from São Paulo’s strategic location: 
alongside two major rivers, between the 
coast and a vast, fertile plateau. The huge 
labour demand of the coffee plantations 
attracted European immigrants and a great 
number of Italians, Portuguese, Spanish  
and Germans settled there. 
When coffee prices plummeted at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, 
São Paulo’s local entrepreneurs switched 
investment into industrial development, 
shifting the economic emphasis from 
agriculture to industry. Once again, a great 
number of immigrants were attracted by the 
opportunities offered by the city, both from 
afar (Japan, Syria and Lebanon) and from 
regions closer by (north-eastern Brazil). 
The third transformation occurred at the 
end of the twentieth century as competition 
for industrial activity became more intense 
between Brazilian cities. This heralded a 
shift towards the service sector, and São 
Paulo is now the main business hub in 
Latin America, hosting many local and 
international banking offices, law firms, 
multinational companies and consumer 
services. The economy of the Metropolitan 
Region generates over 19 per cent of the 
national GDP, concentrated in established 
financial centres such as Avenida Paulista. 
The importance of immigration in the 
city’s evolution means that São Paulo is 
an extremely multicultural city. Indeed, 
over 100 ethnicities coexist in São Paulo 
today, with the main communities being 
Italian, Portuguese, African, Arab, German, 
Japanese and Lebanese. This pattern of 
migration reflects the administrative city’s 
growth: from 32,000 residents in 1880, 
240,000 in 1900, 1.3 million in 1940,  
3.8 million in 1960, 8.5 million in 1980  
and almost 11 million today. 
Despite all of these successes, urban 
development has raced ahead of urban 
planning and a limited public transport 
infrastructure. Heavy car use continues to 
congest the city’s streets while air and water 
pollution, extensive poverty, high crime 
rates and gang violence all pose debilitating 
challenges in what remains an extremely 
unequal and spatially segregated city. The 
poor are concentrated in the periphery, with 
extensive favelas existing alongside protected 
reservoirs. In terms of human development, 
the periphery exhibits levels closer to North 
Africa while the centre boasts levels similar 
to Scandinavian countries.
Education levels
The distribution of units in which the head of household 
lacks primary education in São Paulo presents a clearly 
defined pattern of segregation. In the periphery over  
50 per cent of families have a poorly educated head of 
household, while in the central areas this figure drops  
to 5 per cent. Nonetheless, sustained efforts to provide 
basic education across the city have seen a decrease in 
illiteracy rate in the metropolitan region from  
7.2 per cent in 2001 to 5.5 per cent in 2007. 
AREA 
(KM2)
POPULATION
(2005)
DENSITY 
(PEOPLE/KM2)
GDP 
(BN US$ CURRENT)
GDP/CAPITA
(US$ CURRENT)
% OF 
NATIONAL GDP 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNITS
BRAZIL 8,514,876 183,888,000 22 882 4,795 100% 27 unidades federativas
STATE OF SÃO PAULO 248,209 39,838,000 161 299 7,494 34% 645 prefeituras
SÃO PAULO  
METROPOLITAN REGION
7,944 19,226,426 2,420 171 8,896 19% 39 prefeituras 
SÃO PAULO 1,525 10,886,518 7,139 108 9,927 12% 31 subprefeituras
Of the 15 per cent of São Paulo’s population living in favelas, close to 60,000 people reside in Paraisópolis, the largest favela located in wealthy Morumbi.
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SÃO PAULO URBAN AGGLOMERATION
1950 2000 2020
2,334,038 17,099,204 21,124,314
SÃO PAULO
1950 2000 2020
2,198,096 10,434,252 11,210,909
Administrative city boundary
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RIO DE JANEIRO
Rio de Janeiro is the second largest city in 
Brazil, with a population of six million and 
a Metropolitan Region of 11.6 million people.  
It occupies most of the south-western portion of 
the Guanabara Bay, a flat terrain interspersed 
by hills and surrounded by mountains. The 
city developed along the coast of the bay  
and the Atlantic, and then expanded inland.
While São Paulo’s history has been shaped 
most profoundly by economic factors, it is 
politics that has affected Rio de Janeiro. The 
city’s early history was shaped by colonialism. 
Founded in the sixteenth century by the 
Portuguese to claim back the bay from French 
settlers, it quickly became a strategic location 
for the Atlantic transit of ships between 
Brazil, the African colonies and Europe. 
This position was confirmed in the eighteenth 
century when Portugal’s colonial 
administration was moved to Rio de Janeiro, 
and then again in the early -nineteenth 
century when the Portuguese royal family 
fled to the city during the Napoleonic wars, 
establishing Rio de Janeiro as the only 
European capital outside Europe. 
During twentieth-century industrialisation, 
Rio de Janeiro’s status as a capital city made 
it an attractive location for investors, and  
for the headquarters of major state-owned 
companies. Despite the transfer of the 
national capital to Brasília in 1960, Rio de 
Janeiro kept attracting more companies, 
especially those involved in oil and gas after 
the nearby discovery of oil in the Campos 
Basin (which produces most of Brazil’s oil). 
Today, the city ranks second nationally in 
terms of industrial production, is host to  
the second most active stock market in 
Brazil, and is a major service centre. It is 
also a national telecommunications and 
entertainment hub as well as the nation’s  
top tourist attraction for both Brazilians  
and foreigners. It has an extremely vibrant 
culture, borne from its multi-ethnical 
make-up. Indeed, almost half of the population 
is black or mixed-race and their cultural 
influence is expressed in the Rio de Janeiro 
Carnival and its Samba.
However, like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro 
is plagued by a number of social problems, 
the most salient of which are inequality and 
crime. The disparities between rich and 
poor in Rio de Janeiro are reflected spatially: 
the poorest favelas are crowded onto the 
hillsides above the waterfront, where sturdy 
buildings are difficult to build, accidents 
from heavy rainfall are frequent, and access 
to sanitation and electricity networks can  
be inconsistent. 
These favelas exist in close proximity  
to the city’s wealthiest districts, with upper-
class neighbourhoods such as Ipanema and 
Copacabana squeezed in between the beach 
and the hills. These disparities can be 
argued to contribute to Rio de Janeiro’s  
high crime rates: murder rates are 17 times 
higher than in London. Violence is most 
acute in the favelas, where the poor are 
preyed upon by gangs and drug traffickers, 
and where corruption and violence have 
undermined confidence in law enforcement. 
AREA 
(KM2)
POPULATION
(2005)
DENSITY 
(PEOPLE/KM2)
GDP 
(BN US$ CURRENT)
GDP/CAPITA
(US$ CURRENT)
% OF  
NATIONAL GDP 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNITS
BRAZIL 8,514,876 183,888,000 22 882 4,795 100% 27 unidades federativas
STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO 43,696 15,406,478 353 101 6,582 12% 92 prefeituras 
RIO DE JANEIRO 
METROPOLITAN REGION
5,724 11,563,302 2,020 71 6,128 8% 20 prefeituras 
RIO DE JANEIRO 1,261 6,093,472 4,832 49 8,018 6% 18 subprefeituras
Christ the Redeemer Statue
RIO DE JANEIRO URBAN AGGLOMERATION
1950 2000 2020
2,950,238 10,802,750 13,178,717
RIO DE JANEIRO
1950 2000 2020
2,377,451 5,857,904 6,234,509
D
an
te
 B
us
qu
et
s
Education levels
Despite sustained efforts to improve access to 
education, the national literacy rate for the population 
aged 15 and over in Brazil was 88.6 per cent in 2005, 
lagging behind other Latin American countries like 
Argentina, Ecuador and Paraguay. In Rio de Janeiro, the 
distribution of families in which the head of household 
has a poor level of education shows a widespread 
pattern across the entire metropolitan area, with peaks 
in the more outlying areas. Instead Rio de Janeiro’s 
central districts, Niteroi and the southern coastal 
neighbourhoods have less than 5 per cent of families 
with a poorly educated head of household. A recent 
survey suggests that half of the city’s population of 
15-17 year-olds does not go to secondary school. 
Administrative city boundary
Advanced High Relatively high Relatively low
Low Poorly educated
Metropolitan region boundary
Administrative city boundary
Beyond the city centre, the panoramic view from the Christ the Redeemer Statue takes in Sugarloaf Mountain, the beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema, as well as several of the city’s favelas.
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BUENOS AIRES
Buenos Aires is Argentina’s financial, 
industrial, commercial, and cultural hub. 
Located on the southern shore of the Río de 
la Plata on the south-eastern coast of South 
America, Buenos Aires is the country’s 
capital and largest city with a population 
of three million in the city. Over 12 million 
people live in Greater Buenos Aires, South 
America’s second largest conurbation. 
Founded in 1536, the early history  
of Buenos Aires was dominated by trade, 
though also by tensions with Spanish 
colonisers who sought to direct trade 
through Lima and were ejected from the 
city in 1810. From the second half of the 
twentieth century until the 1920s, Buenos 
Aires experienced rapid growth and 
development of infrastructure, including 
South America’s first underground metro 
system, made possible by the wealth 
generated by the fertile pampas around the 
city, by its strategic riverside position, and 
by the construction of the railway system 
that allowed raw materials to flow into its 
factories. Buenos Aires became a favoured 
destination for European immigrants – a 
multicultural city that ranked alongside the 
major European capitals. 
This golden era ended with the global 
economic crisis of the late 1920s. As the 
city’s population continued to grow, many 
workers in the city were forced to relocate to 
peripheral shanty towns in order to survive. 
In the next decade, this impoverished 
population would provide the social base 
for Juan Peron’s populist nationalism. 
Following Peron’s deposition in 1955, the 
ensuing three decades were marred by 
military rule, uprisings and state-sponsored 
violence that left little room for planned 
urban development. 
Following the resumption of democratic 
rule, a constitutional amendment was 
passed in 1993 that gave the city autonomy 
from the federal state and allowed it to elect 
its own mayor. This authority corresponds 
with the economic dominance of the city, 
which contributes close to one-quarter 
of the to the national GDP. The city’s 
economy is defined in part by its port, one 
of the busiest in South America, which is 
connected to north-east Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Paraguay by navigable rivers 
that serve a vast area of south-eastern South 
America. Even so, the Mayor’s authority over 
metropolitan-wide issues is greatly limited 
since the city occupies only five per cent  
of the area of Greater Buenos Aires. 
The disparity between its service-
oriented city centre and a Metropolitan 
Region dominated by agriculture and 
manufacturing industry is reflected in 
its physical and social composition. The 
city’s high human development index 
(HDI) reveals concentrations of better 
educated middle and upper classes in 
the small administrative city (203 km2) 
along with businesses and most transport 
infrastructure, while the poor live in the 
peripheral areas of the Metropolitan Region. 
Education levels
South American cities such as Buenos Aires reveal strong 
patterns of segregation in educational attainment across 
the city as a whole. At 97.2 per cent, Argentina has a very 
high national literacy rate for the population aged 15 and 
over, but in Buenos Aires there is an unequal distribution 
of the lower educated population, with a concentration  
of families with a high proportion of children under the 
age of 14 in peripheral areas. The Partidos in the South, 
West and North of the city are particularly affected due  
to land tenure vulnerability and the absence of basic 
social infrastructure.
AREA 
(KM2)
POPULATION 
(2005)
DENSITY 
(PEOPLE/KM2)
GDP 
(BN US$ CURRENT)
GDP/CAPITA
(US$ CURRENT)
% OF 
NATIONAL GDP 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNITS
ARGENTINA 2,766,889 38,592,150 14 183 5,840 100% 23 provincias + 
1 ciudad autonoma
PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES 307,571 14,654,379 48 60 4,085 33% 134 partidos
GREATER BUENOS AIRES 3,839 12,198,207 3,177 n/a n/a n/a 24 partidos
BUENOS AIRES 203 3,018,102 14,867 43 14,231 24% 15 comunas
El Obelisco 
BUENOS AIRES URBAN AGGLOMERATION
1950 2000 2020
5,097,612 11,847,329 13,652,564 
BUENOS AIRES
1950 2000 2020
2,981,043 2,995,397 3,122,542
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Low Poorly educated
Avenida 9 de Julio spans an entire city-block and ranks among the widest streets in the world. Its tree-lined traffic lanes stretch north-south through the downtown area, home to a resilient 
middle-class population which has remained stable despite decades of rampant change in Greater Buenos Aires.
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BOGOTÁ
Bogotá is the capital city of Colombia and 
the most populous city in the country with 
nearly 7 million inhabitants and a Metropolitan 
Region population of over 8 million. Located 
between a mountain range and fertile 
agricultural land, Bogotá is the highest-
altitude city in the world after La Paz and 
Quito. The city is home to Colombia’s largest 
economic centre and main stock market. 
Of the five South American cities included 
in this study, Bogotá is the only one that was 
already inhabited when the Spanish colonised  
it in 1538. Always seen as a regional capital, 
Bogotá was, until the early-nineteenth century, 
the capital of the Viceroyalty of Grenada,  
an area that broadly encompassed modern 
Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 
In 1819, Bogotá was liberated by Simon 
Bolivar and made capital of Gran Colombia, 
a federation including those same states. 
After Gran Colombia’s dissolution in 1831, 
Bogotá became the capital of the Republic  
of Colombia. 
The rest of the nineteenth century was 
dominated by civil wars and in 1900 the 
isolated city’s population was only about 
100,000. The construction of railways and 
infrastructure, as well as a hydro-electric 
dam, and in 1920, South America’s first 
airport, enabled development into the 
twentieth century alongside a tripling of  
the population by the 1930s. 
Following urban and rural political 
disturbances in the 1950s, the city’s pattern 
of growth changed. Richer residents moved 
out of the centre to peripheral areas, forcing 
the city to modernise them and to extend 
infrastructure and transport networks. At 
the same time, rural violence led to a mass 
influx of people in Colombia’s largest cities, 
and especially to Bogotá. These factors led  
to a sharp increase in both the spatial extent 
of the city and its population, which went 
from a little over 630,000 in 1951 to around  
7 million today. In 1955, the municipality 
was extended to take over neighbouring 
municipalities, and the next four decades 
saw the creation of new municipalities 
around the city. In 1991, a further merger  
of the municipalities created a new 
administrative entity: the Distrito Capital,  
or Capital District. 
While problems of out-migration  
persist, Bogotá’s mayors have in recent years 
implemented innovative programmes that 
address shortcomings in transport, green 
space and education. One of the most 
noteworthy is the TransMilenio ‘bus rapid 
transit’ (BRT) system. Other initiatives 
include a city-wide programme of bicycle 
paths, public schools and library construction. 
Bogotá has also reduced crime and murder 
rates – dropping from 61 to 24 murders  
per 100,000 in a little over ten years. 
Education levels
At 92.8 per cent, Colombia has a high national literacy rate 
for the population aged 15 and over, yet Bogotá displays 
inequality in the distribution of poorly educated children. 
This pattern is closely related to other social variables across 
the city’s localidades (boroughs) – such as Ciudad Bolívar 
and Rafael Uribe – which reflect the social and economic 
dynamics of accelerated urbanisation. The localidades 
situated at the southern end of the city have the highest 
urban growth. The distribution of inequality forms the basis 
of a city-wide strategy that prioritises fiscal and investments 
programmes that benefit the most deprived social groups. 
AREA 
(KM2)
POPULATION 
(2005)
DENSITY 
(PEOPLE/KM2)
GDP 
(BN US$ CURRENT)
GDP/CAPITA
(US$ CURRENT)
% OF 
NATIONAL GDP 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNITS
COLOMBIA 1,138,194 42,888,592 38 144 3,365 100% 32 departamentos + 
1 distrito capital
DEPARTMENT OF CUNDINAMARCA  
(EXCL. BOGOTÁ D.C.)
22,435 2,200,790 98 8 3,512 5% 115 municipios
DEPARTMENT OF CUNDINAMARCA  
(INCL. BOGOTÁ D.C.)
24,210 9,040,906 373 44 4,862 30% 116 municipios
BOGOTÁ METROPOLITAN AREA 3,732 8,074,212 2,164 n/a n/a n/a 18 municipios
BOGOTÁ 1,775 6,840,116 3,854 36 5,296 25% 20 localidades
Ciudad Universitaria
BOGOTÁ URBAN AGGLOMERATION
1950 2000 2020
630,315 6,355,892 9,298,779 
BOGOTÁ
1950 2000 2020
630,315 6,302,881 8,380,801 
Metropolitan region boundary
Administrative city boundary
Administrative city boundary
Advanced High Relatively high Relatively low
Low Poorly educated
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More than 50 per cent of the inhabitants of Bogotá were born somewhere else, attracted in part by the city’s international acclaim owing to a city-wide renaissance over the last decade. 
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LIMA
Lima is Peru’s capital and largest city. It is 
located on desert land on Peru’s Pacific 
coast, around the valleys of the Chillón, 
Rímac and Lurín rivers, and forms, together 
with the major port of Callao, a continuous 
urban area referred to as the Metropolitan 
Region of Lima and Callao. 
Following the Spanish conquest of the 
Inca Empire, Lima was established as the 
capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru, which  
at the time corresponded roughly with the 
whole Spanish colonial empire. Its prestige 
was enhanced by the fact that Callao served 
as the shipping base for all Incan gold that 
was sent back to Europe, and Lima also 
hosted South America’s first university and 
printing press. The city flourished during  
the seventeenth century as the centre of a 
trade network that extended as far as Europe 
and the Philippines, but the city’s growth was 
hampered by a series of major earthquakes 
between 1582 and 1746, the last of which 
caused immense damage. Lima nevertheless 
remained the most important Spanish  
city in South America until the early 
nineteenth century.
After independence, a mid-nineteenth-
century economic boom led to renewed 
growth, and in 1872 the city walls were torn 
down to enable expansion. However, during 
the 1879-1883 War of the Pacific, Chilean 
troops occupied Lima, destroying and 
burning some parts of it. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, the city remained 
relatively small, with a population of around 
170,000. But from the 1940s onwards, internal 
immigration accelerated growth – from 
650,000 in 1940, to 1.85 million in 1960, and 
to 4.6 million in 1980 – which outstripped 
public services, giving rise to large shanty 
towns, or pueblos jóvens, some of which have 
now been retrofitted with infrastructure  
and are fully incorporated into Lima. 
The Metropolitan Region of Lima and 
Callao today is home to almost 7.8 million 
people, spread over an area of 2,800 km2. 
The vast majority live within the City of Lima, 
Peru’s industrial and financial centre, which 
accommodates more than two thirds of the 
country’s industrial production and most of 
its service sector. Callao remains one of the 
main fishing and commerce ports in South 
America, handling 75 per cent of Peru’s 
foreign trade. Consequently, the Metropolitan 
Region of Lima and Callao accounts for  
47 per cent of Peru’s GDP, and most of the 
foreign companies operating in the country 
are based there.
Public transport provision is a major 
challenge for Lima. Since privatisation in  
the 1980s, an illegal but tolerated system  
of private mini-buses created erratic and 
sometimes dangerous travel conditions in 
the city. In 2005, the municipality was given 
authority to extend the metro network 
beyond its one line, while a BRT system  
is also planned.
Education levels
While the national literacy rate in Peru is around 88 per 
cent, it rises to almost 96 per cent in Lima, reflecting the 
higher concentration of better facilities and levels of 
educational attainment across the capital. Nevertheless, 
within the city there is a clear pattern of inequality with 
less educated populations concentrated on the fringes. 
Many districts such as Villa Maria del Triunfo and Villa El 
Salvador in the South, and Ventanilla and Puente Piedra 
in the North concentrate the highest number of people 
without primary education, while in central districts such 
as San Isidro, San Borja and Miraflores over 60 per cent  
of the population has higher levels of education. 
AREA  
(KM2)
POPULATION 
(2005)
DENSITY 
(PEOPLE/KM2)
GDP 
(BN US$ CURRENT)
GDP/CAPITA
(US$ CURRENT)
% OF 
NATIONAL GDP 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNITS
PERU 1,285,220 26,152,265 20 79 3,039 100% 25 regiones
REGION OF LIMA PROVINCIAS  
(EXCL. METROPOLITAN REGION OF LIMA AND CALLAO)
32,129 812,048 25 n/a n/a n/a 177 distritos
REGION OF LIMA PROVINCIAS  
(INCL. METROPOLITAN REGION OF LIMA AND CALLAO)
34,923 8,577,163 246 n/a n/a n/a 226 distritos
METROPOLITAN REGION OF LIMA AND CALLAO 2,794 7,765,115 2,779 37 4,829 47% 49 distritos
LIMA 2,665 6,924,547 2,598 n/a n/a n/a 43 distritos
Plaza de Armas 
LIMA URBAN AGGLOMERATION
1950 2000 2020
1,065,888 7,116,441 9,251,023 
LIMA
1950 2000 2020
n/a 6,400,000 n/a 
Metropolitan region boundary
Administrative city boundary
Administrative city boundary
Advanced High Relatively high Relatively low
Low Poorly educated
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Approximately 370,000 people live in the largely self-organising district of Villa El Salvador on the outskirts of the city. The area began as a shantytown in the empty sand flats to the south of 
the city almost 40 years ago because of the urgent housing shortage among immigrant families.
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SÃO PAULO
São Paulo’s city government is led by a directly-elected mayor, 
and São Paulo State is led by a directly-elected governor. The 
mismatch between São Paulo’s municipal boundaries and the 
extent of the city requires these two levels to work very closely 
together. In terms of transport, the city government controls part 
of the urban transport system while the state is responsible for 
integrated transport planning across the metropolitan region. 
With respect to housing, both levels have housing enterprises 
with specific responsibilities. As concerns security, the military 
and civilian police forces fall under the State’s authority, while 
the city maintains a local police force. In the field of education, 
responsibilities are divided between the state and the city 
governments while in health, an institutionalised structure of 
management exists that distributes responsibilities to federal, 
state and local governments. A third decentralised level also exists 
under the municipality: 31 subprefeituras are the main point of 
contact for the population, manage local public services and have 
some planning and transport responsibilities.  
GOVERNING CITIES
BOGOTÁ
Bogotá’s city government is headed by a directly-elected mayor 
and a separately-elected council. As Colombia’s Capital District, 
it has the administrative status of a department and thus enjoys 
full autonomy from Cundinamarca, the greater administrative 
area in which it is located. The Mayor operates as the executive 
arm of the city government, with the city council performing a 
legislative function. City government’s remit includes transport, 
environmental issues, economic development, healthcare, and 
education. In the field of security, even though the police is a national 
force, the Mayor is constitutionally the Chief of Police of the city. 
Beneath city government, Bogotá has 20 partially autonomous Local 
Administrative Boards – while the local population elects its members, 
it is the Mayor of Bogotá that chooses the local Mayor. These Local 
Administrative juntas prepare district level plans and programmes 
for economic and social development and are also responsible for the 
management of the municipal funds they receive.
BUENOS AIRES
In 1994, the City of Buenos Aires adopted a constitution that allows its 
citizens the right to choose their own government. The city, Argentina’s 
capital, is governed by a directly-elected Mayor and a 60-member 
City Assembly. City government manages education, health care, 
housing, parks and social and economic development. But provincial 
government, led by a directly-elected governor, retains many 
functions, including policing. While the city can regulate land use, it 
cannot independently organise public transport (with the exception 
of municipal bus lines), which is managed by private companies under 
supervision of the provincial government. Additionally, the Buenos 
Aires metro and commuter rail network has been privatised since 
1994, stripping governments on both levels of any strategic planning 
with respect to transport. In 2007, the city embarked on a new 
decentralisation scheme, creating new comunas managed by seven-
member elected committees. These have authority over social and 
cultural policies at neighbourhood level as well as the management  
of green spaces and secondary roads.
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NEW YORK
New York City’s government operates within a legislative framework 
determined at state level (the Federal State of New York). Federal 
government in the United States has no direct powers to direct or 
legislate for the actions of individual cities, though federal agencies 
operate in all parts of the country. However, the state level of 
government is important both as a legislator but also because of its 
powers of budgetary supervision. The state also runs the major 
transport systems, is co-owner of the city’s airports and some elements 
of economic development. Within its powers, the city is powerful by 
international standards, with the Mayor of New York one of the most 
important politicians in the United States. Local legislation is the 
responsibility of the City Council. New York City government is 
responsible for public education, public hospitals, social care, the 
environment, local transport and planning. There are five boroughs, 
headed by an elected Borough President, which have rights to  
be consulted, though they provide no services. There are also  
59 Community Boards which provide advocacy for neighbourhoods. 
These six charts are illustrative indications of how government structures are organised in São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, New 
York, Mumbai and London. They are designed to give a crude impression of how the basic patterns of responsibilities are organised 
within each of these cities, identifying some of the key functions carried out at central, state and local government level. While they 
offer a useful comparative overview they are not intended to give an accurate account of the detailed systems of accountability, 
which can only be explained comprehensively on a case-by-case basis.
LONDON
London’s government operates within a relatively centralised, unitary 
state. Several central departments have responsibilities within the city, 
including health care, the regulation of commuter railways and as final 
arbiter for major planning decisions. Central government also has a 
number of regulatory powers over the Mayor and the city’s boroughs. 
The Mayor of London is the elected executive for a number of major 
city-wide services, notably public transport and spatial planning.  
The Mayor is overseen by an elected, non-legislative assembly. There 
are also 32 elected borough councils whose responsibilities include 
schools, social care, the environment, local transport and local 
planning. The City of London, the UK capital’s financial and 
business hub, has the powers of a borough but also several 
additional responsibilities. The government of London has been 
reformed on several occasions since the late-nineteenth century,  
most recently in 2000 to allow Londoners to vote for a mayor for  
the first time in their history.
MUMBAI
Mumbai’s government involves interventions at national, the state of 
Maharashtra and local levels. The national government has a number 
of powerful departments that provide services and resources for the 
city. There is a powerful level of state government, headed by a Chief 
Minister, which operates many services within the city, including 
roads, housing, education, health care, environmental services and 
policing. The city government is headed by an elected Mayor with 
limited power. The real executive power lies in the hands of the 
Municipal Commissioner and the Secretary for Special Projects, both 
civil servants appointed directly by the Maharashtra State government. 
The state government is about to constitute a Metropolitan Planning 
Committee for the Metropolitan Area as required by the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). There is 
significant overlap between responsibilities at state and city levels. 
Overall, the city government is relatively less powerful than the state  
as required by the JNNURM.
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CITIES AND REGIONS
Cities are dynamic, while administrative geography is static. 
As cities have grown, many municipal boundaries look 
increasingly outdated and unrepresentative of the functional 
extent of the city. 
The Urban Age has a primary focus on the municipal 
level of organisation, reporting data at this level and targeting 
municipal government in drawing out implications for public 
policy. Nonetheless, it is important to see municipalities within 
their wider metropolitan and regional context. For example, 
while the São Paulo municipality (covering around 1,500 
km2) comprises more than ten million people, the wider  
São Paulo Metropolitan Region (covering around 8,000 km2) 
has a population of over 19 million, and includes many  
of the peripheral settlements (including decentralised 
industrial areas and favelas) that form part of São Paulo’s 
functional metabolism. At the other extreme, Shanghai 
covers more than 6,000 km2 and includes extensive areas  
of agricultural land as well as built-up space.
Other Urban Age cities show a varying degree of 
matching. While London’s boundaries broadly match the 
‘Green Belt’ that constrains its growth, the city forms part  
of the densely-populated south-eastern region, with cities 
around its periphery forming part of its functional economic 
geography. New York includes rural areas in Staten Island, 
but across the Hudson River, Newark and Atlantic City are 
not only separate municipalities, but part of a separate state 
(New Jersey). In other cases, like Berlin and Johannesburg, 
there is a closer correlation between built-up area and 
municipal boundaries.
These differing administrative arrangements have 
implications for both analysis and governance. Firstly,  
they require a degree of caution in interpreting raw data  
on a city-wide basis; apparent dissimilarities in economic 
and social structure, or physical form, can be exaggerated  
or even brought into being by differing geographies. For  
this reason, some elements of the Urban Age research are 
presented for a specified area: our density diagrams on  
pages 32-33 are presented in relation to 100 x 100 km2 tiles,  
and the diagrams on this page represent 315 x 315 km2.
Mismatched boundaries can create the potential for 
conflict between neighbouring administrations. For 
example, while São Paulo’s municipal boundary extends 
southwards to take in two major water sources (the 
Guarapiranga and Billings reservoirs), upstream pollution  
of the Tiete and Pinheiros rivers remains a challenge for 
cooperation between São Paulo and neighbouring 
municipality Guarahulhos.
Conflicts can arise over social and economic issues  
too. In cities like Bogotá, the city’s boundaries are seen  
as undermining social cohesion and the city’s tax base,  
as richer people migrate to suburbs located in different 
municipalities (attracted by lower tax rates and, in some 
cases, by planning regulations that permit more sprawling 
development patterns). 
A related problem is the way in which the political 
representation of urban areas lags behind their relative 
growth, often compounding an anti-urban bias in national 
political discourse. For example, while São Paulo State 
houses more than 20 per cent of Brazil’s population, its 
representation in Brazil’s National Assembly is capped at 
13.5 per cent, with only four per cent of Senate seats, which 
are shared equally among Brazil’s states. This means that  
São Paulo State has less than two representatives per million 
people in the National Assembly, compared to an average  
of five across Brazil.
Praça da Sé 
SÃO PAULO
El Obelisco 
BUENOS AIRES
Christ the Redeemer Statue
RIO DE JANEIRO
SÃO PAULO METROPOLITAN REGION  
7,944 km2 
SÃO PAULO: 31 SUBPREFEITURAS 
1,525 km2 
RIO DE JANEIRO METROPOLITAN REGION  
5,724 km2
RIO DE JANEIRO: 18 SUBPREFEITURAS 
1,261 km2 
 
GREATER BUENOS AIRES  
3,839 km2
BUENOS AIRES: 15 COMUNAS 
203 km2 
URBAN AGGLOMERATION 1950 2008 2025
SÃO PAULO 2,334,038 19,097,819 21,427,559
RIO DE JANEIRO 2,950,238 11,890,040 13,413,254
BUENOS AIRES 5,097,612 12,901,465 13,767,514
BOGOTÁ 630,315 7,969,462 9,600,119
LIMA 1,065,888 8,139,667 9,599,648
NEW YORK 12,338,471 19,181,849 20,628,241
LONDON 8,360,847 8,585,818 8,617,842
SHANGHAI 6,065,511 15,244,010 19,412,266
MEXICO CITY 2,883,228 19,178,471 21,008,776
JOHANNESBURG 899,876 3,506,876 4,040,979
BERLIN 3,351,757 3,412,490 3,435,600
MUMBAI 2,857,359 19,348,649 26,385,026
2007 UN World Urbanization Prospects
POPULATION GROWTH
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1,644 km2 
30  URBAN AGE CITY DATA
URBAN FOOTPRINT
Praça da Sé 
SÃO PAULO
El Obelisco 
BUENOS AIRES
Christ the Redeemer Statue
RIO DE JANEIRO
SÃO PAULO METROPOLITAN REGION  
19,226,426 people
SÃO PAULO  
10,886,518 people
GREATER BUENOS AIRES  
12,198,207 people
BUENOS AIRES 
3,018,102 people
RIO DE JANEIRO METROPOLITAN REGION 
11,563,302 people
RIO DE JANEIRO 
6,093,472 people
These previously unpublished maps identify the built-up 
area (shown in grey) of twelve world cities, drawn to  
the same scale. They have been drafted using the latest  
‘heat-sensitive’ GIS technology based on recent satellite 
views rather than on census or survey data. As a result they 
give both an accurate and contemporary account of the real 
shape of the human footprint in these metropolitan regions 
today, offering a new perspective of settlement patterns across  
a range of global cities. 
Two phenomena immediately stand out. The first is the 
clear misalignment in some cities between the administrative 
boundaries and where people live and work. São Paulo spills 
out of its municipal boundaries with a level of uncontrolled 
peripheral development that is similar to Mexico City (which 
overshoots the boundary of Mexico’s Distrito Federale 
governed by the city’s Mayor) and the lower density urban 
development on the fringes of New York City (outside the 
five boroughs controlled by New York’s Mayor). 
Instead, London demonstrates the effectiveness of its 
‘Green Belt’ – revealed by the white circle around its 
periphery – that has acted as an effective urban containment 
boundary for the last 50 years, and is now controlled by the 
Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority. Shanghai’s 
vast administrative boundary encompasses nearly all the 
continuous built-up area and the large number of farms and 
agricultural land, as well as the Chong Ming Island in the 
Yellow River Delta. Reforms in boundary configuration have 
determined that the bulk of Bogotá’s population falls under 
the administrative authority of the city Mayor, while the 
larger component of Buenos Aires falls within the Buenos 
Aires State Government.
The second significant finding is the extreme variation in  
‘land-take’ of cities in response to their geographic locations 
and differing population densities (further data on density 
follows on the next pages). Mumbai, with a population size 
comparable to São Paulo and Shanghai – is densely packed 
in a relatively small footprint within its natural contours 
between the Arabian Sea and the Thane Creek. São Paulo  
has been able to expand horizontally along its high plateau, 
encroaching on natural features and water reservoirs to the 
South. In a similar fashion Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Rio 
de Janeiro and Lima are constrained by the incidence of 
natural features including high mountains on one side and 
the ocean coastline on the other, which have shaped their 
geometries with ‘fingers’ of (often informal) settlements 
along the deep valleys connecting to the more structured 
waterfront areas. Shanghai reveals a pattern of organic 
‘satellite towns’ along radial routes feeding to the heart of 
this Asian megacity, with the bulk of development in central 
areas close to the Huang-Po River. Johannesburg is a unique 
phenomenon across the sample of Urban Age cities, with its 
relatively empty inner-city core, while a large proportion  
of its population is located in the wider Gauteng Province, 
which is set to become one of the largest metropolitan  
areas in Africa. 
 METROPOLITAN REGION  ADMINISTRATIVE CITY
SÃO PAULO 21% 56%
RIO DE JANEIRO 29% 51%
BUENOS AIRES 47% 89%
BOGOTÁ data not available 18%
LIMA 26% 25%
NEW YORK 13% 88%
LONDON 7% 53%
SHANGHAI 18% 18%
MEXICO CITY 25% 36%
JOHANNESBURG 5% 18%
BERLIN 11% 38%
MUMBAI 15% 53%
BUILT-UP AREA
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DENSITY
Urban density (illustrated here in terms of the number of people 
living in each km2 of a 100 x 100 km2 urban area) is driven by 
topographical constraints, by the provision of public transport 
and other infrastructure, but also by inherited traditions of 
urban planning and development. While high density can be a 
symptom of overcrowding, it can also enable a better quality of 
life and limit environmental impact by enabling walking and 
cycling, enhancing urban vitality and making the provision  
of public transport and other amenities more viable.
Urban Age cities include a wide range of different density 
patterns, from the very high densities exhibited in the centres of 
Mumbai and Shanghai, to the much lower density development 
patterns of Berlin and London. A third category, exemplified 
among the Urban Age cities by Johannesburg but also visible 
in many North American cities, shows limited areas of high 
density set around a downtown that no longer has a residential 
population, in the midst of a very low-density sprawl. 
In falling between the extremes, most of the Urban Age 
South American cities exhibit similar patterns to New York. 
Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Rio de Janeiro and Lima show how the 
constraints of mountains and water drive densities that rise  
to a ‘spike’ like Manhattan’s. 
São Paulo, on the other hand, is multi-centred (though with 
a high-density centre) and similar in its overall density pattern 
to Mexico City. This is striking, given that the two cities are 
very different in terms of their urban form: São Paulo’s skyline 
is dominated by high-rise apartment blocks, while Mexico City 
is consistently low-rise (see next section for analysis of these 
differing forms). Urban form and density are different concepts, 
however, and the similarity of these two cities’ density profiles 
shows how high-rise building does not necessarily create higher 
density by comparison with more tightly planned low-rise 
development, especially when individual towers are surrounded 
by large areas of motorways or unused space.
DENSITY METROPOLITAN REGION
ADMINISTRATIVE  
CITY
CENTRAL AREA 
(WITHIN 10 KM OF 
CENTRE POINT)
PEAK
SÃO PAULO 2,420 7,139 10,299 29,380
RIO DE JANEIRO 2,020 4,832 8,682 29,450
BUENOS AIRES 3,177 14,867 12,682 49,340
BOGOTÁ 2,164 3,854 21,808 59,870
LIMA 2,779 2,598 12,620 31,342
NEW YORK 783 9,551 15,361 53,000
LONDON 679 4,795 7,805 17,200
SHANGHAI 2,862 2,862 24,673 96,200
MEXICO 3,796 5,877 12,541 48,300
JOHANNESBURG 520 1,962 2,270 38,500
BERLIN 801 3,806 7,124 21,700
MUMBAI 4,090 27,348 34,269 101,066
RESIDENTIAL DENSITIES OF CITY AND REGION (PEOPLE/KM2)
SÃO PAULO PEAK 29,380 pp/km2
RIO DE JANEIRO PEAK 29,450 pp/km2
BUENOS AIRES PEAK 49,340 pp/km2
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Population Density (people/km2)
LIMA PEAK 31,342 pp/km2
MEXICO CITY PEAK 48,300 pp/km2
SHANGHAI PEAK 96,200 pp/km2
LONDON PEAK 17,200 pp/km2
BOGOTÁ PEAK 59,870 pp/km2SÃO PAULO PEAK 29,380 pp/km2
RIO DE JANEIRO PEAK 29,450 pp/km2
JOHANNESBURG PEAK 38,500 pp/km2
MUMBAI PEAK 101,066 pp/km2
NEW YORK CITY PEAK 53,000 pp/km2
0 – 1,000 
1,000 – 5,000
5,000 –10,000
10,000 –20,000
20,000 and over
BERLIN PEAK 21,700 pp/km2
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BUENOS AIRES PALERMO
The layout of streets, buildings and spaces forms the spatial 
DNA of urban growth, the patterns through which city life 
can develop and cities can grow. These spatial arrangements 
are critical to the liveability of cities, to the quality of life that 
they can offer their residents, to the density that they can 
accommodate, and to their flexibility in adapting to change 
and growth.
The images presented here help to visualise the  
micro-structure of urban neighbourhoods, how buildings 
(in black) and open spaces (in white) come together to create 
an integrated urban whole. The maps presented each cover 
one km2, usually near the centre of the city under analysis.
The South American cities exhibit a variety of spatial 
structures, reflecting their different historical inheritance 
and development patterns. The low-rise Palermo district of 
Buenos Aires exhibits a highly regular urban grid around 
a clearly defined centre, analogous to centrally planned 
European (and in particular Spanish) cities, and Lima’s 
Miraflores district exhibits a similar form, while Bogotá’s 
rectangular blocks with central courtyards, around Parque 
de Virrey, are more like New York’s in their proportions.
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand, have 
a less regular urban form, reflecting their topographical 
characteristics and a colonial heritage that was Portuguese 
rather than Spanish. In Rio de Janeiro, the high-value 
apartment blocks on the headland between Ipanema and 
Copacabana beaches contrast starkly with the favelas that 
crawl up the slopes of Morro do Cantagalo. In São Paulo’s 
wealthy Jardins District, south-west of Avenida Paulista 
(seen surrounded by larger buildings in the top-right corner 
of the diagram), high-rise tower blocks are set apart from 
the urban grid, making streets almost impossible to discern 
from other areas of open, usually gated, space. 
The other Urban Age cities exhibit a similar diversity 
of urban layout. The central area of Buleshwar Market 
in Mumbai is formed by dense urban blocks, arranged 
efficiently along main streets and side alleyways. New York’s 
East Village shows how a dense continuous street grid has 
adapted to different economic cycles, as do Mexico City’s 
north-eastern neighbourhoods. In the Hongkou district of 
Shanghai and in Johannesburg, neighbourhoods are more 
dispersed, lacking the continuity found in the crescents  
of London’s Notting Hill or in the perimeter blocks of 
central Berlin.
URBAN FORM
SÃO PAULO JARDINS
RIO DE JANEIRO COPACABANA
Aerial view of the Jardins District in São Paulo.
1 km
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BERLIN PRENZLAUER BERGSHANGHAI HONGKOU DISTRICT
MEXICO CITY GUSTAVO A. MADERO DELEGACION
NEW YORK EAST VILLAGE JOHANNESBURG SANDTON
LIMA MIRAFLORES
LONDON NOTTING HILL MUMBAI BULESHWAR MARKET
BOGOTÁ PARQUE DE VIRREY
36  URBAN AGE CITY DATA
MOVING IN THE CITY
Transport infrastructure is a critical driver of urban form, 
enabling centralisation of economic functions and the 
accommodation of a growing population along metropolitan 
rail and bus routes. Where public transport infrastructure  
is not in place, space-hungry motorways dominate, usually 
resulting in more sprawling forms of development, and 
generating congestion as private car use persistently runs  
ahead of road building.
The Urban Age South America cities offer varying levels 
of transport infrastructure, though none has the extensive 
metro systems that have been put in place in London, New 
York and Berlin. As a result, many South American cities are 
now following Bogotá’s example in seeking to implement 
‘bus rapid transit’ systems, which re-allocate road space to 
dedicated bus corridors, thereby creating a bus system that 
can operate with a speed and frequency nearing that of 
metro systems, but without the considerable capital  
costs and disruption involved. 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro show a three-way split 
between walking and cycling, public transport, and private 
car use, with a stronger bias towards car use in Rio de 
Janeiro. Buenos Aires has very high public transport use, 
but it is notable that this appears to have displaced walking 
and cycling rather than private car use, despite the city’s 
compact urban form. Lima is dominated by various informal 
methods of road-based public transport (including micro-
buses and taxis), reflecting its minimal public transport 
system, while the dominance of public transport in Bogotá’s 
figures reflects the success of the TransMilenio system.
Buenos Aires has the most extensive rail network in 
South America, developed by a British-owned company 
in the late-nineteenth century. While this infrastructure 
has suffered from limited investment in recent decades, 
combined with pedestrianised central streets and a highly 
regular block formation, it creates one of South America’s 
most walkable cities.
São Paulo has a small but growing metro system, and is 
crossed by major railway lines, reflecting the city’s history 
as a centre for trade. While these railway corridors are 
dominated by freight, city transport planners are examining 
options for running more passenger services along them. 
The city is also currently implementing proposals for an 
orbital motorway network, to remove truck movements  
from its centre. 
Bogotá and Lima both exhibit extremely low levels of 
public transport infrastructure. In Lima, even the limited 
bus networks have been privatised, leading to inconsistent 
provision of services across the city, though new investment 
is now underway. Bogotá had an equally poor inheritance, 
but the introduction of the TransMilenio ‘bus rapid transit’ 
system has made a dramatic difference to journey times  
and to the public realm within the city.
METRO TICKET PRICE (US$) SYSTEM LENGTH (KM) 
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non-motorised transport
public transport
private motorised transport
Mumbai
Berlin
Johannesburg
Mexico City
London
Shanghai
New York 
Lima
Bogotá
Buenos Aires
Rio  de Janeiro
São Paulo 1.1
0.3
n/a
2
1
7
0.2
3.3
0.2
0.7
1.1
n/a
Besides metro systems which are most developed In Berlin, 
London and New York, regional rail is a significant component 
of rail transport in the twelve cities. The estimated GIS figures for 
the length of regional rail networks in each city within 70X70km 
emphasise the extensive amount of rail infrastructure in London 
and significant levels in Berlin, Johannesburg,  Buenos Aires, New 
York and Mumbai. 
The above figures refer to the prices for similar single metro tickets. In 
Mumbai, the price is for a general class rail ticket and in Johannesburg 
for a rail ticket. London has by far the most expensive metro tickets 
(US$ 7) amongst the twelve cities. Tickets in Buenos Aires, Mumbai and 
Mexico City are 10 to 30 times cheaper than in London and reflect the 
importance of the metro systems as an inclusive mode of transport 
there. Prices range from US$ 0.70 to US$ 1.10 in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, 
Shanghai and Johannesburg, while in New York and Berlin they are 
respectively US$ 2.00 and US$ 3.30.
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How people travel within cities – the ‘modal split’ –  reflects 
public transport infrastructure, but also economic development, 
climate and urban form: walking may dominate as a form  
of transport not only in cities designed to be pedestrian-
friendly, but also in cities where many residents do not have 
access to private motorised transport or do not have the 
means to pay for public transport. Walking therefore 
accounts for a massive 56 per cent of journeys in Mumbai 
and around 30 per cent of journeys in Johannesburg and 
Shanghai, but also accounts for a relatively high modal share 
in London and Berlin. Cycling, on the other hand, is limited 
in cities like Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro, where hilly terrain, 
a tropical climate or poor road safety make the experience 
unpleasant.
Car ownership has increased rapidly in many South 
American cities, particularly in the São Paulo Metropolitan 
Region (which added more than one million cars to its 
streets in the last five years), but remains highest among all 
Urban Age cities in Buenos Aires, reflecting the city’s status 
(until recently) as the richest city in South America. Buenos 
Aires also has a very high density of car ownership, though 
this is not fully reflected in modal split: car ownership  
does not necessarily imply car use.
Around 40 per cent of residents in New York’s midtown 
Manhattan walk to work and over 90 per cent of affluent 
business workers use public transport to go to London’s financial 
hub. Shanghai has experienced rapid growth in public transport 
use, while cycling remains prevalent. While Berlin has high rates 
of cycling, its relatively uncongested roads also allow high levels 
of car use (despite the presence of a high-quality public transport 
system). In some other cities, even where there is a good metro 
system (like Mexico City’s), informal transport by mini-bus 
often dominates, reflecting a mismatch between commuting 
patterns and infrastructure as well as the relatively high cost  
of public transport. 
MOVING IN THE CITY
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2,005
210
874
Rio de Janeiro
São Paulo
Buenos Aires
Bogotá
Lima
New York 
Shanghai
London
Mexico City
Johannesburg
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Road deaths per 100,000 residents are extremely high in Mexico 
City (29) and Johannesburg (26). They are lowest in London, Berlin, 
Shanghai, Buenos Aires, New York and Mumbai, with figures 
ranging between 1 and 4.4. São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá and 
Lima fall somewhere between these two extremes with figures 
between 8.2 in Bogotá and 14 in São Paulo. With the exception of 
Lima and Mexico City, road fatalities are lower than the national 
average in all cities.
The twelve cities exhibit varying degrees of non-motorised 
transport use, a crucial factor influencing urban quality of life. 
While in Shanghai and Mumbai walking and cycling make up  
more than 55 per cent of all trips, in New York and Buenos Aires  
it is 10 and 13 per cent respectively.
The above chart shows car ownership, expressed as the number of cars 
per 1,000 residents, and car density, the number of cars per km2. The  
data for Johannesburg refers to the Gauteng Province. Mumbai and 
Shanghai have the lowest levels of car ownership with respectively  
29 and 32 cars per 1,000 residents. This is in stark contrast to 429 
in Buenos Aires, 383 in Mexico City and 351 in São Paulo. All South 
American cities except Bogotá have very high numbers of cars per km2. 
Car density is by far the highest in Buenos Aires, where it is three times 
higher than in New York. 
non-motorised transport
public transport
private motorised transport
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Urbanisation was originally a product of the industrial 
revolution. Cities are now at the forefront of a new 
transformation, the shift to a more knowledge-based service 
economy, though different Urban Age cities are at different 
stages of this transition. The employment figures presented here 
show that London and New York are the cities that have moved 
furthest in this economic transformation, though neither 
city has an economy exclusively based on financial and 
business services; retail, leisure, personal and social services 
continue to be major sources of employment in both cities.
Most other Urban Age cities retain 10 to 20 per cent 
of their secondary sector employment – dominated by 
manufacturing, industry, and construction. In some 
cases, a small agricultural sector also remains. Within 
the South American cities, Lima and Bogotá remain the 
most industrialised, while São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
have significant financial services and real-estate sectors. 
Shanghai retains an extensive manufacturing base, but 
the relatively high proportion of agricultural employment 
indicates that this can partly be attributed to the wide 
territorial definition of the city, which includes  
rural and outlying areas. 
Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have the 
highest GDP per capita among the Urban Age cities after 
London, Mexico City, New York and Berlin, although of the 
other South American cities, Bogotá and Lima contribute 
more to their national economy, respectively 25 per cent  
and 50 per cent of their country’s wealth.
The shift towards a service-based economy has far-
reaching implications for urban government. New office 
development has created new urban districts (often away 
from the traditional city centre) in London (Canary Wharf), 
Buenos Aires (Puerto Madero), Mexico City (Santa Fe) and 
Johannesburg. In some cases, these new developments have 
been criticised for their lack of public infrastructure, for 
engendering social segregation and for draining life from  
the traditional central business district.
In addition, highly-paid service sector jobs are also 
knowledge-intensive, placing a premium on high quality 
education. Without more accessible education, cities  
may increasingly operate two parallel economies: one 
populated by a highly mobile, highly educated elite, the 
other dominated by people whose skills do not allow them  
to share in the prosperity that the knowledge economy  
can bring.
THE URBAN WORKFORCE
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In all cases, with the exception of Bogotá and Berlin, each of the Urban 
Age cities has a higher score for the Human Development Index (which 
combines life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment and GDP per 
capita) than their national hinterlands. New York, London and Berlin have 
the highest scores, followed by Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Shanghai and  
São Paulo. 
The literacy rate represents the percentage of the population above 
the age of 14 who can read or write. In the case of Mumbai, this figure 
refers to those above the age of six years. The data for Johannesburg 
refers to Gauteng Province. All cities have higher literacy rates than their 
respective countries and only Mumbai has literacy rates under the 90 per 
cent mark. 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX LITERACY RATE OF POPULATION  
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METROPOLITAN SCALE IN SÃO PAULO
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São Paulo was designated as a metropolitan region by the 
Federal Government in the 1970s under its Metropolitan 
Action Program. The São Paulo Metropolitan Region 
(SPMR) not only accommodates the largest urban population 
in the country, it also has the highest residential density 
at 2,420 people/km2. The city is at the centre of a radius of 
100 km regional hinterland that encompasses the SPMR’s 
nearly 19 million inhabitants and extends southwards to the 
Santos Coastal Metropolitan Region (1.7 million inhabitants), 
northwards to the Campinas Metropolitan Region (2.7 million 
inhabitants) and includes the city of Sorocaba and cities in  
the Paraíba Valley. 
The extended Metropolitan Region covers less than  
6 per cent of the area of the State of São Paulo and has a  
total population of 24 million inhabitants, which amounts to  
59 per cent of the state’s population. It generates 63 per cent  
of the state’s GDP and nearly 20 per cent of the national 
GDP. The SPMR covers an area of 7,944 km2 and includes  
39 municipalities, with the city of São Paulo (1,525 km2) at its 
centre. In the region, 95.7 per cent of the population is urban, 
with 10.9 million people concentrated in the municipality of  
São Paulo, and only 8 of the 39 municipalities not integrated  
in the continuous built-up area. 
Between 1990 and 2002, the built up area of the SPMR 
increased from 1,765 km2 to 2,208 km2, due mainly to the 
growth of illegal housing, often in environmentally protected 
areas surrounding the city’s peripheral water basins where 
there has been little or no investment by public and private 
sectors. The conflict between social and environmental forces is 
at the centre of informal growth patterns in these vulnerable 
areas which put natural resources and new residents at risk. 
The last decade has witnessed the construction of 
shopping malls, supermarkets, hypermarkets and fast-food 
outlets in the city’s and the state’s outlying areas. At the same 
time, approximately 900,000 inhabitants in the SPMR live 
in public housing complexes, called areas of ‘social interest’. 
Since the 1970s, the state and municipal governments have 
built approximately 210,000 dwellings that fall under this 
category, but the government’s limited capacity to produce 
housing for low-income families and the limited availability 
of financing has meant that the deficit between supply 
and demand has grown. In 2000, it was 529,000 dwellings, 
while by 2005 the deficit had increased to 738,300, affecting 
around 86 per cent of the most deprived families in the area. 
It is now clear that specific aspects of the city’s current 
organization must be discussed, since the metropolitan scale 
has been thus far considered only in reference to surface. 
Nothing has been added as to the way the new organism is 
understood, nor has any evaluation been made of the mobility 
impacts of recent major projects. Among other complex 
phenomena, the exact functioning of the metropolitan gears 
must also take into account that the conventional forms 
of industrial activity have been replaced with new types of 
labour arrangements. The attributions of metropolitan areas 
in this new stage of the Brazilian and international economies 
are expanding, largely due to the presence of organisations 
that are better able to perform new services and different 
industrial functions. The result is an important characteristic 
phenomenon in which services have become more important 
than industry.
Regina Meyer is a member of the Faculty of Architecture  
and Urbanism at the University of São Paulo (FAU/USP) 
and currently coordinates the Laboratory of Metropolis 
Urbanism (LUME).
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As one of the biggest cities in the world, São Paulo shares 
many of the beauties and the tragedies of being a major 
cosmopolitan centre. What is most striking is the level of 
inequality and diversity inside this one city. As in many 
other world cities, in São Paulo one will find modern 
buildings, the most up-to-date fashion, services and  
goods, the best brands from all over the world, high-tech 
commercial and entertainment centres, and modern 
hospitals and health services, as well as fine art exhibitions. 
At the same time, it faces the same structural problems as 
many cities but in very severe forms: appalling traffic, poor 
public transport, high levels of unemployment, very high 
levels of crime and violence, very poor air quality and in 
general high levels of pollution.
How do its citizens feel? Comparing the views of 
Paulistanos and Londoners, living in a very different global 
city, both single out job opportunities and the range of 
shops as the best things about it. In London many people 
also single out the diversity of the city – London is more 
diverse than anywhere else in Europe. Interestingly this  
is not an issue in São Paulo: although the city has a diverse 
series of migrant communities, most of its inhabitants  
don’t seem to take it for granted – only 5 per cent see it as  
a positive factor worth mentioning. Perhaps that is the 
difference between a city built on international migration 
and one that is thousands of years old but has only changed 
dramatically by migration recently.
It is when we come to problems and priorities for change 
that people in the two cities are very different. While for 
Londoners the top three issues are the cost of living, traffic, 
and crime, Paulistanos are more worried about health 
services, safety and crime rates, and public transport. The 
top problems in São Paulo are all related to public services 
– problems aggravated by the fact that the city has grown 
too fast without adequate planning. In the 1930s São Paulo 
became an industrial centre, and population in the ‘locomotive 
of Brazil’ exploded. In the 1900s, São Paulo had a population  
of 240,000 people. By the 1960s it was 3.8 million. In the 1990s, 
the Metropolitan Region had around 15 million, and now  
it totals more than 19 million people. 
While the migration of people to São Paulo is 
diminishing and the pace of population growth is slowing 
down, public services are now under huge pressure. Ratings 
of these are very negative compared to London (where 
criticising them is a popular hobby, but satisfaction is much 
higher), and an ageing population will increase pressure  
on them in both cities, especially in terms of health care. 
Health services stand out a as huge challenge for São Paulo, 
with a very low level of satisfaction compared to most 
European countries.
In fact, the only services the majority of Paulistanos are 
satisfied with are banks and supermarkets. All others have 
very low satisfaction scores compared to London or many 
other ‘western’ cities. Clearly the quality of public services 
has a huge impact on how satisfied people are with the city 
as a place to live. The more satisfied they are with public 
services the more satisfied they are with the city. But when 
asked how their city can improve, Londoners also cite 
healthcare, education and transport, although their views 
are less acute and more varied. In São Paulo the problems 
are more fundamental and there is far more consensus on 
what is needed. First people want to see the basic needs 
being supplied: the needs for better health and education 
services are seen as most pressing. These and public housing  
are absolutely key for the future of ‘Sampa’, taking precedence 
over even crime. 
Londoners actually attach more priority to crime levels 
than São Paulo residents: despite murder and kidnapping 
rates being much lower, and despite feeling safer in their 
own local areas than a decade ago, they are appalled by 
high profile ‘signal’ crimes such as teenage stabbings that 
now make the news daily in London.
Interestingly, once we look at the statistical relationship 
between what people say matters most, and what is revealed 
in their views via analysis, crime levels and traffic (among 
the most startling features for foreign visitors to the City), 
turn out to matter, if anything more than public services for 
quality of life. São Paulo faces many major challenges that 
its residents are well aware of.
URBAN AGE CITY SURVEY
As part of the 2008 research focus, Urban Age commissioned a city survey about quality of life in São Paulo to better  
understand the public’s perception of current urban trends. Luci Oliveira, Manager of Public Affairs at Ipsos Brazil,  
and Ben Page, Chairman of the Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute in London, highlight the survey’s major findings.
There are marked differences between the public’s perception and that of key stakeholders and experts with regards to the 
top challenges in São Paulo. The public view (left) was gathered by the Urban Age São Paulo poll conducted by Ipsos Mori in 
June 2008 of 1,000 residents living within the São Paulo Metropolitan Region. The perception of leaders and experts (right) was 
extracted from meetings in August 2007 with 44 key individuals working in various urban spheres of government and private 
practice. Clear differences are the degree to which ‘health’ and ‘crime’ are regarded as the top two challenges by the general 
public compared to ‘transport’ and ‘housing’ for urban leaders and experts. The latter view might partially be informed by which 
services city government is responsible for in contrast to the major overarching societal concerns identified by the general public.
PUBLIC OPINION LEADER & EXPERT OPINION
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What concerns people most about the city?
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What would improve quality of life in the city?What do people like most about the city?
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The city's top challenges
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Environmental problems in the city
ENVIRONMENT
The high volume of traffic and poor fuel quality (in Brazil, 
diesel has 500 particulates per million, while in Europe and 
the US, diesel has 10 particulates per million), as well as the 
sparse amount of green areas in the city make air quality a 
serious problem for residents in central areas of São Paulo. 
In outer areas, sewage systems are seen as more problematic. 
Interestingly, climate change – a topic which features high 
among environmental concerns for residents in many 
European cities – gets little recognition in São Paulo.
URBAN GOVERNANCE
A peculiar characteristic in São Paulo is that civic and political 
society seem much less effective than elsewhere. Its people are 
less politicised than in other big cities of the developed world. 
In Brazil voting is compulsory, but half of people in São Paulo 
cannot remember who they had voted for in the last elections 
for governor, while around 42 per cent are not sure who they 
voted to be mayor. In this context, accountability is weak. 
Satisfaction with the government in general is low, although as 
in other countries it is a little higher for local government than 
for the state government, reflecting criticism of health services 
and public safety.
But despite low satisfaction with so many public services, 
residents do not see elections and political engagement as an 
effective way to improve urban life. This illustrates a cyclical 
problem where lack of education, and the slow development  
of a ‘middle’ class, together with a very polarised society 
contribute to a lack of political culture and participation.  
São Paulo has a long way to go before it can be considered a 
developed city, especially given its social and economical 
inequalities. It needs to keep growing its economy but in a 
more sustainable manner. It faces huge challenges on quality  
of life, and to make progress, the city will need to try to reduce 
social and economic inequality, despite a political system  
that seems destined to preserve the status quo.
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SECURITY
São Paulo is a city of dramatic contrasts. As one walks 
through the city you will see people of all ages on the 
streets, begging in the traffic jams, prostitution, and huge 
favelas alongside middle-class neighbourhoods. The latest 
and greatest example of São Paulo’s contrasts is a compelling 
architecture symbol of the city, the modernist Ponte Estaiada 
bridge. Its futuristic design is surrounded by favelas. In São 
Paulo overall, 11.1 per cent of the population live in favelas.
The same inequalities are vivid when it comes to public 
investment. Some areas and neighbourhoods have reasonable 
public services and infrastructure and low crime, for example 
Jardins, Pinheiros, Itaim, Moema, and Higienopolis. In 
contrast, neighbourhoods like Campo Limpo, Casa Verde, 
M´Boi Mirim, Brasilandia, and Cidade Tiradentes have low 
public investment and the highest crime levels in the city. 
According to official statistics, crime rates are in decline 
across the city as a whole from astronomical levels. Residents 
are extremely fearful of crime in their own neighbourhoods 
after dark – twice as concerned as in London (despite 
Londoners being as or more likely to see crime as a  
major problem in their city).
The vast majority are worried about being robbed or 
attacked. And the absence of adequate policing is seen as  
a big issue. Overall 57.3 per cent report being robbed or a 
close family member being robbed. Half (47.5 per cent) say 
they know someone who has been murdered and 4 per cent 
have direct experience of kidnapping. As a result there is 
real demand for more visible policing, with more police 
posts in the city, for a faster and more severe judicial system, 
and for tougher punishments for teenagers, giving them 
the same penalties as adults. 
The use of CCTV in public spaces is a reality in  
São Paulo, and the population wants more of it. Use of 
private security is also extensive, and most people approve 
of the idea – the lack of police patrols is the third most 
important reason for fear of crime, and this fear is even 
stronger in the Metropolitan Region than in the centre. 
Other typical problems of the developing world can be 
found here, such as a significant informal economy,  
drug dealing, and lack of basic infrastructure in some 
neighbourhoods, poor urban environments and street 
furniture, degradation of public spaces and graffiti.  
A short walk through the city centre presents a mixture  
of neglected but beautiful architecture together with a 
massive informal economy and high levels of crime.  
Even so, education levels and formal employment are 
improving. The city still needs to answer to some basic 
needs, especially in terms of public health services.
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TRANSPORT
Problems of pollution and traffic are common to cities around 
the world, but are more dramatic in São Paulo due to the city’s 
role as the economic and financial heart of the country. The 
richest city in Brazil – and the 19th in the world – faces huge 
pressures on its infrastructure with economic growth driving 
some of its most significant problems. 
The traffic congestion is due in part to the late development 
of mass public transport systems; the metro was planned in the 
1930s but the first line only started to operate in 1974. Today the 
metro is still only 62 km long. On the other hand, the city has 
18,000 km of streets, and 15,000 urban buses and almost four 
million cars. Today people spend an average of 42.8 minutes  
to get to work. But even with terrible traffic, most Paulistanos 
would not think twice about buying a car if they could afford it. 
And they would use that car as their main form of transport. 
Although high concentrations of traffic are disturbing to many 
visiting Europeans and North Americans it is a phenomenon 
which the general population can cope with much more easily 
than inadequate health and education services.
When thinking about what could improve traffic congestion 
the top two solutions residents point to are investment in the 
metro system and the expansion of bus corridors in the city.  
At the same time, the great majority affirm that they would use 
public transport if there was more of it available and if it was 
more comfortable, less crowded and faster.
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Would potential car owners buy a car if they  
could afford one?
 Would car be used as the main mode of transport?
In the past, most surveys of the way people move in cities focused only 
on motorised transport. Furthermore, they have tended to assume 
that journeys occur by only one mode of transport. This survey allowed 
for more specific and dynamic information about the main daily journey 
and it captures the multiplicity of different means of transport used by 
those surveyed. The largest percentage of people (39 per cent) only 
walk to their main daily destination; the second largest travel mode  
(30 per cent) combines walking with bus transport.
including car 2.1%
no car 5.4%
Walking and car
4.5%
Walking and
metro
1%
Walking and
bus
29.5%
Car only
13.6%
Walking only
38.6%
Other
5.3%Multimodal:
One mode
Multiple modes
Means of travel The public view on solving the transport problems
Agree to reduce car use and promote public 
transport, walking and cycling
A vast majority of those surveyed would prioritise the expansion  
of the metro and rail network followed by expanded bus corridors. 
Approximately fifteen per cent of those surveyed adhere to the classic – 
and in most cities unsuccessful – strategy of building more roads and 
motorways as a priority
Average travel times for residents of favelas are significantly 
higher (100 minutes) than those living in formal settlements 
which are not close to favelas (70 minutes). The average 
return travel time for the main daily activity of those surveyed 
is 80 minutes – slightly lower than the travel to work average 
(85 minutes).
Almost one quarter of those surveyed require between 20 and 40 minutes for their 
combined return journeys to their main daily destination. More than 7 per cent spend 
more than 3 hours on these daily journeys.
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For all urban destinations above, actual average travel times exceed 
the acceptable levels as stated in interviews. The ratio between the 
two is similar although slightly higher for those facilities further away, 
for example museums, theatres and concert halls. 
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Every Friday afternoon, an insane race begins for millions 
of Paulistanos. Who manages to escape São Paulo first? The 
city’s fugitives know they will face miles of congestion, that 
it will take up to four hours in a car to make a 150 km-long 
journey, and that the same punishment awaits them on their 
return the following Sunday. Yet this breathless race is repeated 
every weekend and on national holidays, accompanied by 
traffic stopping over 220 km of the city’s streets. 
São Paulo’s biggest challenge is invisible, but it is both 
the cause and effect of its most renowned problems: security 
and traffic. This challenge is the feeling of being in an urban 
prison and the need to escape it. Residents complain about 
it daily, and even those who love the city say ‘São Paulo is 
hopeless’. But how can such a young city, which only became 
important in the second half of the twentieth century, now 
be seen as an incorrigible old hand?
In this era of global competition, in which cities want to 
impress investors and tourists and recruit talented nomads 
and resources, São Paulo does not present an image of 
modernity. Missing are Shanghai’s Maglev, Dubai’s new 
skyline and Tokyo’s high-speed trains. Old and insufficient 
infrastructure is everywhere: 62 km of metro lines compared  
to 200 km in Mexico City; hour-long connections between the 
airport and city centre that depend on taxis; and rivers, the 
city’s business cards, which are dead and stinking despite 
decades of investment to clean them.
Trying to assess where São Paulo went wrong or to 
identify solutions involves confronting questions, which 
range from a lack of mobility to architectural ugliness  
and residents’ feelings of insecurity – even in safe areas.  
São Paulo needs to analyse itself, and correcting its future 
growth would be a good starting point.
Over the last 20 years, the Berrini and the Nações 
Unidas Avenues have shown the greatest economic strength 
in São Paulo. Yet the area’s expansion reveals a series of 
mistakes, especially in the inhuman, arid and unsustainable 
form the city is adopting – mistakes that were not due to a 
lack of money as with other cities in the developing world. 
The roads that surround the area are only suitable for cars, 
never for public transport, and they send a clear message: 
use your car because you cannot rely on access via a  
metro line or bus.
Real estate speculation has transformed what was once  
a marginal area inhabited by slums into a series of so-called 
‘intelligent’ high-rise buildings that shut out the city. In 
some cases, it is difficult to find an entrance other than the 
car park or the garage. Blocks are over-sized, there are  
no trees or public spaces, and the ground floors lack bars, 
restaurants and shops. Even during the day his areas seems 
uninhabited apart from the permanent traffic congestion 
surrounding it.
Property developers bought the area cheaply and 
built-up the last square centimetre. Subsequent lobbying  
on behalf of the corporations that settled there forced the 
government to bring in electricity and water supplies, as 
well as public transport and other public services, leaving 
the bill to be picked up by the public coffers. São Paulo has 
repeated this property market cycle now several times: first 
abandoning the centre for Avenida Paulista in the 1960s, 
then Paulista for Brigadeiro Faria Lima Avenue in the 1980s 
and now with this western area since the 1990s. Rehabilitation 
and modernisation of the city’s architectural heritage is 
alarmingly rare – existing buildings are neglected while new 
financial districts are created.
São Paulo is, increasingly, an octopus whose tentacles 
stretch further and further outwards, making it impossible 
to provide efficient public transport. The tentacles head in 
all directions: to the West, where the corporate world, gated 
communities and high-rise buildings proliferate. While the 
centre has hundreds of empty areas, abandoned buildings 
and waste land, the poorest people seek housing on the edge 
of the city, in the North, East and South, polluting areas 
that should be environmentally preserved, and contaminating 
the reservoirs that provide the metropolis’ drinking water.
In both the expansion of the suburbs and of financial 
districts, public powers arrive too late, and thus institutionalise 
the errors made. And despite São Paulo’s construction 
boom and unprecedented economic growth over the  
last 30 years, resources are not being directed to correct 
previous mistakes. Both the Mayor and the state government 
are required to act as educators and regulators for managed 
growth, and neither should be afraid to curb certain 
investments, put up barriers or impose conditions. 
The unwelcoming character of the Berrini and Marginal 
Pinheiros areas can be addressed through demands to the 
property developers themselves. Buildings over fifteen-
storeys high should allow for the creation of a square, a 
garden or a public space that enhances the street-front 
experience. Avenues need restaurants, bars, shops, pharmacies 
and bookshops on the ground floors. These functions 
animate streetlife throughout the day and night, and provide 
the social surveillance that São Paulo so desperately needs. 
Why is it, then, that Avenida Paulista is more secure  
day and night than other parts of the city? It is because its 
design embraces the city and mixed-use. There is Trianon 
Park, public squares, wide pavements, medium-sized blocks 
and an eclectic occupation. Next to large residential buildings, 
such as Paulicéia, Saint Honore, the Nações Unidas and 
Tres Marias, there are banks, schools, colleges, hospitals, 
pharmacies and pubs, newspaper stands and cultural centres 
such as the Theatre of SESI, Itaú Cultural and MASP.
Conjunto Nacional proves that São Paulo once knew 
how to build intelligent buildings. On its 33 floors, divided 
into three blocks, there are offices and apartments with 
separate entrances. The wide pavements outside the 
building are made of the same material as the floors inside, 
thus obliterating the boundaries between public and 
private. The ground floor hosts cinemas, shops, banks, 
pharmacies and restaurants. This varied use demonstrates 
how to inject modernity and new life in a 1950s building 
without damaging it. The result is that the block of the 
Conjunto Nacional is the liveliest on Avenida Paulista. 
Continuous streams of people walk the area, weekdays  
and weekends. In a city that is prisoner to the paranoia 
about safety, the generous and welcoming architecture  
of Conjunto Nacional offers coexistence and safety for 
thousands of people. Criminals, who prefer dark and 
abandoned places where they can be left alone, are 
unwelcome there. 
Why have the postmodern buildings of the Marginal 
Pinheiros and Berrini never managed to repeat the success 
that the Conjunto Nacional, designed in 1953, still has in 
2008? If the current real estate market of São Paulo prefers 
repetitive and simple solutions, it is the responsibility of the 
public powers to make demands that can ‘build the city’. 
The same permissiveness exists in the planning for shopping 
malls despite extensive literature about how malls damage 
the urban landscape. São Paulo now has nearly 80 malls. In 
five years, the Daslu, Cidade Jardim and Vila Olímpia malls 
were built next to older ones such as Iguatemi, Morumbi, 
D&D and Market Place. The result is a chain of seven malls 
within 10 km2. Just as the Mayor can veto building a hundred-
storey tall tower because of its impact on the neighbourhood,  
or can prevent the demolition of a house built in the 1920s, 
permission for the construction of new shopping malls should 
require contractors to think about alternatives.
Any intervention that makes a Paulistano not use a  
car, but instead walk for a few hours on the street in public 
space, would already have an educational value. Not only 
because the streets – like the ones in Manhattan, Buenos 
Aires, Paris or Rio de Janeiro – would be full of people, but 
also because if São Paulo’s elite occupied the streets, there 
would be greater demand for the care of pavements, traffic 
signs, and urban furniture. 
The new malls could remember the trade streets that 
marked the Paulistano centre, such as the Barao de Itapetininga. 
The shopping mall typology that has dominated the past  
40 years is not sustainable. Beijing has just inaugurated the 
Sanlitun Village mall which features 19 low buildings, up  
to four-storeys high, designed by 16 different architects.  
NEW URBAN OPPORTUNITIES
High-end office space is concentrated in towers such as these overlooking the Marginal Pinheiros River in the Berrini region, the second largest financial district in 
São Paulo. A deficiency of integrated transport here makes the area less attractive than the new growth corridors along Avenida Paulista near the city centre.
In a critique of the status quo’s preference for privatised urban development and 
banal urban forms, Raul Juste Lores advocates a fundamental shift to reclaim  
the architectural richness of existing infrastructure in São Paulo’s centre. 
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The result creates diversity among the buildings, vast 
pavements and safe alleyways. It is, in effect, an open mall. 
So why continue to allow projects that do not give anything 
back to the urban landscape?
In Tokyo, where real estate is more expensive and scarcer 
than in any neighbourhood of São Paulo, municipal regulations 
required the multifunctional complex of Tokyo Midtown  
to set aside 40,000 m2 of gardens, with an art gallery in the 
middle, as public space. Roppongi Hills sponsored the 
design of banks around the enterprise. In Berrini, builders 
have already demonstrated that they will not care for the 
city of their own volition. Regulations could force them to 
look after the design and maintenance of bus stops, benches 
and squares – investments that would only enhance their 
property values.
Palácio das Indústrias, Casa das Retortas, Memorial  
da América Latina, Casa e Parque Modernistas e Parque 
Trianon, are all well-known names for Paulistanos, but 
what do they have in common? The first two are large 
historic public buildings that have been empty for years, 
waiting for a new use. The others are freely accessible  
public spaces that are empty during weekends. Meanwhile, 
São Paulo has built several theatres in recent years in a 
region beyond the Marginal Pinheiros and Berrini. For 
most of the public it takes up to an hour and a half by car  
to get to a concert or a play. The public authorities have 
failed to create incentives to use empty and centrally 
located places that already have infrastructure and  
public transport.
In a city that has only a handful of buildings more  
than 150 years old, the heritage of the small town that 
became the largest metropolis in South America should make 
preservation and re-investment in the centre a priority. There 
are dozens of empty or underused twenty-storey buildings.  
Yet despite the rhetoric about revitalising the historic centre, 
the last remaining large companies and law offices have left  
in the last five years. 
Residential projects in the centre do not succeed because 
either humble people without savings are installed in twenty-
storey buildings in which the lifts alone generate service 
charges expected of middle-class housing; or because the 
‘brand’ of the centre still has a negative connotation. Buenos 
Aires with its Puerto Madero, Mexico City with its historical 
districts of Condesa and Roma, and Bogotá with Macarena 
prove that even cities poorer than São Paulo can recover 
derelict neighbourhoods and transform buildings of past 
decades into local versions of Soho and Chelsea in New 
York City or the fashionable Marais district in Paris.
São Paulo’s centre has the highest concentration of 
museums and cultural facilities in the city, the most metro 
stops and bus stations, several squares, wide pavements and 
public buildings, and the police is more present there than 
in other areas. The centre is also strategically located in  
the middle of the city. 
Why, then, has the revitalisation of the centre not 
worked? The answer is that the boost given by the public 
authorities was too timid. Large construction companies 
could have been required to think about alternatives in  
the empty centre or even retrofit buildings whose historical 
charm is an added bonus. Photographers, visual artists, 
stylists, advertising executives, musicians and designers 
have never needed an explicit and direct invitation from  
the authorities to occupy these voids. The city quickly 
expropriates whole buildings to make room for viaducts, 
tunnels and other works, but it cannot allow new uses  
for empty buildings in the centre for professionals in  
the creative industries who are priced out of overvalued 
properties in Vila Madalena, Vila Olimpia or Jardins. 
The Pinacoteca, the Sala São Paulo and the Museu da 
Língua Portuguesa, all excellent cultural institutions, suffer 
from a pre-supposed revitalisation of their neighbourhoods. 
They remain isolated buildings, where users arrive and 
leave hastily by car, avoiding any intrusion into the areas 
beyond their walls. Nobody thought about creating offices, 
residential use or studios – subsidised or not – which could 
have provided a halo effect for the surroundings. 
One of the recent examples of São Paulo’s vitality can be 
seen at Roosevelt Square. A pile of concrete since the 1960s, 
when it was constructed to connect express roads and 
viaducts, Roosevelt Square was the locus of drug trafficking 
and prostitution until five years ago. Its devalued residential 
buildings, however, now have new uses on the ground floor: 
cinemas and bars sit next to alternative theatre groups in 
search of cheap space. From the dramaturgic talent to 
urban opportunity, Roosevelt Square now hosts bars and 
seven theatres that offer plays throughout the day to pay  
for their expenses.
The courage of the pioneers and the growing movement 
in the area has driven away criminals. Roosevelt Square  
has thus turned into a small village in the city centre.  
But despite years of discussions and promises, a ‘pentagon’  
of concrete prevents it from becoming a real square. A 
landscape design project would allow the Roosevelt ‘movement’ 
to spread to neighbouring streets, building even more 
theatres, pizzerias, and bars and bringing even more lively 
youngsters to the area. Several other areas in the centre 
could host clusters of creative industries, such as the beautiful 
working class village next to Casa de Dona Yayá in Bexiga, 
the empty plot beside the Teatro da Oficina, the large 
pavements with galleries from the 1950s, the beautiful 
Largo do Arouche, the Avenida Vieira de Carvalho, and  
the abandoned Vila Itororó.
The success of the Cidade Limpa (Clean City) project, 
which focused exclusively on removing billboards and 
outdoor advertisements from the streets of São Paulo, 
shows how even very small interventions can have a strong 
impact on Paulistanos’ perception of their city. This was not 
an expensive project, but it managed to counter the belief that 
‘São Paulo is hopeless’. That the project stopped working 
reinforces the idea of timidity of São Paulo’s public management. 
The billboards hid an ugly and grey metropolis that is now 
visible, and the government’s failure to improve the urban 
landscape only adds to Paulistanos’ low self-esteem. 
Twenty-two years ago, Barcelona changed its landscape 
with the ‘Barcelona, posa'te Guapa’ project, which combined 
the withdrawal of outdoor advertising with concessions for 
temporary billboards. When renovating the façade of a 
historic building, the sponsors were permitted to put their 
logo on the protective mesh covering the work. With the 
ban on billboards, street advertising was thus transformed 
into something more valuable that gave the local authorities 
enormous bargaining power when it came to making better 
use of existing resources.
São Paulo has one of the world’s largest collections of 
architectural modernism: from the 1930s to the 1960s the 
city was what Shanghai is nowadays. Yet despite several 
works by Oscar Niemeyer, a cultural or tourist map does 
not utilise this heritage. Recovering the self-image of the 
city would start with these architectural landmarks. If it 
wants to be beautiful, São Paulo needs to dust off, polish 
and illuminate its past glories as any old European city 
knows. That the façade of Copan is in poor condition, that 
the Esther building from 1936 has a decrepit front, and that 
historically important if not architecturally revolutionary 
buildings like Martinelli or Sampaio Moreira seem semi-
derelict, show the challenges ahead for São Paulo.
São Paulo needs to re-embrace architecture, just as it 
did in the years of accelerated boom and confidence in the 
future – in the years when its elite created the MASP, the 
Biennale and the Museum of Modern Art. This could give 
its young talent the opportunity to build better than the 
repetitive and awkward custom of today’s real estate market.  
It could ease the entry of talented foreign architects, who would 
bring new perspectives, new materials and sensibilities to  
the city. It could also allow the creation of social housing 
projects by local architects finding new forms rather than 
the hundreds of identical ‘crates’ on the periphery. Lastly, 
the city could create public-private partnerships and 
international competitions for the construction of major 
buildings, with prizes awarded by the public for projects 
that stimulate beauty and create collective spaces that, 
rather than frighten, attract the Paulistano.
The business services which make São Paulo the leading financial centre of South America have yet to occupy the modernist structures in the city centre. These 
commercial buildings, the result of feverish building activity accompanying industrialization, encapsulate the city’s entrepreneurial spirit yet remain largely vacant.
The public authorities have failed to create 
incentives to use empty and centrally 
located places that already have 
infrastructure and public transport
Raul Juste Lores is the Beijing correspondent for Folha  
de São Paulo. He has served as editor and Buenos Aires 
correspondent for Veja magazine and an anchor and  
editor for Cultura TV.
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The city of São Paulo and its Metropolitan Region form 
without a doubt a multicultural whole. The list of cultural 
diversities that characterises them is extensive and complex, 
which is not only due to waves of foreign immigration since 
1870, but is also a result of the diversity that characterised 
this immigration.
The most significant of them, the immigration of Italians, 
was not actually ‘Italian’ per se. Theirs did not constitute  
an influx of tens of thousands of immigrants coming from 
Italy proper. They came from a newly unified Italy, a new 
state and nation while they originated from many political 
realities, and hailed from regional cultures that formed the 
map of Italian diversity, unified by the Risorgimento. They 
arrived here speaking their regional dialects, bringing local 
customs and traditions with them. In some of São Paulo’s 
neighbourhoods people still speak Portuguese with a 
Neapolitan, Calabrian, Venetian or Mantovanian accent.
They became ‘Italians’ in Brazil, through their children 
who possibly went to Italian schools to learn their parent’s 
native language. São Paulo became a city characterised  
by cultural duplications, where people would speak their 
mother tongue, whichever it was, at home, and speak 
Portuguese with a strong foreign accent on the streets.  
It is no coincidence, then, that the engineer Alexandre 
Marcondes Machado invented an ironic Italian-Paulistano 
dialect in his literary work, under the pseudonym Juó 
Bananare, and that his first book, La Divina Increnca, 
published in 1915 – a parody on Dante’s Divine Comedy – 
imagined multiculturalism as confusion instead of an 
encounter. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Portuguese 
with a foreign accent mixed with foreign words has been 
the language of comedy in the work of different authors  
in São Paulo. This was not meant to be ironic about the 
immigrants, but to provide an external point of view that 
could highlight, in a critical way, the municipal and political 
absurdities of the city, which was being transformed through 
the influx of money from the coffee export: money that 
would be multiplied in the financial world, in industry  
and in trade. Money that also disrupted social relations, 
especially social differences, took away prejudices and in  
a short time inverted relations of dominance and power.
In his book, Bananere traces a portrait of intense 
sounds, of the daily mentality of the population of São Paulo 
in the 1920s and 1930s, their ways of recognising the city 
and living the contradictions of life. Immigrants had become 
Brazilians by the time they had grandchildren, in a process 
of slow cultural migration to the culture of the society  
they had adopted, which wasn’t a strong culture either, but 
rather a patchwork of contributions from various sources, 
among them Italian regional cultures and foreign immigrants 
in general. The work of an Italian descendant – João Rubinato 
– illustrates this. He made a move in the opposite direction 
of Bananere, by adopting a Brazilian pseudonym: Adoniran 
Barbosa. His musical and popular compositions talk – also 
ironically – about the life of simple people and are written 
in a residual Brazilian language, mixed with traces of the 
Italian accent of the working-class neighbourhoods of  
São Paulo. Many people believe that this was a made-up 
language, like in Bananere’s book. However, in reality 
Rubinato spoke exactly like that. When dealing with 
matters of daily life in the city, as in ‘Saudosa Maloca’ and 
‘Trem das Onze’, he transformed the accent into a disguised 
ironic language that tells of the small daily dramas of 
workers and drunks, just like himself.
This diversity had countless other important  
manifestations that showed a kind of recognition and 
respect for multiculturalism, which separated the new 
generations of children from the generation of their parents 
(which involved just one or two cultures). Such was the  
case with a successful radio programme in the 1940s, the 
Escolinha of Nhô Totico. Nhô Totico was the nickname of 
Vital Fernandes da Silva, who was born in the countryside 
near São Paulo from an Italian mother and a Brazilian 
father from Bahia. He had a multicultural background  
as he was born into and educated in a third culture, the 
caipira culture, which was formed by old descendants  
of Indians and whites. In his radio school, Nhô Totico 
performed all the voices of its different characters: the 
Brazilian professor, as well as the Italian, Spanish, Syrians, 
Portuguese and Japanese students. He transformed the 
diversity of origins, so characteristic of São Paulo at that 
time, into a pluralist panel unified by the school and by the 
Brazilian teacher, turning it into an invitation to overcome 
cultural differences through education.
Later in the 1950s, the vast and intense stream of 
immigrants from north-eastern Brazil, expelled by the 
crisis in sugarcane farming caused by episodes of drought, 
and attracted by the new industrialisation developed by  
the car industry, made the culture of São Paulo even more 
diverse. Not only by the way they spoke, but also because  
of their kitchen and customs, the Nordestinos from 
North-Eastern Brazil added to the São Paulo culture 
specific traces of their own. Like there are typically Italian, 
Spanish, Arab, German, Jewish, Eastern, Russian and 
Ukrainian neighbourhoods, there are also typically 
Nordestino neighbourhoods in São Paulo. In recent decades 
Latin American immigration has added new colours to  
the city, particularly through immigration of Bolivians. The 
culinary cultures of these various national groups, which 
can be experienced through the many restaurants that 
represent them, easily make any tourist and the city’s 
population recognise it as a multicultural city. 
The same can be said regarding its religious diversity, 
with buildings of worship ranging from synagogues to 
mosques, from Protestant and Evangelical temples to a 
great diversity of Catholic churches organised around 
different devotions which are all expressions of cultural 
diversity. You can follow a Mass with Gregorian singing  
in the church of São Bento, or a popular Mass in the shrine 
of Santo Amaro, an Orthodox Mass in Vila Mariana, a 
Protestant worship in the city centre, a Muslim celebration 
on the Avenue of the State, a Jewish worship in one of the 
several synagogues, a session of the Pentecostal cult in a 
church in Vila Pompéia or in the Baixada do Glicério, a 
Protestant worship with the sound of balalaicas in a church 
of Russian immigrants in Vila Prudente, or even a Protestant 
worship in a Korean church from Luz.
However, São Paulo is multicultural not because it was 
historically open to diversity and tolerance. On the contrary, 
it carries the weight of two kinds of slavery in its history, 
together with the restrictions and prohibitions that all 
forms of slavery eventually resulted in. First, the indigenous 
slavery, which formally terminated in the early-eighteenth 
century, and subsequently black slavery, which was abolished 
in 1888. In a city with few slaves, one would anticipate 
slavery to end in several ways. However, it happened not as 
the result of a generous commitment to the idea of freedom 
and equality, but because slavery was an obstacle for a 
society hungry for cheap labour, which had already 
established a regular flow of immigrants and free workers 
that could fulfil its demands. In economic terms, slavery 
was a disadvantage.
THE MULTICULTURAL CITY
The Bandeiras Monument marking the entrance to Ibirapuera Park was inaugurated in 1953 and pays tribute to the founders of São Paulo. To capture its non-stop 
economic progress and successive waves of immigrants, the city adopted ‘São Paulo: cidade que não pode parar’ as its slogan – the city that is not able to stop.
Multiculturalism was, and somehow still 
is, experienced as a way of life in which 
people move through different cultures 
daily, depending on the roles they play 
in a fragmented life of slow and difficult 
convergences.
José de Souza Martins connects the roots of São Paulo’s transitive 
multiculturalism to the everyday experience of urban life for Paulistanos. 
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Influences from those periods of slavery in the language 
remain in culinary and religious traditions and in other 
customs. There are even remnants of hybridisations from 
the time of indigenous slavery. Saci Parerê for instance is  
a mythical being of indigenous origin, which in its African 
version appears as a black boy with only one leg. As a 
regular appearance in stories as a naughty character, he  
still inhabits children’s imagination. His original name, 
Saci Pererê, is indigenous. He became a black character  
in the eighteenth century, when indigenous slavery was 
abolished and the flow of black slaves to São Paulo increased, 
especially to the sugar cane plantations that flourished 
within the Capitania, the state of São Paulo. 
Studies by Renato da Silva Queiroz show the Saci Pererê 
was a mythical figure related to limits and boundaries, and 
therefore he usually appears in fences. In the eighteenth 
century he had crossed the boundaries and passed on to  
the side of the new subordinates, the black slaves, taking  
on their skin colour and identity while continuing to be an 
indigenous being in a society with social stratification, with 
more or less rigid boundaries between races, ethnicities and 
social groups. This cultural transgression of Saci Pererê  
was the first highly symbolic demonstration of adaptive 
multiculturalism in the region of São Paulo.
It is not strange that, at that time, the abbot of São Bento 
paid a black slave from his Order, a magician, to remove  
the banzo from his slaves. This means that a representative 
member of an emblematic Catholic order turned to voodism  
to have his slaves freed from curses and spells. This is a 
demonstration of diversity and multiculturalism that do 
not converge, as if society was composed of a structure of 
specific and distinct cultural layers, each with its own logic, 
values and reach. Multiculturalism was, and somehow still 
is, experienced as a way of life in which people move through 
different cultures daily, depending on the roles they play in 
a fragmented life of slow and difficult convergences. This is 
something that persists in practices such as the attendance 
at shrines of Umbanda, and some people’s adhesion to 
Candomblé and to traditions of African and black religious 
orientation, while at the same time moving in entirely 
different cultural and religious circles.
It is in religion and religiosity, indeed, where we find the 
most relevant signs of original traditions’ survival, which is 
a very typical Paulistano way of continuing to be what one 
once was, rather than ceasing to be what one is. That is what 
makes São Paulo peculiar and multicultural. Not because  
it accepts the cultural diversity of those who arrive in it 
without conflict, but mainly because it ensures each one  
of the living experience of diversity is allowed to be what  
it has always been, and at the same time embracing it as the 
novelty of the daily coexistence of similarities and innovations. 
It is therefore not strange to find a Japanese descendant 
singing Italian tarantelas in a canteen in Bras, still an 
Italian neighbourhood, or a black man from Bexiga spilling 
his sins into a priest’s ear in Calabrian during confession. 
Or to have a Frenchman, such as the sociologist Roger 
Bastide, who is of Protestant and Calvinist origins, dive 
into African cultures so deeply that one could say that 
being black is not based in colour of one’s skin but on the 
structure of how one dreams. These are examples of how 
São Paulo’s multiculturalism is, essentially, an invitation to 
continue to be what it always was, and to become someone 
new and different. It is a call for cultural creativity and for a 
free and constant move between different cultural standards.
In that sense, the multiculturalism of São Paulo and  
its surroundings can be better understood as a transitive 
multiculturalism, which makes it very different from other 
multicultural metropolises that are characterised by the 
collage of a certain diversity of cultures. In such cases, we 
are dealing with a multiculturalism of confinement, where 
diversity is accepted as an aggregation of cultural differences 
and not as a way of communication and transit between 
differences. With this, I am not saying that multiculturalism 
should be faced in terms of rigid forms of organisation  
of diversity, but as diversity that may be considered from 
two opposing cultural trends.
The transitive multiculturalism of São Paulo, despite  
its historical references tending to confinement, ended  
up being imposed by the complex need for a multicultural 
transit in a city that was re-created in an urban, architectural 
sense, and, in terms of its population, at least thrice in 
modern times: in the 1880s, 1910s and 1960s. These were 
culturally cataclysmic moments that added new characters 
to the scene and at the same time, cancelled out old 
conspiracies.
The rigidity of cultural traditions and customs softened 
to allow the new and reciprocal adaptation of the former 
residents and welcome the new residents. However, it would 
be wrong to say that Paulistanos are unconditionally open 
to multiculturalism. They are, in relation to aspects of 
everyday life, in areas where plurality is inevitable, not 
failing to recognise that this plurality of coexistence is 
largely responsible for the breaking down of previous 
identities and the dilution of possible cultural resistance  
to change and adaptation. Simultaneously, they are not, 
when it comes to aspects of their private life, family and 
community, where they will take care for certain elements 
not to become mixed up in a pluralistic re-socialisation.  
As is the case of marriages in some of the cultures that 
persist in São Paulo, reasonably protected from the outside, 
especially when they involve rituals between young and  
old generations, such as Japanese and Korean. It has been 
typical, however, that the dilution of these obstructions  
that happens with the passing of generations, which is  
what characterises the transitivity to which I refer, exists  
in a meaningful balance with maintaining the essential 
elements of the cultures of origin and a complete assimilation 
of what does not conflict with them or complements them.
A diverse mix of Paulistanos crowd the bustling commercial area surrounding 25 de Março Avenue. Among the nearly 19 million residents in the Metropolitan Region are the largest Lebanese population outside of Lebanon, the biggest Japanese 
community outside of Japan, and the third largest Italian city outside of Italy after Buenos Aires and New York City. 
It is therefore not strange to find a 
Japanese descendant singing Italian 
tarantelas in a canteen in Bras, still  
an Italian neighbourhood.
Sociologist José de Souza Martins is an Emeritus Professor  
of the University of São Paulo. He has published books on 
the agrarian question, migration, social movements, and  
life in the Paulista suburbs and periphery. 
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Over 19 million inhabitants and 6.2 million cars occupy  
the São Paulo Metropolitan Region, Brazil’s largest, while 
the municipality of São Paulo accommodates more than  
11 million people and 4.2 million cars. São Paulo boasts  
the second largest helicopter fleet in the world, and its main 
modes of transport are private vehicles, public transport 
and walking. Public transport is feebly subsidised however, 
with nearly half of the city’s households opting to commute 
by car. To date, traffic management has been limited to 
‘plate restriction’ (rodízio) through which 20 per cent of  
cars are not allowed to circulate in the extended centre 
between 7 am and 10 am and 5 pm and 8 pm on weekdays. 
Local and state authorities are taking actions to remedy  
the city’s infamous traffic congestion and although official 
proposals are heading in the right direction, a more conceptual 
change would prioritise public transport, as well as 
pedestrians and cyclists. 
There are currently 313 km of metro and rail lines 
dedicated to passenger transportation in the Metropolitan 
Area. This is less than half the networks of either London, 
Berlin or New York, all in metropolitan regions smaller 
than São Paulo. Within Latin America, only Mexico City’s 
rail network is on a par with São Paulo with a total of  
553 km. To further complicate matters, some of São Paulo’s 
major commuter rail lines accommodate freight as well  
as passenger transport. Since the late 1990s, the State 
Secretary of Transport through Dersa (Empresa de 
Desenvolvimento Rodoviario) has started to implement  
a plan to segregate freight from passengers through 
construction of an outer road ring, the Rodoanel, and an 
outer rail ring, the Ferroanel, so that passengers will no 
longer have to share the same rail lines with freight trains.
The Brazilian transport system is highly concentrated 
by the use of motorised traffic. Even so, in 2002 about  
7.4 million journeys on public transport and 8 million car 
journeys took place in São Paulo, compared to 4.2 million 
public transit journeys and 4.9 million by car in the other 
municipalities combined. Then, the number of journeys by 
car represented 53 per cent of the daily total of motorised 
journeys in the Metropolitan Region, an increase from  
48 per cent in 1997. Recently, though, this trend has  
begun to reverse: preliminary data from 2007 shows that 
car journeys are down to 45 per cent. It is thought that  
the introduction of the bilhete único (single ticket), which 
allows users of the rail network to pay a standard fare, 
regardless of distance or number of connections, has 
reinvigorated the use of public transport. Use is very much 
concentrated on buses (76 per cent of journeys in 1997 and 
72 per cent in 2002). And while the current use of bicycles  
is negligible, preliminary data from 2007 shows that 33 per 
cent of families in the Metropolitan Region own at least one 
bicycle. Increasing the supply of dedicated cycle lanes might 
increase the use of bicycles considerably.
São Paulo’s dedicated bus lanes, Corredores de ônibus, 
are similar to the TransMilenio in Bogotá, but are much 
less segregated from general traffic. Furthermore very few 
stations have passing lanes, and there is no high-level entry 
or fare pre-payment as in the TransMilenio. Operating at 
speeds only half that expected of a bus rapid transit (BRT) 
system, in 2005 the city’s Corredores de ônibus occupied 
just 112 km of the 4,300 km of roads covered by the bus 
network. The first stage of a new bus line, the Tiradentes 
Expressway, was recently opened in the South-East of São 
Paulo, connecting the city centre with the largest social 
housing complex in Latin America, Cidade Tiradentes. 
When fully implemented, the Tiradentes Expressway will 
be able to transport 50,000 passengers per day. It is the only 
system in São Paulo comparable to a BRT as it currently 
runs at speeds over 30 km per hour along permanent, 
demarcated lanes. The current investments will add  
around 160 km of corridors.
The general overall public transport plan for the São 
Paulo Metropolitan Region has been consolidated into  
an Urban Transport Integrated Plan (PITU) to include 
projections up to 2025. The PITU 2025 implies very few 
extensions to the commuter rail network, but a considerable 
improvement using profits generating from the separation 
of freight transport. The PITU proposal calls for the partial 
duplication of lines with new expressways, a single 
extension outwards as well as the extension of several lines 
inwards to make them all converge in one area. It also 
envisages two new lines, one of which will be an express 
train to the airport. In terms of bus corridors, besides 
adding more than 300 km to the network, PITU proposes 
110 km of ‘urban corridors’ including passing points to 
increase their speed to the equivalent of a BRT system.  
The proposal projects a total of 580 km of new corridors  
by 2025. To generate these significant change, the system 
should be highly integrated, a priority of PITU 2025, which 
calls for 15 key terminals connecting the different modes of 
transport. Future terminals would start in the metro system 
and connect directly to buses or rail services at street level.
Since the 1950s, transport policies in the São Paulo 
Metropolitan Region, as in most other Brazilian 
metropolitan areas, have neglected public transport, 
pedestrians and cyclists. The result is a chaotic and 
inefficient system with long commuting times, especially 
for the poor. The obvious way forward is to improve the 
supply of public transport. However, just improving the 
supply is not enough. A fundamental shift towards more 
equitable and sustainable transport modes is needed. Cars, 
buses, pedestrian, cyclists, motorcyclists and street sellers 
all compete for limited space on city streets, avenues and 
sidewalks. The government has the power to regulate the 
use of these spaces and to decide how they are distributed 
through a range of instruments. Increasing the space 
allocated to public transport, bicycles and pedestrians is an 
important first step to redistribute resources as these will 
specifically improve the lives of the poor. Since the poor 
have less access to private space for non-motorised uses, 
they use more public space for those purposes. This modal 
shift would also benefit the environment  
by reducing travel distances considerably.
There is no doubt that the PITU proposals represent  
an advance in standards for public transport in the greater 
With one of the largest fleets of helicopters in the world, the business elite in São Paulo opt to commute by helicopter to avoid paralysing traffic throughout the city and the Minhocão (shown centre), completed in the early 1970s to alleviate already 
debilitating levels of traffic congestion. 
SÃO PAULO’S URBAN 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
A research team* led by Ciro Biderman assesses how to improve the current 
transport system in the São Paulo Metropolitan Region.
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The Minhocão must be seen as an 
exemplar of what could be achieved 
across the city if a new approach to 
public transport and the public realm 
were introduced in São Paulo.
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metropolitan area of São Paulo. Apart from increasing  
the length of its rail-based network, they also envisage 
integration of a bus rapid transit system in the region.  
Even so, the proposals may still be seen as rather timid 
given the magnitude of the city’s transport challenges.  
To this end, the study developed by our research group has 
identified a number of strategies and initiatives that could 
enhance the impact and efficiency of the plan. Detailed 
analysis and proposals will be published in a separate 
report, but the main recommendations include expanding
the proposed network of BRT lines by 190 km, upgrading 
all public transport corridors to BRT standard and adding 
60 stations to the system. In addition to spatial strategies 
such as the future of the Minhocão, the study proposes new 
funding schemes that rely less on general state taxes and 
more on tax revenues from petrol, which have remained 
stagnant despite the massive increase in car ownership in 
recent years. The overall objective of this new cocktail of 
proposals is not simply to increase the supply of BRT lines 
but to bring about a paradigm shift in transport policy in 
São Paulo to prioritise the balance between public transport 
and the private car.
One of the key focus areas of the study is the Elevado 
Costa e Silva, a major elevated motorway known as the 
Minhocão (big worm) built in 1971 by the national dictatorship 
government. Apart from its significant political associations, 
the overpass cuts East-West through downtown São Paulo 
and is considered to be partially responsible for the 
deterioration of the city’s historic core. Despite this, the 
Minhocão is the main vehicular link between the centre 
and the city’s western region. The Sé municipality that 
surrounds it is a socially diversified area characterised by  
a highly mixed land-use pattern, located close to São Paulo’s 
main public transport hub with access to metro, bus, and rail. 
The Minhocão covers an area of 3.4 km, about 5.5 metres 
above ground and its width varies between 15.5 and 23 
meters, with some adjacent buildings within a very close 
distance of 5 metres. No bus lines run on the Minhocão 
while 80,000 vehicles pass on it each day. Its construction 
accelerated land and building depreciation in the downtown 
area, especially along the urban blocks which border it.  
In 1976, degradation was so severe that the city decided  
to close the Minhocão at night because of high accident 
rates and noise pollution. Today the structure is closed to 
vehicles on Sundays when it is used by city dwellers as a 
linear urban park. In 2003 a public transport corridor 
system was introduced at the lower level to integrate the 
network to the metro through the Marechal Deodoro and 
Santa Cecilia stations even though no physical connections 
were implemented.
The study has identified the Minhocão as a major 
strategic component of the city’s public realm. It proposes 
that the Minhocão be converted and that the resulting  
open space be turned into a permanent urban park for 
pedestrians and cyclists. Currently there are four lanes  
for cars on the top level and two lanes for buses and four 
lanes for cars at the lower level. The system could be easily 
modified in such a way that the entire upper level and two 
lower level lanes are given over to pedestrian and cycle 
routes. Overall four lanes that are currently used by cars 
could be used by public transport, cyclists and pedestrians. 
This strategy would transform an urban problem into an 
urban asset, increasing land values and potentially leading 
to a significant upgrading of the wider area, even though 
the economic impact would need to be carefully regulated. 
This proposal for the Minhocão must be seen as an 
exemplar of what could be achieved across the city if a new 
approach to public transport and the public realm were 
introduced in São Paulo, bringing with it considerable 
social, economic and financial benefits to the surrounding 
areas. On balance, the study proposes a new way of 
thinking about transport policies which prioritise modes  
of transport that have never been prioritised before. Its 
implementation does not require a substantive increase  
in expenditure but a diverse investment approach that  
shifts the balance away from individual to collective  
modes of travel. 
MOBILITY AND THE URBAN POOR
Almost 30 per cent of Paulistanos travel by bus on privately operated lines. 
Ciro Biderman, Professor, Centre for the Study of Policy and Economics of the  
Public Sector (CEPESP) at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and Visiting Fellow, 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Bernardo 
Guatimosim Alvim, Director of B. Alvim Engenharia, World Bank Consultant and 
Researcher, CEPESP, FGV; Luis Otavio Calagian, Researcher, CEPESP, FGV; Diogo 
R. Coutinho, Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Law, University of São Paulo and 
Senior Researcher, Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning; Angélica Aparecida 
Tanus Benatti Alvim, Assistant Professor, Mackenzie Presbyterian University; Maria 
Inês Garcia Lippe, Transportation Planner, Secretary of São Paulo Metropolitan 
Transportation and Researcher, CEPESP, FGV; Vladimir Fernandes Maciel, PhD, 
ABD Public Administration, EAESP, FGV, Researcher, CEPESP, FGV; Luciana de 
Mattos, Researcher, CEPESP, FGV.
Poverty is a phenomenon of many dimensions. It is not just 
about insufficient income to meet basic needs, but also 
about the deprivation of basic social rights and limited 
access to essential services such as public transport. Urban 
poverty manifests itself through the spatial segregation  
of the poorest in the peripheries – areas characterised by 
insubstantial public services and deficient infrastructure 
– where the provision of mass transport is inappropriate in 
terms of price as well as availability. As a result, the poorest 
have restricted access to the opportunities offered by life in 
the city.
For the poorest, expenses for transport are very high  
in relation to their low household incomes. IGBE reported 
that for 20 per cent of the poorest people living in the  
São Paulo Metropolitan Region, the cost of urban transport 
represented around 8 per cent of total family expenses – 
double the average of 4 per cent for the entire population. 
This association between mobility and income is important. 
The Origin and Destination survey for the São Paulo 
Metropolitan Region reported in 2002 that people with 
lower incomes make about 60 per cent of their trips each 
day on foot while the rich make five times more per day on 
motorised transport. This indicates serious problems of 
access to employment opportunities, recreational activities 
and social facilities, since the distance the poorest are able 
to reach each day is restricted solely to walking.
Another survey conducted by the Institute of 
Information and Development in Transportation and the 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômia Aplicada identified 
problems of urban mobility for low-income populations in 
four Brazilian metropolitan regions, including São Paulo.  
It showed that people with family incomes up to three times 
the minimum wage are deprived of access to collective 
public transport because of the high prices and infrequency 
of services as well as the difficulty to physically reach 
distant stations. It also showed that low levels of mobility  
for leisure activities during weekends are partly due to the 
prohibitive total cost to transport a family, but also because 
the scarcity of public transport is even worse on weekends. 
The formulation and implementation of public policies 
for urban transport towards the poor is imperative, 
especially for those living in metropolitan peripheries. 
Suggestions to facilitate the mobility of low-income 
populations include mainly a reduction in the price of 
tickets, but also an increase of the quantity of services and 
the reduction of waiting times. Since a large part of the poor 
live in areas with deficient road infrastructures, paving 
streets was also recommended to allow vehicle access to 
their neighbourhoods.
In this sense, it is understood that there needs to be 
means to subsidise transport for the poor by, for example, 
extending the benefits of vale-transporte, which is currently 
provided by employer to employee, to low-income people 
employed in informal markets. Mechanisms to provide 
financial assistance for people searching for employment 
should also be developed. Funding of such programmes 
must also be taken from sources outside the current 
revenues from ticket sales, and not from a cross-subsidy 
among users of the services. A legitimate cross-subsidy in 
urban transport systems would tax cars in congested areas 
in view of their negative impact, with the collected 
resources allocated to subsidise public transport.
Mobility can be improved not only by investments  
in rapid and efficient transport systems, but by a better 
distribution of economic and social activities in urban 
space. Doing so would reduce the distances required for 
travel. Here, the relationship between land use and 
transport policies is critical. Their proper integration is a 
key issue to ensuring sustainability and mobility in cities. 
Through their integration, it is possible to reduce distances, 
increase the productivity of the available infrastructure, 
reduce costs and travel times. 
However, such actions are not going to be solved by 
technicians, but in the political sphere where conflict – 
around public budgets, the location of urban activities,  
the use of property or the granting of public services –  
is inevitable. From this perspective we see the need to 
strengthen and improve democratic institutions and 
political dialogue. Civic participation in the formulation, 
monitoring and evaluation of local policies becomes more 
important every day.
Alexandre Gomide is a PhD candidate at Fundação 
Getulio Vargas and a researcher at the Instituto de 
Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. His research includes 
urban development, public services regulation, strategic 
planning and public management.
Exploring the links between public transport and quality of life, Alexandre Gomide 
posits a reframing of the public debate about mobility for the urban poor.
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One of the most iconic views of contemporary São Paulo, 
commonly used in international publications dealing  
with the city, is a picture in Morumbi showing the favela 
Paraisópolis on one side of a wall and a luxury building 
with tennis courts and one swimming pool per balcony on 
the other. However, the scholarly literature on the city and 
several of its main instruments of urban policy insist on 
another image: one that contrasts a rich and well-equipped 
centre with a poor and precarious periphery. According to 
this view, the city is made not only of opposed social and 
spatial worlds but also of clear distances between them. Since 
these imaginaries are contradictory – one pointing to the 
obscene neighbouring of poverty and wealth and another  
to a great distance between them – can both represent the 
city? If so, how well? 
Undoubtedly, São Paulo has always been a city marked 
by sharp social inequalities. However, in the last few decades, 
the multiple meanings of inequality, the quality of urban 
space, and the distribution of social groups across the city 
have changed considerably. The peripheries have improved 
and some of the physical inequalities between spaces have 
been reduced as the peripheries have improved. Yet the city 
that no longer believes in progress – as it did during the 
second half of the twentieth century and where violence 
and fear came to occupy the central stage in citizen’s lives 
– is now a city in which the markers setting social worlds 
apart are carefully and emphatically drawn. It is also a city 
in which the public space abandoned by most is reinvented 
as space of contestation inscribed on its walls. 
São Paulo is a complex city that will not be captured  
by simplistic dual models: neither of the proximity nor of  
the distance of its opposed social groups. Together, both 
pictures represent the city. In isolation, neither can capture 
the pattern of spatial and social inequality that structures  
the metropolis today. These images are the result of two 
historical processes that have now coalesced and their 
material expressions are superimposed in the spaces of the 
city. The view of the rich centre versus the poor periphery 
corresponds with the pattern of urbanisation consolidated 
around the 1940s that dominated the city up to the 1980s. 
During this period, São Paulo’s urbanised area expanded 
dramatically due to the spread of auto-construction. 
Workers moved to the city by the millions and settled in 
non-urbanised areas on the outskirts. They bought cheap 
lots of land in areas without infrastructure and spent 
decades of savings and family work to build and improve 
their dream houses. In São Paulo, as elsewhere in Brazil and 
in the developing world, workers have always understood 
that illegality and precariousness are the conditions under 
which they become property owners and inhabit the 
modern city. The middle and upper classes remained in  
the centre and benefited from good infrastructure and 
services, and regularised and subsidised access to land. 
Thus, metropolitan regions have been marked by a dichotomy 
between the ‘legal city’, the centre inhabited by the upper 
classes, and the precarious peripheries.
However, since the 1970s this neat separation started to 
be transformed by processes affecting both the centre and 
the periphery. One of the main sources was the organisation of 
social movements by residents of the peripheries. These urban 
activists, a majority of them women, were new property 
owners who realised that political organisation was the only 
way to force city authorities to extend urban infrastructure and 
services to their neighbourhoods. These social movements 
contributed significantly to the democratisation process 
and a new concept of citizenship. They also provoked a 
significant transformation in the urban environment of the 
peripheries. The state administrators responded to their 
demands and the city of São Paulo, among many others in 
Brazil, borrowed heavily to invest in urban infrastructure. 
As a consequence, the peripheries substantially improved 
road access, as well as sewage, sanitation, and electricity. 
These improvements sharply reduced infant mortality rates. 
As a result many neighbourhoods in the peripheries that 
began as ‘bush’ just a few decades ago have been completely 
urbanised. Although the urban social movements started to 
diminish in the 1990s, São Paulo remains highly organised. 
NGOs and associations of all forms, from religious to artistic 
– not to mention criminal – are everywhere. These 
heterogeneous associations signify the consolidation of 
democracy and the civic engagement of citizens. 
A second process that transformed the centre-periphery 
pattern started in the centre. Beginning in the 1970s, wealth 
steadily moved away. On the one hand, a new business pole  
was formed in the south-western zone of the city along the 
Pinheiros River which today concentrates high-end office 
complexes, shopping malls, media headquarters, hotels, and 
new cultural centres. On the other, some of the middle and 
upper classes began to retreat from the centre and its public 
space. Fear of violent crime – which grew from the mid-
1980s to the late 1990s – was their main justification for 
migration by the hundreds of thousands. They built 
fortified enclaves for home, leisure, and work in areas where 
only the poor had lived before and from where they were 
not entirely expelled, as in the case of Paraisópolis. Thus, 
the dramatic proximity of wealth and poverty is a recent 
phenomenon caused by the voluntary displacement of  
the upper classes. 
Although the image of the favela side-by-side with 
luxury apartments outside of the centre captures a recent 
configuration of social inequality in São Paulo, it misses 
important factors. Favelas are not the type of housing in 
which the majority of São Paulo’s poor live, and the 
heterogeneous peripheries cannot be described by the term 
favela. What distinguishes them is home ownership. Although 
there are many conditions of illegality and irregularity, the 
majority have bought the land on which they built their 
houses and have claims to ownership. Favela residents also 
own their homes, but not the land, which has typically been 
invaded. Moreover, the increase in homeownership in the 
municipality of São Paulo from 19 per cent in 1920 to 69 per 
cent in 2000 is due to high rates in the peripheries rather 
than in the central wealthy districts. In many of the poorest 
neighbourhoods, it is more than 80 per cent. Approximately 
10 per cent of São Paulo’s population lives in favelas, while 
Rio de Janeiro and a few other Brazilian cities have an 
exceptionally high percentage of favela residents. Yet, if the 
view of the centre distant from the periphery misses the 
new developments that have brought people from radically 
different social conditions to live side by side, the picture 
that features this proximity misses the complexity of the 
peripheries and their significant improvement. 
Increased violent crime and fear have also provoked 
dramatic changes in the space and quality of everyday life 
across the city since the mid-1980s. The circulation of fear 
and discourses about violence have created the idiom under 
which polarised representations proliferate and dualistic 
and simplistic representations of inequality and are framed.
Violent crime increased substantially from the mid-1980s  
to the late 1990s. With an overall annual murder rate of more 
than 60 per 100,000 people in the late 1990s, São Paulo 
became one of the most violent cities in the world. However, 
violence is distributed unevenly. Many of the neighbourhoods 
in the peripheries had a murder rate of more than 110 per 
100,000 people, compared to less than fifteen in the city’s 
central districts. The main victims of murder are young 
men, especially black. Moreover, most of the outrageously 
high number of cases of police abuse and killings happen in 
the peripheries. In the 2000s, violent crime rates decreased 
from 57.3 per 100,000 people in 2000 to 12.1 in 2007, which 
includes decreases in the peripheries. But it is not yet clear 
WORLDS SET APART
Extremes of wealth and poverty in São Paulo, as is often cited by this image of the Paraisópolis favela sitting cheek-by-jowl to gated complexes of wealthy Morumbi, 
only partially capture the city’s deep inequality.
Together, both the picture of proximity  
of wealth and poverty, and that of their 
distance, represent the city.
Teresa Caldeira defines the inequalities, fear, and transgressions which determine 
the social and spatial configurations of urban life in São Paulo.
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what this change will generate in terms of representation as 
the city still seems to operate under the stereotypical mode 
of the talk of crime. 
Conversations about crime have been common since  
the 1980s. Amid the chaotic feelings associated with the 
spread of random violence people talk. Contrary to the 
experience of crime, which disrupts meaning and disorders 
the world, the talk of crime symbolically reorders it by 
trying to re-establish a static picture of the world which is 
expressed in simplistic terms and clear-cut oppositional 
categories, the most important of which are good and evil. 
Such reductions and caricatures are central mechanisms 
associated with the talk of crime. Like other everyday 
practices dealing with violence, crime stories try to recreate 
a stable map for a world that has been shaken. These 
narratives impose partitions, build up walls, establish 
distances, segregate, impose prohibitions, and restrict 
movements. In short, they simplify and enclose the world, 
elaborating prejudices and eliminating ambiguities.
Fear and the talk of crime also organise the urban 
landscape and public space, generating new forms of spatial 
segregation and social discrimination. Their most emblematic 
form is the fortified enclave. These are privatised, enclosed,  
and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure,  
and work structured by the discourse of security. They  
can be shopping malls, office complexes, residential gated 
communities, and edge cities. They depend on private 
guards and high-tech security for protection and for 
enforcing exclusionary practices that guarantee their social 
exclusivity. They reproduce inequality both as a value and 
as a social fact. They treat what is enclosed and private as  
a form of distinction. As this logic becomes dominant,  
it spreads throughout the city. Walls are now everywhere, 
even in the most remote areas of the peripheries, not only  
to protect from crime, but also to distinguish neighbours 
from each other and express claims of social belonging.
It is in this context of simplifications and stereotypical 
interpretations anchored in the fear of crime that the 
heterogeneous peripheries of São Paulo started to be called 
favelas, a process that obscures their significant urban and 
social improvements. The tendency to homogenise the 
conditions and spaces of poverty and to identify them with 
their worst configurations is now widespread. It is found in 
several recent Brazilian films that make poverty and favela, 
blackness and violent crime coincide. The iconic example  
is City of God. It is also the procedure Mike Davis uses in 
Planet of Slums to reduce the most diverse urban housing 
conditions of the poor worldwide to a single symbol of  
the worst: the slum.
This tendency is also reproduced by residents of the 
periphery themselves. In important ways, São Paulo’s rap 
music elaborates a dichotomy between there and here and 
the denunciation of the inequality that exists between them. 
Rap articulates the experience of young men in contemporary 
peripheries growing up in a context of high violence and 
few chances for inclusion in the formal markets. Hip-hop 
wants to save their lives and contain violence. By portraying 
the conditions of the poor in the peripheries, and critically 
incorporating the prejudices usually voiced against their 
young and black residents, rappers articulate a powerful 
social critique. They denounce racism, express an explicit 
class antagonism, and create a style of confrontation that 
leaves very little space for tolerance and negotiation. Their 
raps establish a non-bridgeable and non-negotiable distance 
between rich and poor, white and black, the centre and the 
periphery, and articulate a position of enclosure. They think 
of the periphery as a world apart, something similar to the 
American ghetto, an imaginary that has never been used 
before in Brazil in relation to the peripheries, whose residents 
have always considered themselves unprivileged but 
nevertheless an integral part of the whole city. As one of the 
most famous rap groups, the Racionais MC’s, put it in the 
rap ‘Da Ponte pra cá’ (‘On this side of the bridge’): 
in the party with us you don’t go
We here, you there; each one in his place
Did you get it?
If life is like this, am I to blame?
The world is different on this side of the bridge.
As hip-hop followers reflect on the conditions of life  
on the outskirts of the city, they transform the quite diverse 
peripheries into a symbol: a periferia. As this new symbol, 
the periphery is homogenised to represent the worst social 
inequalities and violence. This transformed space of despair 
contrasts sharply with the image of improvement and mobility 
that dominated its representation from the 1940s to the 1990s. 
It is also sometimes called favela, not to describe the peripheries 
but to refer to its poor conditions which are re-signified to 
represent and denounce poverty in general. 
The construction of clear and non-negotiable social 
separations, the circulation of imaginairies despair, the 
construction of left-over spaces, and the use of stereotypical 
symbols to represent opposed social worlds is nowadays 
found on both sides of Brazilian society. Rappers’ construction 
of self-enclosure is paralleled by upper-class practices of 
enclosure. Dichotomisation, simplification, and intolerance 
structure the imaginaries on both sides. 
Fear, the talk of crime, and the adoption of walls and 
separations all transform the character of public space. 
Privatisation, enclosures, policing of boundaries and 
distancing devices create a fragmented public space in 
which inequality is an organising value. Even so, this left-over 
public space has not remained empty or unmarked. In São 
Paulo, in addition to walls and fences, graffiti and pixações 
proliferate on almost every street. These public inscriptions 
are usurpations that recreate a public domain in a city 
privatised by walls. Graffiti and pixação reclaim the streets, 
the façades, and the walls as spaces of communication and 
contestation instead of separation. Most graffiti artists and 
pixadores are young men from the peripheries. Through 
their inscriptions, they transgress, ignore boundaries, and 
appropriate spaces to mark their discrimination. Obviously, 
many interpret these appropriations as vandalism, crime, 
and proof of the deterioration of the public space. 
Although both graffiti and pixação have similar roots, 
they constitute different types of intervention in public 
space. Graffiti is represented frequently on large public 
surfaces such as viaducts and tunnels. It is accepted as a 
type of public art authorised by the city, and occasionally 
sponsored by private institutions. Several graffiti artists 
from São Paulo are known internationally, and a few sell 
their art in private galleries for high prices. 
But if graffiti can be assimilated into the imaginary  
of art and beauty, pixação has remained much more 
transgressive. Pixação is equivalent to the American 
tagging, the writing of words, especially names, in public 
spaces. It is conceived by its practitioners as an anarchic 
intervention and as a radical urban sport, an urban 
alpinism. Pixadores inscribe the most impossible of spaces 
and are never sponsored by City Hall. Instead, they are 
targets of police harassment and the general population’s 
disdain, who think that they deteriorate and deface, not 
improve, public space. For pixadores, though, their 
intervention signals the character of a public with few other 
forms of belonging. With pixação and graffiti, those who 
have been kept outside of the dominant cultural systems 
master writing and painting in the same way that rappers 
master rhyming. They invent new styles, spreading signs  
of their transgressions and powerfully transforming the 
character of public space. 
Together, walls, fences, fortified enclaves, raps, graffiti, 
and pixações configure public space with unmistakable 
signs of social inequality and social tension. When the city  
was growing and violence was not an issue, the imagination 
that dominated the city was one of social mobility, 
improvement, expansion, and incorporation. Distances 
embodied spatially and socially were relatively unmarked 
symbolically. They had to remain fluid to anchor the  
strong belief in social mobility. Nowadays, inequalities  
and differences are prominently produced and are rarely 
left unmarked. Exaggerated and simplified, they mask 
processes of transformation and of improvement, and 
inevitably amplify the tension among social groups. 
Inequality has become naturalised, the taken-for-granted 
part of everyday life, the matter of social communication, 
even while it is denounced by unexpected interventions. 
Therefore, it is the tense and multi-layered production and 
contestation of inequality that we should look at to capture 
both the city’s predicament and its vitality.
Teresa Caldeira is a professor of city and regional planning  
at the University of California, Berkeley, and author of ‘City 
of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo’.
Graffiti such as that on Rua Cardeal Arcoverde defines the streetscape experience of Vila Madalena, São Paulo.
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Violence and therefore safety – as themes and elements of 
social configuration – play a major role in the construction 
and characterisation of Brazil’s major urban centres. Since 
the 1980s, marked increases in urban crime alongside the 
emergence of democratic openness and urbanisation have 
transformed Brazil’s cities. The proliferation of robberies, 
thefts, kidnappings and violent deaths has promoted 
criminality and a consolidation of fear and insecurity as 
commonplace characteristics of urban life. Murder rates  
in the country’s capitals have grown significantly, especially 
among adolescents between 15 and 24 years old. While  
the average rates for the entire population remained stable 
between 1980 and 2002, ranging from 21.3 to 21.7 for every 
100,000 inhabitants, those among young people skyrocketed 
from 30 to 54.5. In São Paulo, violence today conjures two 
opposing trends: while in the 1980s and 1990s a systematic 
increase in murder rates scared the city (in 1999 the rate 
was 43.2), both the state and the Metropolitan Region 
benefited from a significant reduction over the last six 
years, so that by 2005 the murder rate had already  
dropped to 22.
São Paulo, with a rate now lower than the national 
average and that of Recife, Vitoria or Rio de Janeiro, presents 
itself as a genuine exception. For although violence remains  
a constituent part of the city’s configuration, especially  
with regards to its recent history, the city has nonetheless 
established new patterns of sociability that allow for a 
renewed understanding of the city and its public and 
private spaces. This understanding and subsequent use 
patterns influence the city’s spatial and architectural 
configuration as well as the opposition between centre  
and periphery. At the same time, the reduction of murders 
entails a reflection on the strategies involved in the process 
of confronting a violent sociability and also signifies 
broader trends related to concepts of violence and safety.
Despite the constant reduction in murder rates, neither 
academics nor policy makers have been able to form  
a consensus about its causes. The reduction has been 
attributed to an extensive and varied set of factors: state 
interventions such as the improvement of management 
policies (for example the creation of INFOCRIM, an 
electronic database that facilitates communication between 
the city’s various police districts to produce an overall 
mapping of crime statistics) and increased investigative 
police activity; the work of non-governmental organisations 
and community engagement in the most violent areas; 
policies such as the ‘dry law’ in some municipalities; reduced 
availability of firearms; demographic changes in the state and 
other parts of the country over recent years; and even the 
rise of Evangelism in the suburbs.
The justifications alternate depending on who constructs 
the explanatory narrative, with each proposed cause subject  
to ongoing research and controversy regarding its relevance 
and effectiveness. Even so, besides the multiple causes of 
violence, an important battle in the political and institutional 
arena is taking place over the factors creating the supposed 
increase in safety and the different ways of confronting it. 
Which is the best strategy: prevention or suppression? Must 
safety be a subject that is primarily the responsibility of the 
police, or does it deserve the attention of other areas of 
public policies such as urbanism, health or education? If we 
add safety and violence to the top metropolitan problems – 
contrary to transport, flooding and pollution, the city’s other 
major challenges – solutions are typically not addressed 
through urban interventions. In the face of violence and 
insecurity, typically resources emanate from the criminal 
justice system, the police force, or other repression apparatuses. 
This equation shows a failure: originally, safety is a problem 
of the city, but not for the city. The metropolis assumes a 
secondary role in formulating policies for the prevention 
and confrontation of violence, as it is unable to actively 
participate in changes that promote safe spaces for living 
and social interaction.
However, an analysis of São Paulo shows how a district, 
as a place of transformation as well as physical and social 
interaction, plays a key role in these processes. Mapping  
the types of safe spaces in different neighbourhoods can 
reveal the unequal distribution of violence in the city. The 
concentration of murders, along with other violent crimes 
against life, in the suburbs demonstrates how São Paulo 
practises an uneven risks economy. Territorial analysis also 
allows a deeper understanding of how the city deals with 
the issue of safety: which are the strategies of each district 
or region? What are the consequences of each option or 
arrangement? What is their potential for universal application? 
And finally, what is the impact on the city’s sociability  
and the life of its inhabitants?
Mapping the heterogeneity of social expressions in an 
apparently homogenous area in socio-demographical terms 
allows the differentiation of forms which define the ‘periphery’. 
Research developed by the Centre for Metropolitan Studies 
(CEM) of four areas in São Paulo – Jardim Paulista in the 
centre, Cidade Tiradentes in the East, Jardim Ângela in the 
South and Vila Nova Cachoerinha/Brasilândia in the North – 
has revealed various conditions of poverty within the same 
area. To distinguish between them, the studies considered 
social group characteristics, combining variables associated 
with income, education, unemployment, access to urban 
infrastructure and race or ethnicity. From these isolated 
indicators, it was possible to make a detailed description of 
the distribution of such social groups and their living conditions. 
As the distribution of violence and safety influences 
patterns of sociability, and affects each district differently, 
the answers revealed phenomena that also take into account 
the particular characteristics of each area. Thus combining 
social and demographic characteristics such as income, 
skin colour and education with symbolic and material 
resources such as public services, community engagement 
SAFE SPACES IN SÃO PAULO
Tiradentes Bus Terminal
Crime in Jardim Ângela, once declared by the United Nations as the homicide capital of the world, is today substantially reduced thanks to community and  
state interventions.
A detailed study by Paula Miraglia traces the complex relationships between 
crime, spatial segregation and quality of life in the centre and the periphery. 
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levels, informal arrangements or the very history of the 
neighbourhood, each community creates its ‘repertory of 
safety’ to be assessed against certain violence scenarios. 
Crime distribution in São Paulo is a good starting point to 
examine this diversity. If, on the one hand, the association 
between poverty and crime is discarded, the coincidence of 
lower income, higher concentration of slums, greater presence 
of black and brown people, low education levels and the 
concentration of murders on the other hand cannot be 
ignored. Other than emphasising the unequal distribution 
of violence, such a scenario offers a macro-analysis which – 
alongside other elements – helps to trace a portrait of the 
periphery and ultimately forms a major contribution to 
understanding the relationship that is established between 
the periphery and its residents and the centre. Certainly the 
occupation and distribution of groups in the city also results 
from state interventions (or the lack of them), therefore these 
social indicators are essential to limit periphery areas. But the 
relational character of the centre/periphery opposition,  
and its attendant spatial understanding, implies a certain 
perspective that must also recognise the diverse political 
and cultural context of what peripheral signifies. 
The victimisation of neighbourhoods alone is not 
enough. Firstly, because not all districts with high rates of 
vulnerability in São Paulo have high murder rates. Secondly, 
even in those districts where we find a combination of 
vulnerability and violence there is a wide range of strategies. 
We are much more interested in exploring the differences that 
such scenarios may produce and in identifying cycles in 
which violence and safety are at the same time producers 
and products of a particular type of social interaction. 
Selecting two opposing poles in the Metropolitan Region 
provides information that can help build a repertory of 
safety in the city. Doing so reflects on how these strategies 
combine the categories of ‘space’ and ‘sociability’ and how 
this interaction and diversity are building the city.
Located just three kilometres from the centre of the city, 
the neighbourhood of Jardim Paulista (Jardins) corresponds 
to the city’s urban development pattern and constitutes  
a wealthy neighbourhood in the city’s South-East area. 
Jardins is considered very safe, with a mix of residential  
and commercial spaces that bring together a wide range  
of shops characterising the city’s luxury retail market.  
The clientele combines local residents with visitors who 
enjoy the leisure activities and shopping offered by  
the district. Recent changes increased the area’s safety, 
although they were intended to improve something that 
already existed, such as the widening of pavements or 
enhanced lighting. These interventions were not substantive; 
on the contrary, the objectives promoted consolidation and 
stability associated with a sense of peace and safety. An  
idea of completeness is added to this perception. From the 
perspective of the residents, the fact that shopping, leisure 
and social activities can all be carried out with relative 
proximity is experienced as something positive. ‘I don’t 
need to leave the neighbourhood’, is often heard. Strategies 
to protect shops and residential buildings include mixing 
private security guards or signs indicating that the space  
is being watched with more hidden features such as 
surveillance cameras. Even large shop windows generate 
selective action, and together these interventions both 
appeal to, and inhibit, passers-by.
One of the most recurring elements when talking about 
fear or the feeling of insecurity is – not incidentally – based 
on the presence of someone else, usually a non-resident or  
a worker from the region. But these ‘others’ are not random: 
street sales people, beggars and the homeless populate the 
category of those that are ‘displaced’ and are all blamed by 
local residents as potential threats to peace and safety in  
the neighbourhood. The CAPE (Centre for Permanent 
Assistance) of the Secretary of Social Assistance offers a 
service that is advertised on the residents’ association website, 
which receives ‘complaints’ about homeless people that are near 
or in front of their homes, and they ’intervene’. In this quick 
description, the various attempts to homogenise the area 
reduce diversity using strategies of avoidance of non-equals, 
and promote urban interventions that ensure a single 
standard of sociability.
On the other side of the metropolis, more than  
31 kilometres from the centre, the Cidade Tiradentes 
district and housing complex – the largest in Latin America – 
occupies a peripheral location in the city’s far East. The area, 
previously a farm called Santa Etelvina, was acquired by 
Cohab, the metropolitan housing authority, at the end of the 
1970s, to be incorporated into the urban network as 
low-value lots. Built from the 1980s onwards, the large scale 
of this housing complex eventually produced a uniformity 
to the landscape which became a defining feature of Cidade 
Tiradentes. For two decades the neighbourhood had a 
reputation as one of the worst places to live in São Paulo. 
The main problems highlighted by residents were the  
long distance from the centre, violence, limited public 
investment in basic urban infrastructure and almost no 
shops. Added to this was the fact that, until recently, the 
region lived under territorial dispute between criminal 
organisations, further evidence of its high murder rate. In 
recent years, however, a series of profound transformations 
such as the construction of the Tiradentes Bus Terminal 
have transformed the area. The terminal has significantly 
improved access to other regions of the city, thus reducing 
the distance and sense of isolation, while ensuring greater 
movement of residents to other sectors of the neighbourhood.
Over time the structure of the housing complex has 
changed. The first- and second-generation buildings were 
subjected to interventions proposed by the residents. The 
construction of walls, sentry boxes (though permanently 
disabled) and the addition of security bars accompanied 
attempts to enhance the buildings aesthetically. These 
interventions went beyond the mere improvement of safety 
standards and defined a process of ‘consolidation’ of the 
property that incorporated new standards and references. 
As a result, more recent buildings were constructed with 
active sentry boxes and electronic gates already in place.
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At the same time the neighbourhood became dominated by 
a single criminal faction: the First Command of the Capital 
(PCC). Its exclusivity marked the end of territorial disputes 
in the area, causing a reduction of murders in the immediate 
vicinity. With the arrival of the police and expansion of the 
district police squad, crime today occupies an area called 
‘Fundão’ with a clear territorial demarcation of the 
activities showing that they have therefore lost a central 
position in the life of the neighbourhood. The arrival of 
shops and more diversified public and private services in 
the area have completed its transformation. Major chain-
stores and supermarkets now serve the residents and are 
seen as important achievements by neighbourhood 
residents. In this sequence of progressive acquisitions,  
a bank is one of the last elements still missing.
Thus, even if the area is not totally homogenous,  
with some pockets benefiting more than others from such 
changes, the image of a violent neighbourhood is changing 
into that of one with potential for economic and social 
development. This process was able to transform the 
residents’ sense of belonging and has changed perceptions 
among residents about how to access their city. 
The presence of public power, exemplified by the 
increase of police action and by the bus terminal, as well  
as the multiplication of services offered were responsible  
for the diversification of the landscape and its social fabric, 
which nowadays is more pluralistic and varied. Therefore,  
it can be argued that Cidade Tiradentes has made use of  
a social diversification strategy. The heterogeneity of the 
neighbourhood has become a factor of resilience. The 
permanence of the PCC indicates that it is not impossible  
to live with violence or crime; the continued proliferation  
of slums emphasises that the region is still extremely 
socially and economically vulnerable. But these changes 
show that the district was able to lift itself beyond a  
position of victimisation. 
Despite the ethnographic wealth of both examples, we 
are not interested in caricatures to illustrate the differences 
between rich and poor neighbourhoods. Instead, the issues 
and problems that actually are in permanent dialogue with the 
wider structures of urban interaction that merit attention. 
Many of the elements mentioned in both cases have been 
repeated, with appropriate contextual adaptations, and offer 
themselves as genuine choices for the city and its residents. 
Together with other tools of segregation, they form a 
fragmented city in which the channels of communication 
between centre and periphery are constantly weakened. Using 
a so-called ‘repertoire of safety’ may become a permanent 
mechanism to promote the actualisation of inequalities. 
Taking the difference between homogeneity and 
heterogeneity in Cidade Tiradentes as an example, the  
void resulting from the lack of public and private services, 
together with an endlessly repeated anonymous architectural 
pattern, created residents’ resignation about the region’s 
vulnerability. Therefore the strengthening and enhancement  
of the complexity of the social fabric are associated with 
changes that, in this case, produce movement and circulation: 
elements that can provide physical, symbolic and social 
interaction between groups from within the district and 
from the rest of the city.
In the case of Jardins, however, the transformation takes 
the form of permanence and repetition. The maintenance of 
certain urbanisation patterns ultimately perpetuates the 
homogeneity of the area, either in terms of space, or with 
regards to visitors’ profile and characteristics. It has 
established itself as a well-maintained progressive area. 
Jardins reinforces a sense of community that is generated 
by an organic enclosure of the neighbourhood. There is 
nothing new about using separation strategies inspired by 
protection: the high walls of closed apartment blocks, the 
gates and the guards make it easy to identify this set of 
mechanisms. But when it comes to open spaces, involving 
streets and pavements, segregation tools go beyond physical 
aspects. From this perspective, imitating the fluidity and 
the ample capacity of the circulation of violence, safety 
appears to be a continuum, that, like violence, is supported 
by urbanisation resources that are merged with segregated 
sociability strategies. This projects the distinct separation  
of a determined area without building intentional explicit 
physical limits.
The comparison between these two strategies to reduce 
crime and violence raises questions about the effectiveness 
of solutions. Although a reduction of murders is evident 
throughout the city, the question persists whether the 
peripheries will some day be less violent than the centre.  
The applied strategies are not able, or do not contemplate  
a reversal of the patterns of victimisation. Even if reduced,  
most violent deaths are concentrated in the periphery. The 
continuing victimisation and levels of violence, as well as  
the strategies of segregation, are obstacles in the subversion of 
the relation between centre and periphery which occur today. 
Spaces are able to determine patterns of sociability, but 
coexistence and interaction are also powerful elements in 
the configuration of community. If we assume that safety 
and its distribution shape the city, the opposition between 
‘strategies of protection’ and ‘safety development’ seems to 
summarise the available options and translate the implications 
of each model. The first, more reactive strategy, mobilises an 
individual dimension of avoidance, while the second, 
propositional, emphasises the collective dimension of 
interaction between individuals and groups. The contrast 
suggests the limits of partial solutions to the problem. This 
is evident not only in the tension between the models of 
safe spaces in a safe city, but also through the way they 
announce a struggle for the city itself. In other words, the 
creation of safe spaces is not complemented by the perception 
of a safe city. Such models are exclusionary, and show that 
either the entire city is safe or no one is.
Cidade Tiradentes, the largest social housing development built by state and city authorities in the far eastern periphery of São Paulo, is defined by hundreds of identical residential buildings and poor social infrastructure.  
Residents spend between two and three hours commuting each way for work. 
Paula Miraglia holds a PhD in social anthropology from the 
University of São Paulo and is the Director of the Brazilian 
office of the United Nations Latin American Institute for  
the Prevention of Crime.
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When it comes to the realisation of major urban interventions, 
São Paulo is lagging behind other world cities. Buenos Aires, 
our closest neighbour, has with Puerto Madero succeeded in 
creating a high-end development on brownfield industrial  
land, which attracts business and visitors, despite its lack of 
integration within the city.  
But who wins and who loses in these projects? How are 
these projects delivered? What institutional arrangements 
impact on design quality and the creation of sustainable 
environments? How many jobs are created? And for whom? 
These are the questions that São Paulo’s political, design and 
development communities need to address to formulate a  
new urban policy and to deliver a strategy to implement high 
quality urban design that works with the grain of the city.
Many of the international success stories in the regeneration 
of large-scale sites – such as redundant ports, railway, 
manufacturing and transport areas – suggest that considerable 
levels of public investment and management are necessary to 
make them work. In Brazil the private sector has historically 
taken the lead due to the lack of public funding or involvement 
in urban regeneration. Yet, a long-term perspective is a 
prerequisite of sustainable planning as opposed to the short-
term returns on investment required by any commercial 
operator. In Washington DC, for example, the Corporation 
for the Development of Pennsylvania Avenue developed a 
25-year vision for the regeneration of the area. The establishment 
of a delivery vehicle – an administrative structure with strong 
public as well as private sector representation – that manages 
and implements the project from inception to realisation is 
critical to its success in promoting economic development  
and generating new activities.
The compact city model, with its reduced energy 
footprint that promotes intensification of well-connected 
inner city sites, has become the central objective of many 
European cities. Urban containment, smart growth and 
sustainable development within a defined urban footprint  
are central components of this new urban vision that not only 
drives the identification of individual sites – often highly 
contaminated areas near the centre – but also shapes policies 
that promote sustainable living such as the introduction of the 
Congestion Charge in London or the Velib public bicycle in 
Paris. This approach has driven the development of a new 
urban hub at Paris Rive Gauche on the Eastern edge of the city 
– coordinated by SEMAPA (Société d'Economie Mixte de 
Paris) – which has attracted 60,000 jobs, counterbalancing 
Paris’s better-known financial centre at La Defense in the West. 
Paris has developed its urban interventions within a clear 
regional and metropolitan perspective of economic 
restructuring that prioritises the international service sector, 
while London has focused some of its spatial policies on the 
creative industries through the actions of the Mayor’s London 
Development Agency. Bilbão, instead, developed plans at 
various regional and metropolitan scales before empowering 
the RIA2000 agency with the strategic implementation of the 
plan that gave rise to Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum, 
Norman Foster’s metro stations and Santiago Calatrava’s 
bridge. These interventions were instrumental elements of a 
successful marketing strategy that has promoted the city as 
tourist destination, placing it in competition with world capitals. 
The wide-scale adoption of neo-liberal ideologies and their 
impacts on social exclusion has led to what Neil Smith has 
identified as the new ‘global strategy for gentrification’. In  
Paris traditional, old-style policies – enshrined in the ZAC 
(Zones d'Amenagement Concertés) – still constitute the legal 
starting point for urban and social housing projects, as they  
do across the whole of France. Exceptions to this rule are the 
implementation structures applied to the redevelopment of 
Paris Rive Gauche, Parc Citroën, Bercy and the former Renault 
car-works area. In the case of Paris Rive Gauche, a direct 
confrontation with the local community resulted in the 
provision of an appropriate number of affordable housing units 
and the incorporation of an old industrial mill as the seat of 
this industrial mobilisation.
The evidence from these projects points to the development 
of new management tools and the involvement of a wider range 
of social agents to better define successful urban regeneration. 
A key element is public transport, a critical component of 
sustainable urban development. Canary Wharf, the massive 
office and commercial complex in London’s East, only took off 
after the Jubilee Line extension connected it to the city’s main 
metro network. The success of the Kings Cross development 
and the London 2012 Olympics site in the Lower Lea Valley  
are also highly dependent on their location next to major 
rail-based transport hubs that will create higher density clusters 
of a polycentric nature. In Milan, the viable redevelopment of 
ex-industrial sites at La Bovisa and La Biccoca into major office 
and residential neighbourhoods were predicated on their 
proximity to the city’s extensive public transport network. 
By analysing international case studies, it becomes clear 
that the state has played a key role in their implementation, 
despite the high level of private sector investment. Even in the 
United States there is evidence of substantial public investment 
– at federal, state and city level – to implement infrastructure, 
transport, public spaces and cultural institutions in major 
urban projects. Another lesson is that solutions to urban 
problems depend on the involvement of local actors, civil 
society and the active participation of government at many 
levels. On balance it can be observed that highly centralised 
traditional planning tools which regulate land use and urban 
development – as they are currently implemented in Brazil – 
have become obsolete. 
São Paulo’s strategic plan – the Plano Director Estrategico 
– is a case in point. The PDE 2000 determined that 20 per cent 
of its built-up area should become sites for Operações Urbanas 
(urban interventions). To date these have been the subject  
of repeated criticism with piecemeal results which lack a 
comprehensive vision of urban design. There is no vision for a 
sustainable urban model with clear environmental objectives, 
nor has there been any public debate about public space and 
rebalancing the role of public transport and the private car in 
the city’s future 
The crisis of contemporary Brazilian urbanism reflects the 
weakness of the system of large-scale ‘strategic masterplans’, 
which wrongly assume that all urban problems can be solved 
by one single instrument. The successful strategy for city-level 
‘urban interventions’ must be considered as an instrument  
of structural transformation, built on a partnership between 
the public and private sectors. It is a process that requires  
the participation of landowners, investors, residents and 
representatives of civil society which identifies particular urban 
areas for transformation as part of a wider metropolitan 
strategy. To be implemented successfully, such a strategy 
requires a series of medium and long-term measures, including 
land tenure reform, evaluation of real estate potential,  
strict land use regulations and public space interventions.
The São Paulo experience has since the 1990s failed to 
deliver an effective and democratic urban vision for the city. 
The major reason for this failure is the absence of a proper 
management and implementation vehicle that takes into 
account the full social and economic costs and benefits of 
projects of this scale and complexity. Any intervention of this 
sort must embrace the various actors and agents involved in the 
production of city space, constructing a communal fabric that 
values the individual citizen. Yet, this approach assumes public 
engagement to achieve a shared objective. Demolition of entire 
pieces of city and their replacement by ‘model’ projects will do 
little to improve the lives of existing urban dwellers, and will 
simply cause displacement and erosion of its existing social  
and urban fabric. 
Given the extreme levels of social inequality found in  
most Brazilian cities we would argue that a more subtle and 
sophisticated approach to urban regeneration is necessary: one 
that is based on a collective effort and broad participation, and 
that aims to promote local development and social inclusion. 
To this end we would suggest that São Paulo adopts a new 
system for the implementation of its urban interventions 
founded on the following principles: require a clear political 
commitment to implementation, innovation and inclusion 
through a metropolitan masterplan that integrates the 
development potential of urban sites with public transport 
provision; establish a legal framework that promotes social 
inclusion and public participation (by creating a Participatory 
Management Forum for individual urban projects); establish 
an independent local development agency to implement 
specific urban projects, that includes all key stakeholders 
and is responsible for project management and delivery, 
inward investment, funding and project financing;  
develop an integrated mobility plan that optimises public 
transport use incorporating metro, bus, bicycle and pedestrian 
movements and minimises private car dependency; establish 
a metropolitan-wide development fund that can capture  
value of future return on investments; promote a sustainable 
environmental approach that integrates the remediation of 
water and river systems with redevelopment of brownfield 
land; propose mixed-use centres that provide housing and 
employment and support the ‘new economy’; and identify 
special conservation areas across the city that take into account 
the historic value and architectural merit of buildings  
and spaces.
IMPLEMENTING URBAN CHANGE
Nadia Somekh is the Dean of the Faculty of Architecture and 
Urbanism at the Mackenzie Presbyterian University. Carlos Leite 
is an architect with a PhD in sustainable urban development and 
is a professor at Mackenzie Presbyterian University.
By comparing São Paulo’s realities with international examples of urban regeneration, 
Nadia Somekh and Carlos Leite explore the constraints and opportunities to 
deliver high quality design in the city’s major urban projects.
Vila Maria -Carandiru
Rio Verde Jacú
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Vila Leopoldina -Jaguare
Diagonal Sul
Diagonal Norte
Cerso Garcia
Proposed projects
Rail
Existing projects Built-up area
São Paulo 
Sites identified by the city authorities for urban regeneration, Operações 
Urbanas (urban interventions), include areas often – but not always – adjacent 
to existing transport infrastructure.
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